Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2013

Interactional Analysis of Emergent Risks in
Institutionally Diverse Construction Projects
Nader Naderpajouh
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Civil Engineering Commons
Recommended Citation
Naderpajouh, Nader, "Interactional Analysis of Emergent Risks in Institutionally Diverse Construction Projects" (2013). Open Access
Dissertations. 5.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/5

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Graduate School ETD Form 9
(Revised 12/07)

PURDUE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Thesis/Dissertation Acceptance
This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared
By Nader Naderpajouh
Entitled
Interactional Analysis of Emergent Risks in Institutionally Diverse Construction Projects

For the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Is approved by the final examining committee:
Makarand Hastak
Chair

Dulcy M. Abraham

Joseph V. Sinfield

Daniel P. Aldrich

To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Research Integrity and
Copyright Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 20), this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of
Purdue University’s “Policy on Integrity in Research” and the use of copyrighted material.

Makarand Hastak
Approved by Major Professor(s): ____________________________________

____________________________________
Approved by: Michael E. Kreger
Head of the Graduate Program

11/27/2013
Date

INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGENT RISKS IN INSTITUTIONALLY
DIVERSE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Purdue University
by
Nader Naderpajouh

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

December 2013
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana

ii

For being together,
in memory, and in essence,
I dedicate this work to my mom, Neda, and Negar,
for their presence, and to my dad, his reminiscences.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The path to this moment was not a typical path, and so is this acknowledgement.
I wish I could start this section with the real acknowledgement of the man whose
last word to me was to express his “best wishes and unremitting support”, the
one exceptionally avant-garde whose vision I yet to assimilate: my father. At the
moment I sadly have to conform to the literal act of recalling him, his vast impact
on my ideas, and his momentous power to my existence. With enormous delight,
however, I acknowledge my mother, the actual author of all my academic works.
Undeniably, with her boundless zest and unremitting sacrifices she has changed
the course of a life of a person, that otherwise might have been best described
by this poetry of Gwendolyn Brooks: “We real cool. We – Left school. We – Lurk
late. We – Sing sin. We – Thin Gin. We – Jazz June. We – Die soon.”
I would like to express my gratitude to my major advisor, Professor Makarand
Hastak, for his support, advices, and guidance during my studies at Purdue
University. I extend my acknowledgement to his impact through sharing his broad
experience and wisdom. I also sincerely thank my committee members,
Professor Dulcy M. Abraham, Professor Daniel P. Aldrich, and Professor Joseph
V. Sinfield. The encouragements, comments, and intellectual guidance of these
four individuals are ingrained in this work as a major contributor to its quality.

iv
I also like to remember Professor Julio Martinez, whose influence is visibly
traceable in this work; and thank Professors Mara Faccio, Philip S. Dunston,
Abbas Afshar, and Raymond E. Levitt, for their generous advices. I also thank
Robert Bowen, Victor Gervais, Nettie Haab, Melissa Geiger, Jennifer Ricksy,
Bonnie Sondergoth, Brandon Fulk, and Professors Sanjiv Gokhale, Mehmet
Bayraktar, Amr Kandil, Panagiota Karava, and Hubo Cai.
I would like to specially thank three of my colleagues and friends: Eun Ho Oh,
Vanessa Valentin, and Arash Mahdavi. I would also like to thank other
colleagues, among them Lauren Turner, Maria L. Peralta, Sanghyung Ahn,
Yoojung Yoon, Soojin Yoon, Joseph Louis, Varun Kishore, Stacey Toguchi,
Abhijeet Deshmukh, Erik Wright, and Saumyang Patel.
I would like to express a very special gratitude to my sisters Neda and Negar, for
the long-lived bond between us as a result of their exceptional personalities and
their impact in my life. I express a countless appreciation for an aged company of
a very special friend: Amir Mansour Khanmohammad. I would also like to
appreciate the company and friendship of many friends among them Valentina
Trinetta, Korosh Torabi, Fatemeh Momeni, Ali Hashemi, Steven and Karrie
Lincoln, Allesandro Gioffre, Kris Villez, Mirhossein Ghodsi, Tiba Feizi, Giulia
Baroni, Saeideh Fallah, Amirreza Zareian, Ana Juan, Morteza Saeidi, Alireza
Lashei, Ehsan Tabari, Amirali Nourinaeini, Amandine Aubry, Magdalena Gehring,
Edwin Antillon, Ardalan Kangarloo, and Robert Marzec. And finally, I greatly
appreciate the much needed support of my family, specifically my grandmother,
my aunts, my uncles, and my cousins. “Together we stand, divided we fall.”

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................... x
CHAPTER 1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.5.1
1.6
1.7

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1
Introduction.................................................................................... 1
Problem Statement ........................................................................ 2
Research Background ................................................................... 6
Research Questions and Thesis ................................................... 8
Research Objective ..................................................................... 10
Research Objective ............................................................... 11
Scope of the Research ................................................................ 11
Outline of the Dissertation ........................................................... 14

CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................ 16

2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.2.1
2.1.2.2
2.1.2.3
2.1.2.4
2.1.2.5
2.1.2.6
2.1.2.7
2.1.2.8
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.3
2.4
2.4.1

Complexity ................................................................................... 17
Definitions ............................................................................. 17
Complex Construction Projects ............................................. 19
Technological Complexity......................................................... 19
Contextual Complexity ............................................................. 20
Diversity of Actors and Roles ................................................... 20
Coupling of Systems ................................................................ 21
Conceptual Complexity of Construction Projects...................... 22
Spatial Extent ........................................................................... 22
Temporal Extent ....................................................................... 23
Project Uncertainties ................................................................ 23
Increasing Trend of Complexity in Construction Projects ...... 24
Complexity in the Context of Interactional Analysis ............... 26
Emergence .................................................................................. 26
Definitions ............................................................................. 26
Emergent Dynamics in Complex Construction Projects ........ 27
Case of Social Opposition as an Emergent Dynamic ............ 29
Institutional Theory ...................................................................... 30
Risk Analysis ............................................................................... 32
“Risk” Vs. “Uncertainty” ......................................................... 33

vi
Page
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.6
CHAPTER 3.
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
CHAPTER 4.
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.2
4.5
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.6
4.6.1
4.6.2
4.6.3
4.6.4
CHAPTER 5.
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2

Risk in Diverse Academic Fields ........................................... 35
Existing Risk Analysis Models in Construction ...................... 38
Risk in the Context of Interactional Analysis ......................... 44
Interactions .................................................................................. 44
Interactional Dynamics and Synergies .................................. 45
Social Exchange Theory ....................................................... 47
Summary ..................................................................................... 47
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................ 50
Research Framework .................................................................. 51
Construction Project as a System of Systems....................... 52
Components of the Research Framework ............................. 55
Types of Input Data ............................................................... 59
Output Format of the IA Framework ...................................... 61
Methodologies Applied in Interactional Analysis .......................... 62
Game Theoretic Model of Emergent Risks............................ 62
Simulation of Emergent Risks ............................................... 64
Integration of the Framework within Current Planning Practices . 66
Case Studies ............................................................................... 69
Verification and Validation ........................................................... 71
Summary ..................................................................................... 73
INTERACTIONAL ANALISYS AT THE POLICY LEVEL .......... 74
Interactional Framework .............................................................. 75
Structure of the Framework at the Policy Level ........................... 77
Interactional Framework of the Emergent Risk ............................ 82
Quantification of the Emergent Risks .......................................... 84
Unilateral Interactional Risk ................................................... 84
Bilateral Interactional Risk ..................................................... 87
Policy Development for Mitigation of Emergent Risk ................... 89
Interactional Elements of Policies ......................................... 89
Mathematical Functions of Policies ....................................... 90
Application, Implications, and Limitations .................................... 91
Application of the Methodology ............................................. 92
Implications ........................................................................... 98
Limitations ........................................................................... 100
Conclusion .......................................................................... 101
INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE STRATEGY LEVEL .. 103
Transition from the Policy Level to Strategy Level ..................... 104
Risk in the Strategy Level of IA ................................................. 105
Structure of the Interactional Model ........................................... 106
Strategies for Sequential Stages of Interaction ................... 109
Terminal Node Outcomes ................................................... 110

vii
Page
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
CHAPTER 6.
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5

Equilibria of the Interaction ........................................................ 111
Simulation of the Interaction ...................................................... 115
Discussion and Practical Implications........................................ 123
Conclusions ............................................................................... 128
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................... 130
Research Summary ................................................................... 132
Research Limitations ................................................................. 136
Intellectual Merits....................................................................... 137
Contributions to Practice ........................................................... 140
Recommendations for Future Research .................................... 141

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 143
APPENDIX

............................................................................................... 155

VITA

............................................................................................... 164

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table .............................................................................................................. Page
2.1 Definitions of Complexity in the Literature .................................................... 18
2.2 Selected Studies on Risk in Construction Literature ..................................... 39
3.1 System of Systems Lexicon for Interactional Analysis .................................. 53
4.1 Basics of Interactional Analysis .................................................................... 76
4.2 Interactional Analysis of Risks Associated with the Public Mobilization and
Relocation in Construction Projects .................................................................... 79
4.3 Interactional Framework of the Social Opposition Risk in Construction
Projects .............................................................................................................. 87
4.4 Utilities of Both Actors in the Example of Bilateral Interaction ...................... 89
4.5 Examples of Policy Development through their Interactional Elements ........ 90
4.6 Examples of Policy Development through its Mathematical Functions ......... 91
4.7 Disutility of the Opposition in the Interaction (x), in 1000 dollars .................. 94
4.8 Variables that Change for Each Case, in 1000 Dollars................................. 95
4.9 Summary of the Statistical Results of the Simulation ................................... 97
5.1 Payoff of the Actors at Each Terminal Node ............................................... 111
5.2 Summary of the Conditions for Each Terminal Node Outcome in IA(1)...... 114
Table 5.3 Summary of Conditions for Each Terminal Node in IA(2) ................. 116
5.4 Variables Fixed Among All Scenarios, in the scale of 0 to 1 ....................... 118
5.5 Variables Changing Among Scenarios in the scale of 0 to 1 ...................... 119
5.6 Preferences of Interactional Model IA(1) .................................................... 123
5.7 Potential Outcomes as Terminal Nodes (Percentage)................................ 124
5.8 Average Outcome of Actor Y (in the scale of 0 to 1)................................... 126
A.1 Risk of Social Opposition in Different Contexts (%) ................................... 159

ix
Table .............................................................................................................. Page
A.2 Variables Fixed Among All Contexts, in the scale of 0 to 1 ........................ 160
A.3 Payoff of the Deverloper in Each Pattern (0-1)........................................... 161
A.4 Payoff of the Opposition in each Pattern (0-1) ........................................... 162

x

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure ............................................................................................................. Page
1.1 Precedence of Decision-making in Construction Projects .............................. 4
1.2 Interactional Analysis and Current Risk Assessment Techniques .................. 6
1.3 Traditional Concept of Actors in Construction Projects versus Current Project
Settings .............................................................................................................. 12
2.1 Simplified Scheme of Major Actors for Public Private Partnership and their
Interactions ......................................................................................................... 21
2.2 Literature Review in the Context of Interactional Analysis ............................ 47
3.1 Focus of IA within the Complex Construction Projects ................................. 51
3.2 Interactional Analysis Framework ................................................................. 55
3.3 Example of Interactions as Defined at the Policy Level ................................ 58
3.4 Example of Extensive Game between Two Actors ....................................... 64
3.5 Flowchart of Simulation Input and Output ..................................................... 65
4.1 Power Relations within a Network of Actors ................................................. 75
4.2 Interactional Framework of the Emrgent Risks ............................................. 82
4.3 Mitigation Policies for the Risk of Social Opposition ..................................... 93
4.4 Social Opposition Risk Profile for Each Scenario and Considering Different
Mitigation Policies ............................................................................................... 96
4.5 Utility Curve of Opposition ............................................................................ 99
5.1 Interactional Structure IA(1) for Social Opposition ...................................... 108
5.2 Meta-model for Selection of Interactional Structures .................................. 115
5.3 Comparison of Outcomes for IA(1) and IA(2) ............................................. 121
5.4 Distribution of Outcomes for Actor Y (Black lines Indicate IA(1) with White
Lines Indicating the IA(2) .................................................................................. 125

xi
Figure ............................................................................................................. Page
6.1 Final Framewrok for Integration of IA with Current Risk Assessment
Techniques ....................................................................................................... 131
6.2 IA Procedures ............................................................................................. 135

xii

ABSTRACT
Naderpajouh, Nader Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Interactional
Analysis of Emergent Risks in Institutionally Diverse Construction Projects. Major
Professor: Makarand Hastak.

Construction projects, as complex systems of systems (SOS), increasingly
involve institutionally diverse actors that escalate complexity of the projects.
Examples of these actors include the export credit agencies, international
organizations such as the World Bank, non-governmental organizations (NGO),
regulatory actors, transnational organizations, as well as public and community
groups. The observed surge in complexity of the projects aim to enhance their
robustness in: i) sustaining the increasing demand for service of these projects,
and ii) sustaining the contextual fluctuation in terms of social, environmental, and
economical dimensions. For example, several financial institutions are engaged
in the projects to enhance their economic sustainability, transnational and
monitory actors to ensure environmental sustainability, and community groups
and NGOs to ensure social sustainability of projects. The increasing complexity,
however, results in fragility in the form of cascading failures and poor
performance of projects. As a result, construction projects face emergent risks
such as risks associated with the interaction of the institutionally diverse actors.
The extensive list of projects that have faced emergent risks associated with
interactional dynamics includes megaprojects or infrastructures with diverse
institutional background such as Stuttgart 21 in Germany, the Belo Monte Dam in
Brazil, the Keystone pipeline in North America, the Nabucco Pipeline in Central
Asia and Europe, and the Bujagali Dam in Uganda.
To address the emergent risks in construction projects, the concept of
emergence in a complex system of systems (SoS) is studied in this dissertation.

xiii
In construction projects, emergent dynamics occur at the level of a large-scale
system (i.e., project), which is built from components that are systems
themselves (i.e., actors). Reflecting this trend within the analysis provides a
better understanding of emergent dynamics that arise, for example, from social
and political interactions. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the analysis of
emergent risks associated with interactions as a coupling of complex systems
(i.e., actors) in institutionally diverse projects (i.e., SoS). Major objectives of the
research include: i) defining emergent risks based on its interactional elements, ii)
quantifying emergent risks based on the simulation of the equilibria of the
interaction, and iii) mitigating the emergent risks at the policy and strategy levels.
The framework to define emergent risks provides a descriptive account of the
emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics. In order to quantify the
emergent risk, the associated interaction is modelled through its equilibria. The
equilibria are developed at the policy and strategy levels and simulated to obtain
the risk profile. Finally, the mitigation strategies and policies are developed based
on the framework of the interactional analysis and their effectiveness in mitigation
of emergent risks is gauged through simulations. The proposed methodology
was applied to cases of social opposition in infrastructure development in
developing countries with the focus on hydroelectric projects. The dissertation is
closed with suggestions on further applicability of the interactional analysis for
different collaborative decision-making contexts.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

The Architectural/Engineering/Construction (AEC) industry faces everincreasing complexity in multiple dimensions. The involvement of more diverse
actors, extended project impacts over time and space, and increasingly intricate
technology exemplify this complexity trend. Project planning is undeniably the
foremost phase of a construction project that should identify and incorporate the
complex nature of the projects. However, the inconsistency in reflecting different
forms of complexity in current planning approaches often results in cost and time
over-runs, conflicts, project re-negotiations, claims, and project modifications.
This dissertation aims to introduce a novel dimension into project planning by
applying the basics of social science and mathematics to address complexity in
construction projects. Transferring the emphasis of analysis to interactions, as
the main source of project dynamics, it studies the emergent dynamics
associated with the interactions among the project actors as a prominent
property of a complex system of systems. Therefore, this dissertation proposes
the methodology of Interactional Analysis (IA) to accomplish the following: 1)
define emergence in a complex system of systems: frame and structure
dynamism within a complex system of systems such as construction projects; 2)
assess emergent risks in a complex system of systems: quantify emerging risks
associated with interactional dynamics; and 3) address complexity: propose a
hybrid (quantitative/descriptive) methodology to develop mitigation policies and
strategies and assess their effectiveness.
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1.2

Problem Statement

Increasing complexity of construction projects: construction projects
are the context for multiple actors (contractual or non-contractual) to interact to
attain a project’s ultimate goal. In the simplest format the interactional context
involves the triplets of theowner, the contractor, and the engineer and their
interactions, while the context can extend to include several other actors as
financiers, users, regulatory actors, etc. The interactive collaborations of these
actors may extend beyond any specific phase of the project life cycle 1 .
Collectively, construction projects exhibit the characteristics of a system of
systems (SoS), enumerated by Maier (1998), as they are comprised of
heterogeneous actors (e.g., financiers, contractors, public, regulatory actors, or
transnational actors) in a highly structured network and in a hierarchical order
(i.e., individuals, firms, coalitions, projects, and programs). These characteristics
can be observed even in the simplest format of the project as the triplet actors
are heterogeneous within the structured network of the project and in their
hierarchical order. However, the attributes of complexity described by Boulding
1956, Carlson and Doyle 2002, Simon 1962, and Baccarini 1996 are increasingly
observed in these systems of systems with the inclusion of institutionally diverse
actors and the coupling of their interactions.
Modifications of a system of systems to achieve higher robustness based
on the characteristics of the system results in increasing complexity of the
system (Carlson and Doyle 2002). In case of construction projects, robustness is
to sustain fluctuations of the environment from one side and to secure the supply
for an increasing demand for the service of these projects from the other side.
For instance, the growing complexity of the network of projects is essential to
address the growing demand for energy and secure sustainable energy supplies
despite economical, social, and environmental instabilities. As a result, there is
an increasing trend towards complex infrastructures such as the concept of

1

Construction project life cycle phases includes: Feasibility Analysis, Conceptual Planning, Detailed Scope Definition,
Procurement, Detailed Engineering, Construction, Turnover, Pre-commissioning, Start-Up, and Operation (CII 1999).
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Desertec that aims to address the increasing need for robust and sustainable
energy for Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, or the Keystone XL
pipeline that aims to address the increasing need for robust energy sources for
North America.
Consequent fragility of complex construction projects: the necessity to
achieve certain robustness through increasing complexity is, however,
compromised through the fragility towards unpredicted dynamics (Carlson and
Doyle 2002). In the case of complex projects this fragility may be observed in the
form of emergent risks associated with the interaction of multiple actors such as
public NIMBY (not in my back yard), transnational oppositions, political parties,
and local or multinational enterprises. The actual impact of these emergent
dynamics on the responses of a complex system of system such as a
construction project is significant and resulted in poor performance of these
complex systems of systems. Several megaprojects and infrastructures in the
global arena have been stalled due to emergent dynamics despite elaborate risk
analysis and cost assessment. The extensive list of impacted projects includes
water treatment facilities, hydroelectric dams, wind farms, pipeline projects, or
even transportation facilities. For example, projects such as the concept of
DESERTEC, the Keystone XL pipeline, and the Stuttgart 21 have all faced
emergent risks associated with the interaction of multiple actors in the context of
the project. To avoid cascading failures at the project level and deliver more
sustainable projects, it is necessary to reflect these emergent dynamics in project
planning and decision-making.
Shortcoming of current methodologies in reflecting this trend:
common planning approaches have been proven insufficient at reflecting the
increasing complexities of construction projects. Performance paradox2, failures
in project completion, cost over-runs, unforeseen conflicts, collusions, and delays
have been frequently coupled with dissatisfaction of target-users and

2

Performance paradox is a term proposed by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) suggesting that performances of infrastructure mega
projects are significantly below expectations despite increasing needs for more complex projects.
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unprecedented friction with non-contractual actors, such as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or local communities. As a consequence of this political
and social complexities, many projects deviate from their initial plans, for
example; changes in the government’s approaches to the project developer and
consequent project renegotiations in the Dabhol project in India, the negative
impact of unforeseen interactions with non-contractual parties on the Bujagali
dam project in Uganda, and the scrapping of the MAGLEV high-speed rail project
in Munich. Deviations such as these indicate a vital need for a paradigm shift in
the strategic risk management of construction projects to account for emergent
dynamics associated with interactions in complex projects. Rather than following
deterministic models, the outcomes of projects are usually determined through
power trade-offs, as well as political and institutional arrangements (Figure 1.1,
Flyvbjerg et al. 2003).
.

Institutional
Arrangements

Project
Accountability

Appropriate Decision Making
in Construction Projects

Figure 1.1 Precedence of Decision-making in Construction Projects

Reflection of this shortcoming in risk assessment methodologies:
one of the core tasks of project planning is assessing risk and devising risk
mitigation strategies. Relevant interactional dynamics, including the institutional
diversity of actors (static interactional dimensions) and the power relations
(dynamic interactional dimensions), are often underrated in planning and risk
assessment. Several models developed on the basis of the literature in the
finance area (e.g., Dias 1995 and Ye and Tiong 2000) are insufficient for efficient
planning of construction projects. These models are too specific to address all
the practical aspects of the dynamic nature of construction projects. That is, they
focus on limited dimensions of projects from financial point of view and disregard
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dynamics of complex construction projects. Many decision-making models lack
integration of the emergent dynamics, political interactions, and complexities that
occur during a project’s life cycle. Most of the existing models provide a single
actor decision-making platform and lack multi-party decision-making dynamics.
Even models that acknowledge the presence of complexities fall short of
integrating the real causes of project dynamics and provide only abstract
frameworks for project planning. The majority of the models neglect institutional
arrangements, existing synergies between project actors, NGOs, government
decision-makers, and strategic systems, all of which are indeed the dominant
determinants of a project’s failure or success (Miller and Lessard 2000). It is
critical to integrate these arrangements into different aspects of project planning
and governance (i.e., risk assessment, strategy development, and institutional
arrangement).
Addressing interactions to overcome this limitation: the dynamic
nature of the interactions, coupled with the diversity of the actors, increase the
complexity of the context (Maylor et al. 2008). Many scholars have emphasized
the importance of the institutional diversity (of actors) as a significant variable in
project outcomes (Miller and Lessard 2000 and 2007, Mahalingam and Levitt
2007, and Orr and Scott 2008). However, there is a lack of methodologies that
integrate dynamic nature of interactions within the project planning process in a
descriptive and quantitative approach. In summary, a paradigm shift in project
planning, including a risk assessment and strategy development approach, is
needed to address: 1) the ever-increasing complexity and institutional diversity of
construction projects and consequent fragility of projects, 2) the interactional
dynamics that impact project outcomes, and 3) the roots of the synergies
impacting the strategic choices of the actors. The need for this paradigm shift is
not limited to construction projects, as authors such as Helbing (2013) had
identified the need for a paradigm shift from an actor-oriented to interactionoriented perspective to address emergence and disruption in systems (or system
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of systems). IA offers such a paradigm shift in analysis of emergent dynamics in
a complex system of systems.

1.3

Research Background

In the context of strategic management, risk is recognized as an essential
component of planning and decision-making (Ruefli et al. 1999). Strategy
developers often apply risk as a prognostic indicator for the consequences of
decisions and plans. For construction projects, the consequences of decisions
are often associated with the emergent dynamics associated with the interactions
of multiple actors. These dynamics prove to be challenging in the risk
management of projects since they are often undermined in analysis models. In

Figure 1.2 Interactional Analysis and Current Risk Assessment Techniques
the construction industry, risk is frequently addressed in a static approach
through deterministic models, neglecting behavioral patterns and social
interactions. The outcomes of projects, on the other hand, are often determined

7
through power trade-offs or political and institutional arrangements (Flyvbjerg et
al. 2003). These determinants are not fully reflected in project planning and risk
governance. On the other hand, the actual impact of emergent dynamics is
significant and influences the responses of the projects as a complex system of
actors. Several megaprojects and infrastructure in the global arena have been
stalled due to emergent dynamics despite very accurate risk analysis and cost
assessment. The extensive list of impacted projects includes water treatment
facilities, hydroelectric dams, wind farms, pipeline projects, or even transportation
facilities. Therefore, there is a need for complementary analysis to current
procedures to integrate emergent dynamics that arise from the interactions of
actors into the existing risk governance methodologies. Two common line of
research concerning risk assessment in construction are i) the checklist
approach that aims to channelize experts’ opinions in identifying the salient risk
indicators and ii) dynamic models that seek to capture the interrelations of the
risk factors (see “Body of Knowledge” in Figure 1.2). The former type neglects
the dynamics and synergies of projects as a result of the interactions in a project
while maintaining a static approach to project risk. The intensity of the identified
risk factors may still be increased or diminished due to the synergic interaction of
the actors. On the other hand, dynamic models emphasize the importance of the
synergies but capture them through the interactions of the risk indicators. The
interplay of the risk indicators will not reflect the root cause of the complexities
and therefore will remain an abstract representation of the project dynamics. The
fundamental roots of emergent risks and outcomes of complex construction
projects originate substantially from interactions among diverse actors. As it is
depicted in Figure 1.2, the risks indicators that are identified through checklists
may be related to interactions in the context of the construction projects. In this
case, the emergent dynamics associated with the interactional risks can be
modeled through extensive study of strategic alternatives. Connecting the
strategic level of decision making with the identified risk through the layer of the
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project context provides a descriptive assessment of the emergent risks
associated with the interactions in a complex construction project.
The majority of the approaches to risk analysis in construction are also
often normatively prescriptive. Rather than reflecting the actual dynamics,
assessments often reflect the planner’s desired consequences of decisions (Han
and Diekmann 2001). In other words, the models reflect the dynamics behind the
decision making to prescribe the ideal actions (Von Neumann and Morgenstern
1953). However, risk analysis in strategic management should reflect the
characteristics of the context and the stakeholders involved (Bromiley et al. 2001).
Resorting to normative models may be attributed to the difficulty in quantifying
interactional dynamics and associated risk. These dynamics are often treated as
an emergent behavior of a complex system of systems. There is no explicit
quantification method for the risks associated with emergent dynamics, and most
of the time this type of risk is addressed either the same way as static risks or is
based on qualitative approaches.
Besides, the dynamics of the synergies associated with the complex system
of systems are often studied by investigating the actors involved in the setting. A
typical approach to analyze these dynamics involves matching the actors, which
are formally connected in the network while considering their salient
characteristics. Analysis of the synergic dynamics of complex settings, such as
global construction, should not underrate the interactions as the main source of
the dynamics.

1.4

Research Questions and Thesis

The core argument of the proposed research is that interactions reflect the
multiple dimensions of a project’s complexity, including the characteristics of the
actors and the dynamism of their synergies. Accordingly, the focal questions of
the research are:
•

What is the practical definition of complexity in construction projects?
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o What are the important features of the complexity in construction
projects?
o What are the important types of emergent dynamics in complex
construction projects?
•

What is the impact of the emergent dynamics associated with interactions
in project metrics and how this impact can be framed?

•

What is the extent of the impact on project risks and how can it be
quantified?

•

How can project planners develop policies/strategies to govern the
emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics of complex
construction projects?
The framework of the research is defined based on these core questions.

Therefore, the research plan is organized in three major steps: 1) develop a
generic framework to define emergent dynamics associated with interactional
dynamics of construction projects, 2) to provide a quantification methodology to
assess the consequences of complexity in construction projects, and 3) develop
a road map to design mitigation policies/strategies that address the emergent
dynamics of complex construction projects and validate their impact. In addition,
this research provides a platform to investigate the influence of network and
institutional resources in the interactional pattern of construction projects. The
research as a whole will ultimately examine the initial research thesis.
Thesis
The emergent risks in a complex construction project, as a collaborative
system of systems, can be analyzed based on the interactional dynamics and
applied in development of the risk mitigation policies/strategies.
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1.5

Research Objective

The objective of this study is to propose Interactional Analysis (IA) as a
methodology to address the emergent risks associated with interactional
dynamics of a complex system of systems, such as construction projects. It aims
to investigate the complexity of construction projects and the nature of the
emergent dynamics in these projects as a complex system of systems (SoS).
Furthermore, a platform to investigate these dynamics based on interactions of
institutionally-diverse actors is developed, which includes a methodological
approach to descriptive analysis of the risks along with a quantified assessment
of these dynamics. The study also aims to provide a methodological pathway
from the results of the descriptive and quantitative analysis to the development of
mitigation mechanisms. The study initially focuses on the risk analysis of
complex construction projects including development of mitigation mechanisms
at the strategy and policy levels. Several examples and cases will be presented,
but the study will elaborate more on the dynamics of social opposition against
construction projects considering the developer and the opposition as two actors
that support and oppose the project, respectively. The ultimate outcome of the
research will provide theoretical insights about the nature of the complexities and
their associated emergent dynamics. IA also complements the common risk
analysis models in the construction industry and provides an additional tool for
the descriptive/quantitative analysis of project risks and the development of
policies/strategies to mitigate the impact of emergent dynamics (Figure 1.2).
From a practical point of view, it will provide decision-makers of complex
construction projects with a methodological tool to analyze the emergent
dynamics of projects in contexts that involve the interactions of multiple decisionmakers. Theoretically, IA can be applied to any complex context that involves
interactions and their emergent consequences, such as the economic and
cultural dimensions of safety management, counterfeiting risk, effective
governance of sustainable construction, building collaborative teams, and Joint
Venture (JV) arrangements. A broader impact of the research is envisioned for
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other areas, including homogeneous networks (e.g., financial networks), urban
and coastal systems, transportation systems, energy networks, and disaster
response networks.

1.5.1 Research Objective
•

Define the complexity of construction projects and its salient features.

•

Investigate the development of a generic framework for comprehensive
and universal analysis of emergent dynamics at the policy level in a
complex system of systems, such as construction projects.

•

Further investigate the development of more detailed structures for
comprehensive and detailed analysis of emergent dynamics at the
strategy level in construction projects.

•

Assess the emergent dynamics associated with the interactional dynamics
of institutionally-diverse projects and their impacts on project metrics and
risks at both policy and strategy levels.

•

Examine the application of IA in the development of risk mitigation policies
for complex construction programs/projects and assessment of the
effectiveness of the potential mitigation policies.

•

Examine the application of IA in the development of risk mitigation
strategies for complex construction projects/procedures and assessment
of the effectiveness of the potential mitigation strategies.

1.6

Scope of the Research

Scope in terms of complexity: The scope of this study will be limited to
single interactions in the context of complex construction projects. According to
Meltzer’s rules (Meltzer 2006), models need to be built with minimal complexity in
order to observe the main behaviors of a system and then the complexity can be
increased gradually as needed. Therefore, at this stage, the study will be limited
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to single interactions between two actors within the network of the project. As it
can be observed in Figure 1.3, the context of the construction projects become
increasingly more complex and include institutionally-diverse actors, beyond the
traditional setting of owner, engineer, and the contractor (left side of Fig. 1.3).
Within the network of the construction project, this study will focus on single
interactions at the current stage to provide an in-depth analysis of each
interaction that can be further extended to the network level in future studies.

Figure 1.3 Traditional Concept of Actors in Construction Projects versus
Current Project Settings

Scope in terms of the nature of the problem: Flyvbjerg et al. (2003)
introduced performance paradox as a steep increase in the frequency and
complexity of infrastructure projects despite striking poor performance of these
projects in terms of sustainability metrics, i.e., social, environmental, and
economic dimensions. The need for more infrastructure and their services as well
as the increasing requirements of sustainability in these projects highlights the
vitality of this analysis, since: i) this need is addressed through increasing
complexity of construction projects, ii) increasing complexity in a system of
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systems, such as a complex construction project, results in fragility towards
emergent dynamics. As the complexity of construction projects exhibits an
increasing trend, specifically in megaprojects and infrastructure development,
addressing the associated challenges is needed.
Different forms of emergent dynamics in complex construction projects can
impact project outcomes and result in the observed poor performance of
infrastructure projects. Projects are increasingly encountering legal, financial,
political, and cultural obstacles. The involvement of institutionally diverse actors,
extended project impact over time and space, and greater technological
complexity has driven this trend. The assessment of complex construction
projects is vital in order to improve effective planning of infrastructure projects
and the performance of these projects and therefore addressing the issues
indicated by the performance paradox.
On one hand, the interactions in complex projects are planned to cover
multiple phases of a project beyond the construction phase. On the other hand,
the diversity of actors (and consequently their interactions) is considerably more
than traditional project setting, since the main goal in current project settings is to
spread responsibilities to a wider group beyond the contractors and owners. This
trend includes social embeddedness of projects and to include more actors in the
decision making process. Investigating this trend in project planning and program
development provides a better understanding of the emergent dynamics that
arise, for example, from social and political interactions. This goal can be
achieved through and applying models that integrate actions of multiple actors in
the process of decision making to increase social embeddedness of projects.
Therefore, a complementary tool to provide a descriptive and quantitative
analysis of emergent dynamics in projects could offer a source of developing
mitigation approach in the form of policies or strategies. Specifically, the
challenges of construction projects are shifting to social issues rather than
technical challenges (McAdam et al. 2010). This study thus highlights social
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opposition and its associated risks in complex construction projects as the case
study throughout the research. Different dimensions of this issue are investigated
within the research and suggestions are made accordingly.
Interactional analysis of complex construction projects focuses on the
particular characteristics of social opposition in construction projects. The longer
the duration of the interactions between the contractual parties and the
opposition, the more suitable they are for analysis. The diversity of the actors
also results in a diversity of interactions that adds to the variation within the
analysis. Finally, the interactions are likely to modify and transform the project in
different phases of its life cycle. These characteristics can be integrated into the
research to reflect the complexity of planning in an evolutionary context.
Further Applicability: The model applied for the analysis of the interactions
in complex construction projects can be simply adapted to other complex system
of systems within and beyond the construction industry since the theoretical
context of IA can be applied to any single interaction regardless of its context.
The framework proposed for application in areas in the nexus of infrastructure
and societies, such as project governance, conflict resolution, and policy-making.
It can be further applied to homogenous networks such as financial systems,
topics within the supply chain management in different industries (i.e., risk of
counterfeiting), or analysis of trends in heterogeneous networks such as energy
networks.

1.7

Outline of the Dissertation

IA, as a transformative concept, will evaluate the complexity of construction
projects according to the power relations in construction project contexts and will
analyze the consequent emergent dynamics. The research involves five major
phases: 1) literature review to define the fundamental outline of the research as a
multidisciplinary research, 2) development of a generic framework of interactions
based on the proposed interactional elements, 3) development of a hybrid

15
(descriptive/quantitative) platform to devise mitigation policies for consequent
emerging risks, 4) development of approaches to devise mitigation policies and
assess their effectiveness, 5) development of specific models of the interactions
according to the detailed stages of each interactional context to assess mitigation
strategies for emerging risks. Chapter 2 reviews the literature of the research in
more detail, which includes the topics of complexity and emergence in detail as
well as other relevant areas such as risk, institutional theory, and interactions and
synergies. Chapter 3 discusses in detail the methodology of the research as well
as the applied approaches. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss IA at both the policymaking and strategy development levels. Chapter 6 concludes the research and
provides suggestions for future research in this area.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This study aims to analyze complexity of systems of systems through
assessment of emergent dynamics associated with interactions in institutionallydiverse settings. It suggests the generic methodology of Interactional Analysis
(IA), which can be applicable to any complex context. The practical dimension of
the current study involves application of the proposed framework for risk
assessment in complex construction projects. The body of knowledge discussed
in this study comprises the literature of complexity, emergence, risk, institutional
theory, and interactions. As is the case with topics such as complexity and
emergence, a clear definition relevant to the problem statement is necessary.
The chapter section on complexity involves elaborate discussion of the definition
of complexity, as well as its implications within the construction industry. It further
clarifies the emphasis of this research in the frame of reference of complexity.
The next section then discusses emergent dynamics as the core property of
complex construction projects, including the concept of emergence and
associated contextual elements in construction projects as complex systems of
systems. As the current study emphasizes institutional diversity in construction
projects, the third section of this chapter provides a discussion on institutional
theory and related previous research in the field of construction. The chapter
continues with a thorough review of the concept of risk, and the body of previous
research related to risk in the field of construction is discussed. Finally,
interactions and interactional synergies are discussed, including a review of the
literature in fields such as organizational theory, social science, and management
and their approach to interactions.
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2.1

Complexity

The literature of complexity spans multiple fields, such as cybernetics, biology,
physics, social science, economics, and engineering. This literature branches
from general systems theory and identifies common and distinctive features
recognized under the term complexity among all the relevant fields. Similarly, the
field of construction has an ongoing discourse on the topic of complexity at
different levels of analysis, such as the construction project level (Baccarini 1996),
and for diverse sets of issues, such as project management (Maylor et al. 2008
and Williams 1999). However, the application of complexity lacks a universal
definition and a standard pattern of application (Bertelsen 2003). This deficiency
necessitates a review of the common definitions of complexity and at the same
time their implications within this research. The next section provides an
overview of the topic of complexity and related definitions, and the implications of
these definitions within the construction field are addressed in the section that
follows. Finally, this chapter concludes with an overview of the application of
complexity in this research.

2.1.1 Definitions
Simon (1962) generally defines a complex system as a system that is composed
of numerous parts that interact in a non-simple manner. Carlson and Doyle (2002)
distinguish complex systems through the heterogeneity of the actors within an
intricate and structured network with hierarchies and multiple scales. Edmonds
(1995) connects complexity to the degree of difficulty in representing a system
solely through its parts and their interactions. Several other studies provide other
definitions of complexity (Klir 1985, Kauffman 1993, Hinegardner and Engelberg
1983, Levin 1998, Waldrop 1992, and Maylor et al. 2008, Arthur et al. 1997).
Table 2.1 presents few studies in the literature of complexity along with the
emphasis and the focus of each study. The common features of complexity
among all these definitions are differentiation and connectivity (Baccarini 1996).
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Table 2.1 Definitions of Complexity in the Literature
Reference
Simon (1962)
Hinegardner &
Engelberg
(1983)
Klir (1984)

Edmonds (1995)

Definition
Complex system is composed
of numerous parts that interact
in a non-simple manner

Emphasized
Features
Number of
parts,
Interaction

Size of the minimum
description of the system

Amount of
information

Complex
Systems,
Evolution

Amount of
information

Complex
Systems

Amount of information to
describe the system and to
resolve associated uncertainty
Degree of difficulty in
representing a system solely
through its parts and their
interactions

Application
Complex
Systems

Language of
Evolution
representation

Baccarini (1996)

Differentiation and connectivity

Diversity,
Interaction

Projects as
Complex
Systems

Arthur et al.
(1997)

Dispersed interaction ,the
absence of a global controller,
cross-cutting hierarchical
organization, continual
adaptation, perpetual novelty,
and far-from-equilibrium
dynamics

Interactions,
Emergence,
Adaptation,
Hierarchy

Complex
Systems,
Emergence

Levin (1998)

Sustained Diversity of
components, localized
interactions, and autonomous
selection process

Diversity,
Interactions,
Adaptation

Complex
Adaptive
Systems
(CAS)

Carlson and
Doyle (2002)

Heterogeneity of the actors
within an intricate and
structured network with
hierarchies and multiple scales

Diversity,
Hierarchy,
Multipe scales

Highly
Optimized
Tolerance
(HOT)

Maylor et al.
(2008)

Interconnected parts with
nonlinear and unpredictable
outcome

Interactions,
Emergence

Projects as
CAS

Williams et al.
(2012)

Structural complexity and
uncertainty within a system

Diversity,
Interactions,
Hierarchy

Projects as
Complex
Systems

Before discussing these two features in the context of this research, it would be
helpful to review the concept of complexity in construction projects.

19
2.1.2 Complex Construction Projects
In the context of construction, complexity may refer to different dimensions
of projects. Williams (1999) enumerates structural uncertainty in terms of
diversity of actors, multiplicity of objectives and interdependence of project
elements, as well as uncertainty of goals and processes as the features of
project complexity. Cicmil and Marshal (2005) highlight communication and
power relations among actors, ambiguity of benchmarks, as well as changes
over time in complex construction projects. Maylor et al. (2008) emphasizes that
definitions of project complexity needs to reflect social aspects of projects.
Similarly, case studies have revealed the increasing trend in multiple dimensions
of project complexity. This complexity trend is increasing not only technologically,
but on several other fronts as well, such as the institutional diversity of the actors,
the coupling of their interactions, and the contextual complexity. The complexity
of construction projects also can be discussed in terms of conceptualization of
projects, here discussed through the spatial and chronological extension of
projects as well as uncertainty. Indeed several studies suggested uncertainty as
a major dimension of project complexity (Maylor et al. 2008, Turner and
Cochrane 1993, and Williams 1999). In order to obtain a solid definition of the
term complexity and to delineate the focus of the research, these dimensions
therefore are briefly discussed as well.

2.1.2.1

Technological Complexity

The most basic implication of complexity in construction may refer to the
technological complexity of projects. Maylor et al. (2008) describes this
complexity as the level of the novelty of the system as well as uncertainty in its
process. In this sense, the term complexity is applied for both processes and
tools. The diversity of the tools and machinery as well as the interdependence of
their parts exemplifies a typical case of complexity (e.g., oil rigs, heavy cranes,
tunnel boring machines (TBM)). On the other hand, applying differentiated and
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interconnected processes and methodologies is another form of technological
complexity. The example of this type of complexity in construction projects is the
case of high-rise buildings that employ almost the same tools as mid-size
buildings while the planning is more complex.

2.1.2.2

Contextual Complexity

Contextual complexity implies differentiation and connectivity within the
context of a project. This type of complexity may include the market, the
institutional background of a project’s context, or the physical setting of a project.
An example of this type of complexity can be observed in global construction,
while the context of the new market itself is more complex (regardless of the
involved actors), or a project in Alaska when the physical setting of the project
proves challenging for an unfamiliar contractor.

2.1.2.3

Diversity of Actors and Roles

The diversity of the actors is one of the most salient dimensions of
complexity in construction projects. Baccarini (1996) and Maylor (2003) label this
complexity as the organizational complexity of construction projects. This
diversity can be analyzed in terms of the institutional diversity of actors. As can
be observed in Figure 2.1, there is an observable trend to increase the
responsibility of other sectors in construction projects. These projects now
involve not only contractors and designers but also actors such as financiers,
international institutions and governing bodies, export credit agencies (ECA),
non-governmental organizations, local communities, etc. This increase in the
number and diversity of actors will increase project complexity tremendously
since all actors pursue divergent goals and often are structured differently. Since
the institutional diversity of actors is the core of this study’s analysis, this
complexity is further discussed in the institutional theory section.
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Figure 2.1 Simplified Scheme of Major Actors for Public Private Partnership
and their Interactions

2.1.2.4

Coupling of Systems

This dimension of complexity solely emphasizes the connectivity feature of
complexity emphasized in definitions. As construction projects involve diverse
actors as the vertices of the network, the interactions of these actors, as edges of
the network, are another dimension of the complexity of construction projects.
Maylor et al. (2008) categorizes this form of complexity as the dynamic element
of complexity. These interactions are defined as the coupling of the actors, which
by themselves are already complex systems. This research therefore focuses its
analysis on this dimension.
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2.1.2.5

Conceptual Complexity of Construction Projects

The complexity of construction projects also can be discussed in terms of
project conceptualization that pertains to how projects are defined and
transformed from an idea to a concept and ultimately to the output (i.e., the built
environment). This dimension of complexity is discussed in terms of spatial and
chronological extension of projects, as well as associated uncertainties.

2.1.2.6

Spatial Extent

The extent of projects within space can be applied to frame the complexity
of construction projects. Construction projects involve a network of actors and a
back-up supply chain that transcends geopolitical demarcations. The complexity
of projects and its trends also can be studied in terms of this extent. For example,
an increase in trans-border projects can contribute to the escalating complexity
trend in construction. This extent is made possible through multiple
transformations, among them the application of distant communication tools. For
example, telecommunication and transportation facilitates the contact of
companies with oversees projects and encourages more companies to explore
distant markets.
The spatial extent of construction projects is also referred extensively
within the literature. The construction field has extensively studied this dimension
of complexity under the topic of global construction. Global construction research
has involved multiple lines of enquiry, primarily owing to the multifaceted nature
of the problems. Multiple researches have focused, among others, on social
(Chan and Tse 2003), organizational (Keast and Hampson 2007), financial
(Walsh et al. 2005), and contractual (Chen and Messner 2009), as well as the
knowledge management aspects (Javernick and Levitt 2010; Taylor 2007). In
addition, some researchers focused specifically on planning and strategy
development in the global context. Market entry decision-making models
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(Dikmen and Bignorul 2004; Han and Diekman 2001), risk assessment models
(Hastak and Shaked 2000; Nasirzadeh et al. 2008; and Walewski 2005), and
strategic management approaches (Miller and Lessard 2000 and Orr and Scott
2008) are among these researches. This study investigates complexity in terms
of the spatial extent of projects with its focus on the institutional diversity of
construction projects.

2.1.2.7

Temporal Extent

Conceptualizing construction projects involves another dimension of
complexity: temporal extent. The focus of construction engineering in this extent
is now beyond the construction phase of the project, extending from policymaking and concept development to project operation, project renovation, and
reuse. Thus, the construction industry is extending its focus from one phase to
the whole cycle of a project’s lifetime. As the life cycle will be repeated again in
some different way after the last phase of a project’s lifetime, the industry will reinvent the wheel integrating the lessons learned during the last cycle. For
example, recent public private partnerships are introducing the concept of profit
margin ceiling to reduce the risks of the contract breach observed in previous
projects. The complexity thereby is increased exponentially through temporal
extent of the project. The rule of the game in the new phases is entirely different
than the construction phase and requires more planning deliberation.

2.1.2.8

Project Uncertainties

Several studies have emphasized the uncertainty dimension of complexity
within the context of construction projects (Turner and Cochrane 1993, Williams
1999, and Maylor et al. 2008). This dimension of project complexity is rooted in
definitions of complexity proposed by Hinegardner & Engelberg (1983), Klir
(1984), and Edmonds (1995), where they emphasize descriptive aspects of
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complexity. In the context of construction project, the term uncertainty may refer
to the lack of clarity of goals or performance metrics (Loosemore and McCarthy
2008), lack of knowledge about processes and methodologies, or lack of
information about the context or other actors. For example, the defined goal of a
project may be ambiguous or poorly communicated which adds to the complexity
of a project. Later in this chapter the concept of uncertainty will be discussed in
more details.

2.1.3 Increasing Trend of Complexity in Construction Projects
Review of any of the aforementioned dimensions reveals the ascending
trend of complexity in multiple dimensions of construction projects. Construction
projects increasingly apply complex tools, involve complex procedures, include
diverse actors and their interactions, expand to complex contexts, and require
complex conceptualization. Several reasons may be enumerated for this
increasing trend. Carlson and Doyle (2002) stated that the complexity of systems
is not necessarily for functional purposes, but rather for robustness. They define
robustness as sustaining the characteristics of a system (or system of systems)
despit fluctuations in the behavior of its components or the environment (context).
In the case of construction projects fluctuations of the environment from one side
and the increasing need for infrastructure from the other side highlights the
necessity of more complex construction projects. Flyvbjerg (2003) labels this
situation as the performance paradox: the increasing need for infrastructure that
coincides with the decreasing performance of these projects. In the literature of
the area of infrastructure, this robustness is further described in terms of the
triple bottom line of sustainability:
•

Economic robustness.

Infrastructure development faces the

increasing problem of financial resources. In order to increase the
financial robustness of infrastructures, actors such as financial
institutions and credit agencies are integrated into projects,
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complicated contracts such as concessions are devised, and
mechanisms such as infrastructure bonds are introduced. The
result of these inclusions is increased project complexity in order to
achieve economic robustness.
•

Social robustness. On the other hand, infrastructure projects face
the rising challenge of social integrity. There is an increased need
for the equity pillar of sustainablity, and projects are frequently
encountered

with

social

opposition,

protests,

or

political

controversies. The increasing complexity of infrastructure project
networks and the involvement of more actors in decision-making
aims to achieve social robustness in infrastructure development.
•

Environmental robustness. Similarly, there is a critical need for
more environmental assessment of infrastructure projects. An
increased number of actors in decision-making and policy
development and the coupling of their interactions is necessary to
increase the environmental robustness of projects.

To summarize, the robustness required by sustainable infrastructures is
achieved through increased project complexity. For example, increasing diversity
of actors in construction projects includes involvement of export credit agencies
(ECA) to increase economic robustness, public NIMBY to increase social
robustness, and transnational groups to increase environmental robustness of
construction projects. The attained robustness is needed to manage the
anticipated fluctuations of the environment and the weaknesses of the system.
However, the robustness achieved through complexity is compromised by
fragility of these systems (Carlson and Doyle 2002). The fragility is in the form of
cascading failures and includes rare and uncommon events as well as
unanticipated flaws in the system (Carlson and Doyle 2002). In the case of
complex construction projects, fragility is observed as emergent dynamics such
as failures in project completion schedule, changes, and modifications, as well as
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deviations from the constructon plans. Understanding the complexity of
construction projects and its two features (i.e., differentiation and connectivity)
enables project planners to address the fragility of these systems and the
associated emergent dynamics.

2.1.4 Complexity in the Context of Interactional Analysis
Based on the discussion of the definition of complexity, the two important
features of complexity includes differentiation and connectivity. This research
focuses on the institutional diversity of the actors (differentiation) and the
interactions of these actors (connectivity). The institutional diversity of the actors
is primarily concerned with the second and third dimensions of complexity
(contextual complexity and diversity of actors and roles) in construction projects,
while it also covers conceptual complexity in terms of spatial extent. On the other
hand, focusing on the interactions among the actors comprises a fourth
dimension of complexity as well as conceptual complexity in terms of
chronological extent since the timeline of the interactions reflects the different
phases of construction with their specific characteristics.

2.2

Emergence

2.2.1 Definitions
Emergent dynamics are a salient property of any complex system of
systems, and several studies have tried to identify cases of emergent dynamics
within diverse fields. Corning (2002) defines emergence as the outcome of the
self-organizing system. However, self-organization and emergence should be
differentiated: emergence is defined as any novel macro-level phenomenon as a
result of interactions at the micro-level, while self-organization is an adaptive and
dynamical increase in order and structure without control mechanisms from
outside of the system (De Wolf and Holvoet 2005). In the case of the construction
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literature, a joint venture may be considered as a self-organizing system as the
order is not enforced externally, while social opposition can be considered as
emergence as it is a novel property at the macro level of the project. Although
both phenomena can happen in isolation, they often accompany each other in
complex dynamic systems (De Wolf and Holvoet 2005).
While emergence happens in diverse fields, Goldstein (1999) proposes
five common properties necessary for any emergence phenomenon: 1) radical
novelty, 2) coherence, 3) macro level, 4) dynamical, and 5) ostensive
(observable). In this regard the emergence phenomenon is novel and has not
been observed before. It is the result of interrelated parts that exhibit a coherent
holism. It is observed at the macro level and as a result of dynamism within the
complex system and is an observable phenomenon in complex systems.

2.2.2 Emergent Dynamics in Complex Construction Projects
Several forms of emergence can be observed in construction projects, as
complex systems of systems that involve multiple actors. In order to have an
overview of the cases of emergence in construction projects these categories
can be discussed as follow:
•

Emerging contextual property. Sometimes, the emergence is observed
as the change in the properties of the project context such as the
transaction costs associated with actions, project modifications, delays,
cost overruns, etc. Extreme project modifications in the case of sudden
fluctuations in the exchange rate of currencies in global construction are
examples of this type of emergence.

•

Emergent actor. Due to the extent of construction projects and their
impacts, often projects face actors that are not expected at the planning
and feasibility stages. The emergent involvement of an unprecedented
actor impacts project dynamics and change the equilibria of the project.
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This type of emergence can be observed in diverse types of projects
specifically in urban development when multiple actors may find conflict of
interest with the project, such as the emergence of green party as an
opposition in the case of Stuttgart 21 project in Germany.
•

Emerging coalitions. Several construction

projects,

such as

the

hydroelectric projects around the world, face emerging coalitions as a new
emergent actor within the context of project. An example of this type of
emergence includes transnational opposition groups in the case of
hydroelectric dams such as the Bujagali hydroelectric project in Uganda.
A generic pattern of these emerging actors is that they begin as a
coalition between local public opposition including public “not in my back
yard” (NIMBY) and transnational opposition groups such as “International
Rivers.”
•

Emerging transformations of an actor. In some cases, the emergence is
observed as the emerging characteristic of an actor within the intricate
network of the project. This form of emergence can be observed within
public private partnership projects when the governing side of the public
exhibits emerging properties after changes in the governments or
elections, such as the case of Dabhol project in India.

•

Emergent synergies. Emergence also can be observed in the form of
synergies such as controversies or conflicts. In these cases, a complex
construction project exhibits properties of emergence in association with
interactional synergies among different actors. The conflicts and
controversies surrounding the Keystone XL pipeline or California highspeed rail project are examples of emerging synergies. This form of
emergence cannot be attributed to any specific actor or environmental
condition but it is rooted in the synergies that arise from the interaction
among actors. For example, cultural and institutional differences might
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trigger a problematic emergent synergy between the owner and
contractors, such as the case of Bechtel’s arbitration in the UAE.
As institutionally diverse construction projects face an increasing trend of
complexity, often an assortment of these types are observed within projects. For
example, an emergent actor most likely forms an emergent coalition and their
action may result in an emergent contextual property. Therefore, to provide a
methodological approach to the emergent phenomena of institutionally diverse
projects, they may be studied through associated deviations in terms of project
metrics (i.e., cost, time, environmental impact, quality, safety, etc.)

2.2.3 Case of Social Opposition as an Emergent Dynamic
The trend of increasing social opposition to large-scale and controversial
facilities (Aldrich 2010 and McAdam et al. 2010) comes from a transformed
global environment, the emergence of new actors such as transnational networks,
coalitions, and social movements (Khagram et al. 2002), and changes in the
power and norm structures (Sikkink 2002). The extensive list of projects facing
significant social opposition includes megaprojects and infrastructure with diverse
institutional background such as the Belo Monte dam in Brazil, the Bujagali dam
in Uganda, the Stuttgart 21 project in Germany, and the Keystone XL pipeline in
North America. Similarly, Japan’s entire commercial nuclear power program now
faces retrenching as a result of public opposition (Aldrich 2013). The enormity of
these deviations from planned outcomes despite the developer-perceived
necessity of these projects suggests the importance of policy models that
account for social and political dynamics. Complex project planning must
integrate power trade-offs and political and institutional arrangements as major
determinants of outcomes (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). Very few research projects
have investigated the emergent dynamics of social opposition in infrastructure
(McAdam et al. 2010) and even less has been done as far as analytical study of
these dynamics (Dietz and Stern 2008).
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In the context of this study, the emergent dynamics associated with social
opposition in complex construction projects occur despite very detailed plans.
While risk analysis is an integral part of planning, it often fails to systematically
integrate these dynamics into risk assessment and risk mitigation. Common risk
analysis models in construction take the checklist approach, which lays out
experts’ opinions for salient risk factors (Hastak and Shaked 2000; Walewski
2005). Models that go further and acknowledge the presence of complexities
often provide a normative assessment of risks (Han and Diekman 2001;
Nasirzadeh et al. 2008); such assessments may reflect desired outcomes rather
than actual dynamics between different actors such as the opposition groups.
These models, though accurate, neglect institutional arrangements and power
relations among project actors despite the fact that they are dominant factors in
determining failure and success (Miller and Lessard 2001). Developers must
increase the credibility of their analyses through descriptive risk assessment and
the integration of interactional arrangements into project planning.

2.3

Institutional Theory

The institutional, financial, and organizational set-up substantially
influences projects and their associated risks as the risks influence those set-ups
(Flybjerg et al. 2003). Institutions involve behavioral structures that shape and
constrain an individual’s actions and relations. North (1990) called institutions
“frameworks within which human interactions take place.” As interactions are the
central focus of this study, the institutional diversity of interactive actors is the
basis of the analysis. It may be argued that background diversity in construction
projects has increased in recent decades due to several reasons, which include
the following:
i.

Field expansion: the need for the cooperation of different types of
public and private organizations such as financial institutions,
international organizations, facility operators, etc. (This dimension
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refers to the complexity of projects in terms of the diversity of the
actors as discussed in the prior section.)
ii.

Globalization: the de facto symbol of modern life with its different
dimensions. (This dimension refers to the complexity of projects in
terms of spatial extent as discussed in the prior section) and includes
the following:
a. Global trend in business: increase in the portion of overseas
involvement in construction companies’ portfolios (Hastak and
Shaked 2000).
b.

Global nature of projects: increase in the need for projects
trans-border in nature (e.g. Nabucco pipeline, Desertec
Foundation, etc.).

The impact of institutional diversity goes beyond institutional risk and also
influences other types of risk (technical, financial, etc.) in a subtle manner.
Multiple researchers have studied these nuances and their related consequences
in multiple aspects of construction industry. Miller and Lessard (2000 and 2007)
and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) emphasized the importance of institutional shaping in
risk management. Mahalingam and Levitt (2007) studied the impacts of
institutional differences on the safety aspects of global projects as well as the
conflicts in global projects and their institutional roots. Orr and Scott (2008)
studied the managerial aspects and the cost-related consequences of
institutional diversity. Jooste (2010) explored public private partnership projects
at the level of the organization, investigating institutional capacity building within
the networks at that level.
Scott (2001) identified three distinctive elements of institutions: 1)
regulative, 2) normative, and 3) cultural-cognitive. Regulative elements concern
the rules and regulations that are either created or evolve to govern behaviors.
Normative elements, on the other hand, involve values and norms that impose
constraints

on

social

behavior.

Finally,

cultural-cognitive

elements

are
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frameworks through which interpretations are made. The cultural side refers to
rationalization with external symbolic frameworks while an internal sense- making
procedure is more on the cognitive side (Orr and Scott 2008). All the
aforementioned elements of institutions are transmitted through different types of
carriers. Carriers that convey specific elements or their combination tentatively
identified by Scott (2001 and 2003) can be categorized into four groups: 1)
symbolic systems, which are diverse types of structured symbolic frameworks
that encode and convey meaningful information; 2) relational systems, which are
linkages among actors at different levels; 3) routines, which are patterned actions
reflecting tacit knowledge of the actors; and 4) artifacts, which are the material
culture devised by the actors.
As the current study emphasizes the importance of the interactions among
diverse actors, institutional diversity is the core of the analysis. This study
integrates institutional theory into the common practices of the construction
theory in a subtle manner to link construction industry social studies with
common planning practices. Therefore, the proposed interactional analysis
framework accounts for institutions and their elements by incorporating them into
construction project planning tools. Apart from the subtle implication of
institutional theory within interactions, the current study proposes network,
normative, and cultural-cognitive resources as elements of interaction and
provides a basis to investigate their influence within project dynamics (Phase I in
Figure 1.3).

2.4

Risk Analysis

Risk is used extensively in settings that involve decision-making (Kangari
1995). It is applied as a prognostic indicator for the consequences of decisions.
Traditionally, the application area of risk was only limited to the negative
implications (Damodaran 1997). For instance, the Merriam Webster Dictionary
defines risk simply as “chances of loss.” Nonetheless, in a practical realm, “risks”

33
and “opportunities” are now used in conjunction with describing the uncertainties
revolving around a project as the possibilities of “failure” and “success.” Failure
and success are extremes that determine the range of the outcomes for each
decision. The Chinese characters for risk underline this importance as they
consist of two symbols representing both danger and opportunity (Damodaran
1997). Similarly, a more comprehensive definition of risk encompasses
opportunities as well as threats, reminding decision-makers to consider a range
of outcomes in the decision-making process.
In many academic fields, risk suffers from the lack of a clear definition. This
ambiguity has resulted in different interpretations and consequent illusions in
terms of incorporating the term “risk” into practice. The construction industry is no
exception, considering extensive practical use of risk in multiple decision-making,
planning, and strategy development procedures in the industry. On the
theoretical side, multiple researches have investigated risk and its applications in
construction industry. An overall review of these studies cannot render a lucid
definition of risk and its application. Therefore, it is necessary to explore risk as
applied in the construction industry and contrast it with approaches in other fields.
The result of this exploration will be a clearly defined foundation to reduce
ambiguities in the definitions that pertain to a classified approach towards risk. It
can also frame an ontological understanding of risk for the current study as well
as for the construction industry in general. For this purpose, the review will
include the distinctions between risk and uncertainty followed by the definitions of
risk in other academic fields. Finally, the section will conclude with exploring risk
and related implications in the field of construction engineering and management
(CEM).

2.4.1 “Risk” Vs. “Uncertainty”
Risk and uncertainty are often mistaken for each other. Therefore, the first
step in defining risk is to distinguish it from uncertainty. Several interpretations
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have been suggested for distinguishing risk from uncertainty. Knight (1921)
studied differences of risk and uncertainty from an economic point of view and
suggested that knowing the probability of the decision’s outcomes as a key
element in distinguishing risk from uncertainty. Risk was attributed to the known
probability of outcomes, while uncertainty concerned the unknown probability of
outcomes by Bromiley et al. (2001). Aligned with this definition, Miller and
Lessard (2000) differentiated risk from uncertainty by the fact that the former can
be described in statistical terms while the latter deals with unknown potential
outcomes. This explanation was not aligned with the expectations of many
practitioners in different fields however (Bromiley et al. 2001). A survey by Baired
and Thomas (1990) argued for the importance of “knowing the probability,”
Bromiley et al. (2001) clarified the strategic management approach by defining
risk as the unpredictability of the outcome variables, while uncertainty was the
perceived unpredictability of the contingencies. On the other hand, in philosophy,
risk is considered the objective unpredictability of an event and uncertainty is
connected to subjective unpredictability. While objective unpredictability deals
with probability, subjective unpredictability deals with attitudes and expectations.
When perceptions are considered to be part of the game, it should be noted that
the lack of insight (background knowledge) will not result in risk elimination, but
rather that the risks will remain unidentified. Since the state of risk perception
only exists in an evaluator’s mind, the lack of this state will automatically result in
the lack of risk perception even though objectively risk does exist in that situation.
Finally, in a game theoretic approach uncertainty is modeled as a move of
nature3 in addition to the actor’s move while risk is modeled as changes in utility
values. Therefore, uncertainty in the construction industry can be attributed to
general unpredictability or a state of not knowing, while risk is always concerned
with variations of outcomes in terms of project metrics. As this study is based on
observations of project metric’s deviations from plans, it should focus on risk as
defined and avoid uncertainty. The practical implication of this strategy is to focus
3

Move of nature in game theory is the option to integrate chance by an actor with no interference in outcomes (a.k.a. nature).
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on the outcomes of projects rather than events and their unpredictability. The
definition of risk will be further clarified in the next sections.

2.4.2 Risk in Diverse Academic Fields
Psychology, finance, economics, and strategic management are all
concerned with risk and its application. However, the definition of risk varies
among these approaches based on diverse assumptions and applications and
the inherent vagueness of the term.
Finance is one of the exceptions, though, with a robust definition of risk as
this discipline closely models financial markets in the real world using the
prevailing assumptions of an efficient market. The key fact in the finance
literature’s approach to risk is that the term “risk” is often coupled with “return.”
Therefore, the main emphasis is on the various rates of return as measured by
standard deviation (SD). The variance of returns (or its square root, SD) is often
applied as a quantitative measure of risk, considering the expected value of
return.
Variance = σ 2 = E {[R – E(R)]2}
In this equation, R stands for the random variable of investment return, E
stands for the expected value, and σ denotes the standard deviation (Smart et al.
2004). Risk of default and bankruptcy is also of interest within the finance
literature (Baired and Thomas 1990).

Generally, risk suggests a downside

outcome of the action while most financial models relate risk to any volatility in
return regardless of its favorability (Smart et al. 2004). Although, by definition,
risk is understood as the downside of return or the chances of loss, practical
applications of risk in academic fields often consider the amalgamated value of
any favorable or unfavorable variance in the outcomes and consequences of
uncertain situations. This difference can be attributed to the fact that analyzing
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both favorable and unfavorable outcomes is the result of studying variation in
returns, which includes both downside and upside outcomes.
Risk in the management field is significantly influenced by psychology
research to determine managerial preferences in decision-making involving
uncertainty and the ability of managers to deal with risks.
In psychology, risk involves individuals’ perceptions of risk, how risk
assessment is developed, and its analysis at the institutional and society levels
(Breakwell 2007). In such studies, risk is often represented through an expected
value, implying that exact probabilities are defined. The limitations of expected
values should be regarded in assumptions to approximate risk in strategic
management due to the greater presence of uncertainty as well as the
complexities involved (Baired and Thomas 1990).
Risk in management is significantly influenced by psychology research to
determine managerial preferences in decision-making involving uncertainty as
well as the ability of managers to deal with risks (Baired and Thomas 1990).
Likewise, in psychological studies of risk, the expected value concept has been
applied.
The omnipresent vagueness in the development of strategies as well as the
importance of actions through the selection of strategies and their influences in
consequent decision are the key elements of defining risk in strategic
management. Defining risk in strategic management was influenced by Bowman
(1980), where the average ex-post analysis of return on equity (ROE) in studied
industries was negatively related to the variance in the ROE (Miller and Reuer
1996).
=

’

Bowman (1980) argued the general belief, initiated from stock market
analysis (finance), that risk has its rewards. Bowman provided some evidence for
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cases where risk and return showed a negative relation in ex-post analysis.
Therefore, risk in strategic management implies a broad definition encompassing
probability, size, nature of outcomes, as well as causal uncertainties and lack of
information (Baird and Thomas 1990). Bromiley et al. (2003) enumerated three
major studies concerning risk assessment in strategic management: 1) prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 2) behavioral theory of firm (Cyert and
March 1963), and 3) agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989).
Prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) investigates
the attitudes of managers towards risk considering the deficiencies of expected
utility theory. Prospect theory proposes a fourfold pattern suggesting riskaversion behaviors in individuals in the domain of gains with high probability and
risk-seeking behaviors in individuals in the domain of losses when the
probabilities are high. In cases where the probability of loss or gain is low, risk
attitudes may reverse suggesting risk-seeking for gains and risk aversion for
losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1992). The analysis in prospect theory is at the
micro level (individuals and their preferences), and the studied cases were
limited to absolute loses or gains. Therefore, prospect theory could not suggest
comparative assessments within the domains of loss and gain (Bromiley et al.
2003).
Behavioral theory of firm takes the approach of analyzing economic
decisions by examining the internal factors of firms, such as their organizational
structures and conventions (Cyert and March 1963). Unlike prospect theory, this
study was at the firm level and contrasted the current status of firms with their
aspiration levels, which were materialized through industry averages or past
performances. The behavioral theory of firm can be applied to determine risktaking at the firm and organization level; however, its limitations must be
considered (Bromiley et al. 2003).
Agency theory examines decisions and risk-sharing problems via the
relations of the principal who delegates the work to the agency (Eisenhardt 1989).
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This line of research also can be applied to investigate governance strategies
and the relations of an agency and a principal and their impact on risk and risktaking (Bromiley et al. 2003).
In conclusion, risk in strategic management has broad implications beyond
the definition of risk in the stock market. Therefore, approaches towards risk in
strategic management should be beyond the variance of return. Investigating risk
in global projects requires a strategic management approach, which inevitably
leads to the definitions of risk in strategic management. The next section will
further discuss the application of risk in construction projects and its implications.

2.4.3 Existing Risk Analysis Models in Construction
Risk has been studied extensively within the construction industry as it
involves dynamic, risky, and capital-intensive projects. Several early works that
proposed systematic approach to risk analysis include Hayes et al. (1986),
Flanagan and Norman (1993), and Raftery (1994). Later on two dominant
approaches for analysis of risks in construction research include frameworks to
channelize expert opinion and models to study interaction of risk indicators.
Hastak and Shaked (2000) proposed ICRAM-1 as a structured model for
assessment of risk in global projects. Their proposed model employs a
framework involving the indicators of project risk in international construction.
Firms opting for expansion in a foreign market can obtain structured evaluation of
the involved risks based on the project context and its characteristics. Analysis is
performed from the project point of view, identifying how project risk would be
impacted by global, market, and project level characteristics (Hastak and Shaked
2000). ICRAM-1 also considers micro-macro division based on spatial
dimensions considering the following levels: global, market, and project. Although
in ICRAM-1 the highest level is called macro level. Apart from the transfer of risk
among the three levels, it also deemed some factors that represent interactions
of multiple parties.
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Table 2.2 Selected Studies on Risk in Construction Literature
Research
Reference
Objective
Focus Area
Political Risks in
International Construction

Ashley, and
Bonner (1987)

Risk analysis
framework

Risk Management
Perceptions and Trends of
US Construction
Project Risk Analysis and
Management
Risk appraisal and
apportionment framework
for megaprojects

Companies
approach to risk
(US)
Chapman
Risk management
(1997)
framework
Risk appraisal
Kumaraswamy
and risk
(1997)
allocation

International Construction
Risk Assessment Model

Hastak and
Shaked (2000)

NPV at Risk Method for
Infrastructure Investment
Evaluation

Ye and Tiong
(2000)

Risk Based Go/No-Go
Decision for International
Projects

Han and
Diekman
(2001)

Understanding and
managing Risks in Large
Engineering Projects
Empirical Study of Strategic
Performance in Global
Construction Firms

Kangari
(1995)

Risk assessment
framework
Compare
financial
investment
alternatives

Global
construction
Construction
industry (US)
Construction
projects
Megaprojects
Global
construction
Infrastructure
investment

Market entry
decision

Global
construction

Lessard, and
Miller (2001)

Recognize, shape,
and manage risks

Megaprojects

Cheah et al.
(2004)

Companies
approach to risk

Global
construction
market

Risk assessment
framework

Global
construction

Risk management
framework

Construction
projects

Perceptions of Contractual
Risk Allocation in
Construction Supply Chain

Walewski
(2005)
Del Cano, and
De la Cruz
(2006)
Loosemore
and McCarthy
(2008)

Risk allocation
within the supply
chain

Construction
projects

Dynamic Risk Analysis in
Construction Projects

Nasirzadeh et
al. (2008)

Risk assessment
model

Construction
projects

Risk Analysis and
contingency
model

Panama Canal

International Project Risk
Assessment
Integrated Project Risk
Management Methodology

Risk Planning and
Alarcon et al.
Management for the Panama
(2011)
Canal
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Han and Diekman (2001) proposed a Go/No-Go decision model for entering
the international market. It adopted Cross Impact Analysis (CIA) for the Go/NoGo application in order to evaluate the decision of entering new markets based
on the risks involved. The core philosophy of the model was that strategic
decisions are made based on the profitability of the project while profitability is
not decisive for rejection or acceptance of a project and other factors should be
taken into account. The proposed model is pointed to interaction and its
importance; however, it does not focus specifically on interactions as separate
parts of the project, thereby undermining the importance of the synergies
developed in the project setting. It also neglected the interactions of entities
beyond the contractor and owner. Finally, the Go/No-Go decision models’
application of sensitivity analysis may not be constructive in view of the detailed
mapping of a strategic system of choices and actions, owing to their focus on
aggregate variables (Miller, and Lessard 2007).
To summarize, the approaches to risk in construction can be divided into two
main categories. Some studies developed static assessment of risks for
construction practitioners (Hastak and Shaked 2000, Walewski 2005, Moselhi
and Deb 1993, Dey and Ogunlana 2001, and Fernandez-Denga et al. 2013).
Some other research involved models that reflect the dynamic nature of projects
(Han and Diekman 2001 and Nasirzadeh et al. 2008). However, the integration of
dynamics into risk assessment models is usually based on the core idea of risk
factor synergies. Risk factors as abstract indicators of project activities may not
be an appropriate approximation of project synergies. Therefore tying risk factors
to actual sources of synergies may provide more realistic picture of the project
dynamics.
As the concept of risk is diverse and can be interpreted and applied in variety
of the topics, the literature of risk in construction is well beyond the two
aforementioned categories. Tab. 2.2 provides a selected collection of these
studies to showcase the extent of the risk literature in construction. Cheah et al.
(2004) examined the strategic performance of firms in a global environment. In

41
this empirical study, certain characteristics of firms, which determine their
performance in a global environment, are evaluated. A conceptual model in the
study was created through the integration of collected data and strategic theory.
One of the main conclusions of the study was the fact that strategies to
success are not fixed and differ depending on diverse modes of operational,
financial, technological, and human-related conditions (Cheah et al 2004).
Dikmen and Birgonul (2004) developed a neural network model to assess
decisions for entering international markets. It provided assessment of project
risk considering interrelated parameters at different levels and their compound
effect and developed a model that captures the relation between the decision
facts (indicators) and the resulted attractiveness of the project (based on
previous data and expert opinion.) The model evaluated projects in a global
market within a two-dimensional matrix of competitiveness and attractiveness.
The complexity of the scenario and the resulted synergies are aimed to be
captured by an artificial neural network (ANN). One of the main limitations in this
case was the fact that global projects are often unique, and training the ANN is a
major challenge. In addition, the interactions of multiple stakeholders were not
addressed within the model since the relations of a company with an owner or
the public may produce different synergic results. As can be observed in these
studies the focus might be on the project as a whole, evaluating its associated
risk (e.g. Hastak and Shaked 2000), or one of the project actors and its related
characteristics (e.g. Cheah et. al 2004). Both approaches ignore some of the
stakeholders (e.g., public or non-contractual parties such as NGOs) and their
interactions. The results therefore lack incorporating broader issues, such as
sustainability in the evaluation of risks and opportunities in global construction
projects, since their analysis approach is either at the macro level or is confined
by the boundaries of a single project actor. Besides, the most common definitions
in construction-based studies may be associated to the definition of uncertainty
(as defined earlier) as well as the financial approach to risk (variance of return).
Financial and market-oriented definitions, though useful for shareholders of
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global firms and upper level management, are not efficient approximations for
planning and strategy development in construction. The construction industry
involves complex settings of a strategic management nature. Therefore,
approaches towards risk in construction should not be limited to return variance.
This study will focus on definition of risk in strategic management and its broad
implications including the unpredictability of project outcomes in terms of different
metrics4 as well as its causal roots.
Similar to research, variety of models and approaches are applied for
analysis and management of risk in construction. Dikmen et al. (2004) presented
a list of commercial softwares for risk analysis. The common methodologies in
the enumerated softwares include risk rating, Monte Carlo simulation, analytical
hierarchy process (AHP), decision tree, influence diagram, fuzzy sets, neural
networks, as well as Latin hypercube sampling (Dikmen et al. 2004). Recent
studies such as the risk analysis of Panama Canal have taken similar
approaches by applying Monte Carlo simulation. These methodologies assist
decision makers to frame their decisions for a wide range of possibilities (e.g.,
Monte Carlo simulation) or based on the input of the experts (e.g., AHP).
On the other hand, four common approaches to estimate the
consequences of plans in construction industry include i) a predetermined
percentage of the work, based on historical trends, ii) an expert’s judgment, iii) a
quantitative risk analysis based on subjective probability and the degree of
impact, iv) a regression analysis based on historical data of similar types of
projects (Molenaar et al. 2010). Organizations apply different tools for this
purpose. For instance, risk priority ranking methods as a qualitative/quantitative
assessment method are commonly used while the California Department of
Transportation (CalTrans) and the Office of Environmental Management in the
Department of Energy (DOE-EM) use Monte Carlo simulation to acquire the
probability of outcomes in the case of risk events (Molenaar et al. 2010).
Accordingly, contingencies are categorized according to the knowledge of the
4

Project metrics include: time, cost, quality, and safety.
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risk

item

and

its

quantity

as

known/known,

known/unknown,

or

unknown/unknown (Molenaar et al. 2010). Emergent risk can be associated with
the last two categories and therefore it is not quantified. Examples of these
dynamics can be unprecedented social opposition as was the case of the
Stuttgart 21 in Germany, since the risk and its quantity were unknown. On the
other hand, opposition to the Keystone pipeline can be categorized as
known/unknown because the opposition of environmentalists was perceivable
but not quantifiable. Descriptive approaches to identify, assess, and respond to
these dynamics can aid planners with multiple strategies to face the challenges
of emergent dynamics.
Recent approaches such as reference class forecasting (Flyvbjerg 2006),
although providing more accuracy for plans as a whole, fall short of assimilating
emergent dynamics. Reference class forecasting provides estimates for projects
based on the data of the similar previous projects. The result can be an accurate
assessment of the black box of a project in terms of the overall project metrics
(cost, time, safety, and quality), while strategy developers are deprived of an
accurate map of the detailed dynamics and their roots within the black box.
Therefore, in the strategic management of projects, these approaches should be
accomplished by methodologies that help decision-makers understand the
dynamics and develop response strategies. Strategic risk encompasses a broad
concept of risk, including actions, their consequences, and responses in the
shape of risk mitigation strategy development. A platform to analyze the actual
dynamics of risk is helpful to develop and integrate risk mitigation strategies into
the risk assessment process.
To summarize, risk in construction spanned over a wide range of issues and
applied various methodologies and techniques to address it. Several studies
have focused on quantification of risk, some on management risk systems, and
further studies on refinement of mathematical approaches such as subjective
probabilities, biases, and risk behaviors (Edwards and Bowen 1998). However,
less has been devoted to emergent risks associated with the dynamics of

44
interactions and synergies among institutionally diverse actors in construction
projects. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the selected research on risk in
construction literature. Next section will discuss approaches to risk and risk
assessment of dynamic system of systems in the context of the interactional
analysis.

2.4.4 Risk in the Context of Interactional Analysis
According to the discussion on risk and its definitions, the strategic
management definition of risk suits well with the approach of IA. Therefore, in this
study risk is associated with the variations on the outcome of actions and
includes context of the project as a complex system of systems, related actors,
and their interactions. Siu (1993) suggested that risk analysis models should
consider the major contributors to risk besides the overall risk associated with the
system particularly to devise strategies to mitigate risks. As discussed
construction projects are complex system of systems with dynamics associated
with the interaction of diverse actors within these systems. Therefore, the risk
analysis of these projects should investigate interactions and their associated
emergent dynamics as the major contributor to risks. Quantitative definition of
risk proposed by Kaplan and Garrick (1981) can be applied well for this purpose.
Hence, risk can be defined as the set of triplets including the scenarios, and their
associated probabilities and consequences.

2.5

Interactions

The literature pertaining to business and strategy management includes
extensive studies indicating the importance of interactions in international
business environment. The majority of the research focused on the actors rather
than interactions and was limited to contractual stakeholders. IA, as proposed in
this current study, may add a novel dimension to the nature of global construction
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by shifting the emphasis to interactions. It also provides a broader implication
considering political dynamics, power balance, and institutional capacity and a
bridge to the risk assessment methods currently applied in global construction
projects. The application can be extended to areas other than construction such
as actors’ interactions within political, business, and social contexts.

2.5.1 Interactional Dynamics and Synergies
Interactions can be studied as communication networks or power relations
between actors and institutions (Foucault 1982). Multiple researchers have
studied communication networks in terms of knowledge mobilization (JavernickWill and Levitt 2010), information network dynamics, and boundary object (Taylor
2007). This dissertation focuses on power relations, given their significance in the
institutional arrangement of projects. This novel approach of the research is a
crucial complementary analysis to precedent studies and common project
planning methodologies in order to accomplish efficient project planning and
project governance.
Synergy, as defined by Corning (2002), is the combined effects of the
components of a system that will not be attained individually (or in different
combination). The global construction environment involves the synergies of
multiple actors that interact in the short or long term in the project context. There
are several models aiming to capture the synergies resulting from the
relationships of multiple stakeholders. Since these synergies are more
conspicuous in international environments, the majority of the research has
investigated the dynamics of these environments.
Hofstede (1984) introduced cultural dimensions, arguing that differences in
values among cultures can be applied to categorize countries. It introduced
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, and Masculinity as a
proxy for cultural dimensions, having strong correlation with geographic,
economic, demographic, and national indicators. Schwartz (1992) moved the
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level of analysis to individuals, arguing that assessment of “psychic distance” for
foreign investments is influenced by individual’s value perceptions. “Psychic
distance” and “cultural distance” are two indicators that are used at the micro
(individual) and macro (cultural) levels, respectively, so as to avail assessments
in the process of decision-making upon entering international business. Kogut
and Singh (1988) investigated the influence of the market entry mode by national
cultures. They applied cultural distance as well as attitudes towards uncertainty
avoidance to relate culture to the entry mode selection. The measure of culture in
their study was built upon Hofstede indices; and they emphasized the importance
of cultural determinants in managerial decision-making. Shenkar (2001)
proposed a revision to cultural distance, labeling it as “cultural friction” with
broader implications. Investigating the conceptual and methodological illusions
present in cultural distance, this study attempted to provide a framework for
application of the concept. The framework integrates an interface among different
parties and the consequent friction through the asymmetric nature of synergies
within different cultures. Robson, Leonidou, and Katsikeas (2004) conducted an
empirical assessment of multiple projects to evaluate the performance of joint
ventures (JV) in an international venue. The results foremost showed the
importance of relational parameters among other parameters.
While most of the research in this area focused on the interactions of
contractual parties (contractors, financiers, JV partners, and owners), Aldrich
(2010) investigated civil society and states and the impacts of their
characteristics in strategies of building infrastructure in multiple countries. He
investigated facilities seen as undesirable by the host community. Reactions to
controversial facilities have often been labeled as Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY)
politics. Aldrich (2010) addresses the impacts of society and the political
structure of the government on the selection of infrastructure construction
strategies and plans.
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2.5.2 Social Exchange Theory
Interactions are central theme of social exchange theory, as a paradigm that
frames interactions according to the governing norms, and rules (Emerson 1976,
Corpanzano, Mitchell 2005). While any form of activity among actors is
considered as interactions, exchanges are specific to interactions that are formed
as series of transactions (Cook 1977). In this sense the social exchange theory
interprets social behaviors as exchanges among actors in the social context
(Homans 1958). In the case of construction projects the example of opposition
against infrastructure projects can be interpreted as the exchange of interactional
resources among involved actors. Power relations among actors can be studied
within social exchange theory considering the flow of resources (Cook 1977), and
as a determinant of outcome of dynamics in the complex system of systems. IA
refers to the literature of social exchange theory as well as social behavior
(Coleman 1973) to develop its fundamental assumptions and frameworks. This is
specifically emphasized in the thesis of the research on the importance of
interactions and power relations in the outcome of emergent dynamics in a
complex system of systems.

Figure 2.2 Literature Review in the Context of Interactional Analysis

2.6

Summary

This chapter served as a basic foundation for the IA approach of this study
by providing a summary of the theoretical research on complexity and
emergence as well as the three main pillars of this study: risk, interactions, and
institutional diversity. As depicted in Fig. 2.2 this study aims to provide the
analysis at the policy and strategy levels. This chapter provides a basis to frame
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emergent dynamics and their associated risks and to analyze mitigation policies
and strategies in the context of complex system of systems such as construction
projects.
Despite frequent use of risk in the construction industry, there is ambiguity in
its application. Therefore, the definition of risk was discussed from the
perspectives of multiple academic and practical fields. Due to the strategic nature
of the construction industry, the definition of risk in strategic management fits well
with the understanding of risk in this study. Therefore, risk in this dissertation is
tied to outcomes and their variations, but it also covers the nature and size of the
outcomes as well as the context of the risk and associated causal uncertainties.
Furthermore, this study focuses on interactions and associated emergent
dynamics as the roots of synergic risks and avoids the gaps identified in the
literature, namely 1) a focus limited on the perspective of a single actor (such as
a contractor), 2) a holistic analysis of a project without considering its
components, 3) an abstract view of dynamics through the interactions of risk
indicators, and 4) normative approach to risk through neglecting emergent
dynamics and their associated risks.
Synergies generally have been studied with the focus on actors and their
characteristics. The majority of the research also has concentrated on the
contractual actors. Neglecting the non-contractual actors has been similarly
reflected in the practice, causing significant deviations from the project plans.
This study aims to avoid these limitations and shifts the focus to the interactions
among the broader pool of actors.
Emergent dynamics are observed frequently in construction projects, as a
complex system of systems. These dynamics need to be quantitatively and
descriptively addressed to provide a practical basis for managers to mitigate their
consequences. Understanding root of these dynamics and their analysis will help
to mitigate associated risks in cases such as social opposition against the
construction projects.
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Finally, the most salient complexity dimension of construction projects is a
reflection of their institutional diversity. Integrating institutional diversity into
construction plans will facilitate the institutional arrangement of projects and the
collaborative governance structure of construction programs, as well as
sustainable integration of project actors. By introducing new dimensions of
institutional theory in construction projects through the interactional patterns of
the actors, this study aims to channel studies on the institutional aspects of
construction projects into the common practices of planning.
Chapter 3 will describe the IA framework of this study and its three major
components. It will also further discuss the literature while building the basic
framework for the typology of the interactions and explain the methodologies
applied.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the overarching framework of the research
including the methodologies and tools and their application procedures. After the
IA core framework is discussed, its integration within existing risk assessment
methodologies is outlined. The integration of IA into current risk assessment and
project planning methodologies may contribute to our understanding of the
nature of the complexities in: 1) the ever increasing complexities and the
institutional diversity of construction projects specifically, 2) the consequent
emergence in the form of changes in project outcome, and 3) the dynamics
causes of the emergence and their implications in strategic choices of the actors.
Understanding of these three aspects provides a basis to refine the existing
process of risk analysis. In this sense, IA bridges the gap between the identified
risk indicators and risk mitigation strategies/policies through interactions at the
project level, as shown in the “Project Context” in Figure 1.2.
Discussion of the IA core framework includes the major components, the
types of input required, and the format of the expected output. The scheme of
how it integrates within the current risk assessment methodologies is provided
and the topic of game theory is discussed as the core methodology of this
research. The application of simulation also will be discussed as a
complementary tool to the game theory framework. Finally, the analysis
procedure is discussed to revisit the effectiveness of the framework in answering
the research questions and fulfilling the research goals.
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3.1

Research Framework

Traditional approach to construction has depicted projects as triangle of
contractor, engineer, and the owner. As discussed in previous chapter, this
perception towards construction projects has changed to a more complex setting
involving more diverse actors (Figure 1.3). These actors may include the public
user, the public not in my back yard (NIMBY), transnational organizations,
financiers, upstream and downstream business, regulatory agencies, governing
bodies, or political parties. IA aims to study emergent dynamics associated with
the interaction of these actors in the complex context of construction projects. As
it was discussed within the scope of the study, at this stage the study aims to
delve in the study of single interactions within the context of construction projects
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Current Project Setting
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Figure 3.1 Focus of IA within the Complex Construction Projects
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to deliberate details of interactions and the mechanics of emergent dynamics.
For this purpose each interaction is studied considering the associated actors.
Actor A has plan i, such that i=1,…,n, that involves risk of interaction with actor B
and the risk is associated with the action j of actor B, such that j=1,…,m (Fig. 3.1).
For example, a project developer (actor A) might have plans for a project such as
a wind farm, hydroelectric power plant, or nuclear power plant (Plan (i)) and there
might be risks related to the act of opposition (action (j)) from the public (actor B).
The rest of the dissertation focuses on the analysis of these single interactions
and their associated emergent dynamics in the context of the complex
construction projects. Last chapter suggests the expansion of IA into the network
of the complex construction projects for future studies.
In this chapter the overall framework of the IA is discussed for further
deliberation in the following chapters. The discussion includes the components of
the IA framework, the applied methodologies, and associated process including
input data and expected output format of the framework. Before introducing the
theoretical framework of the research, the problem is formulated based on the
concept of system of systems.

3.1.1 Construction Project as a System of Systems
The concept of system of systems provides a venue for methodological
formulation of the problem of emergent risks in complex construction projects.
Maier (1998) proposed distinguishing features of any system of systems from a
monolithic system as operational management independence of the components.
That is, the component systems can operate separately and sustain their
autonomous operation. In this sense, a complex system such as a tunnel boring
machine (TBM) that is comprised of heterogeneous parts while those parts do
not operate independently is not categorized as system of systems. In addition to
these key features, systems of systems are geographically dispersed, and exhibit
evolutionary and emergent behaviors (DeLaurentis et al. 2011, Maier 1998).
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Accordingly a construction project can be categorized as a system of
systems as involved institutionally diverse actors have operational and
managerial independence, while they are also geographically distributed.
Besides, as discussed in the second chapter, construction projects exhibit
different forms of emergent behavior, besides their evolutionary nature.
As focus of this dissertation, complexity of construction projects is required to
be formulated based on the literature of system of systems. Complexity of
system of systems can be attributed to heterogeneity of components, their
interactions, as well as deep uncertainty in the state of the system (Agusdinata
and DeLaurentis 2008). Heterogeneity of the actors and their interactions are
main emphasis of this analysis, as it was mentioned in the second chapter. In
addition, the study aims to analyze the emergent risks associated with the
interactional dynamics within the construction projects. Therefore, the major
focus of this study is to provide a quantitative and descriptive assessment of the
uncertainties associated with the outcome of the project.

Table 3.1 System of Systems Lexicon for Interactional Analysis
Category
Description
Resources
Power resources
Stakeholders Project actors
Operations
Power dynamics
Policies
Contextual dynamics
Levels
Description
Individuals involved in or connected to the construction
α
project
β
Actors involved in construction project
γ
Alliances or coalitions between actors
δ
Construction project
δ
Programs

In order to address complexity of construction projects the taxonomy and
lexicon of system of systems can provide a methodological formulation of the
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problem (DeLaurentis and Callaway 2004). Taxonomy clarifies behaviors and
features of the system for the purpose of modeling, while lexicon is a framework
to communicate understanding of the model and its hierarchies (DeLaurentis et
al. 2011). Table 3.1 describes the lexicon of interactional analysis in construction
projects including multiple hierarchical levels in a construction project as a
complex system of systems. In this sense, project actors of a construction project
as stakeholders shape the system of systems along with the power resources.
On the other hand, the dynamics of this system are power dynamics within the
network of a construction project, while any exogenous dynamic is considered as
contextual dynamic.
In terms of hierarchy, the individuals are the base level of analysis (α level)
where further decomposition of the system is not possible in the analysis. At the
higher level (β level), an actor involving several individuals is formed, and
multiple actors can make coalitions such as joint ventures in construction projects
(γ level). Construction projects are a higher level of hierarchy involving multiple
actors or coalitions (δ level). Several projects may be included in a program to
form a higher level of hierarchy (δ level), such as the case of infrastructure
development program (table 3.1). The analysis of this dissertation is focused on
the interaction among actors (or their coalition) under the project (or program)
level.
In addition, the taxonomy of interactional analysis can be proposed to define
systems of systems based on the types of systems, control of systems, and
connectivity of systems (DeLaurentis et al. 2011). In terms of type of systems,
each construction project as a system of systems is comprised of multiple
systems, that is heterogeneous actors, and their power interactions. For the
dimension of control, these heterogeneous actors are fairly independent and
autonomous and can satisfy the assumptions set by Maier (1998), as they can be
involved in other projects with other actors. Finally, the connectivity of this
network in this dissertation is studied based on power relations. That is, these
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heterogeneous actors have power relations with each other and interactional
analysis aims to analyze the dynamics based on the connectivity of the system.
Therefore, system of systems provided a framework to formulate the study of
emergent dynamics in complex construction projects. It viewed projects as a
system of systems comprising heterogeneous actors that have power relations in
a hierarchical order. The ultimate goal of the interactional analysis is to provide
quantitative and descriptive assessment of the emergent dynamics associated
with these interactions or in the other words to address the emergent risk in
institutionally diverse construction projects.

Interactional Analysis

Component I

Preferences

Framework
of Interaction

Risk Mitigation
Policies

Assessment of
Interaction

Policy Development

Structure of
Interaction

Strategy
Development

Interactional Analysis
Policy level

Interactional Analysis
Strategy level

Probabilities

Input Data

Component II

Research Process

Output

Legend

Component III

Transaction Costs

Risk Mitigation
Strategies

Figure 3.2 Interactional Analysis Framework

3.1.2 Components of the Research Framework
In order to address the emergent risk in institutionally diverse construction
projects, IA core framework involves three intertwined components, including
(Figure 3.2.):
•

Component I: Interactional analysis at the policy level

•

Component II: Interactional analysis at the strategy level
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•

Component

III:

Policy-making/strategy-development

component

(mitigation component)
The first component aims to model interactions based on the literature of
risk analysis, power relations in social science, and the bargaining game in
economy (Kaplan and Garrick 1981, Dahl 1957, Foucoult 1982, Harsanyi 1962,
and Wrong 1979, Coleman 1973). The analysis is performed at the policy level
and provides the decision maker with a framework to develop the direction of
actions and assess their impact. It looks at interactions as single instance actions
and does not provide the detailed stages of the interaction. Modeling the
interactions associated with emerging risks has a four-fold goal:
•

to provide a methodological approach to define the context of risk.

•

to facilitate descriptive analysis of risk.

•

to provide a platform to promote innovation in the development of risk
mitigation policies/strategies, and

•

to facilitate quantitative analysis of associated risks
Figure 3.3 provides an example of some risks and their related

interactions. For example, using the social opposition scenario against
construction projects referred to earlier, this could be the degree to which the
project developer can control the act of opposition from groups involved (such as
transnational groups, public NIMBY, etc.) The risk of counterfeiting for the
construction industry depends on the extent that the industry as a whole can
control the act of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items (CFSI). Finally, the
risks associated with the enforcement of safety behavior depend on the degree
that the governing body can control the unsafe actions of the labor (Fig. 3.3).
Although the first component provides insights for the analysis of
emergent dynamics at the level of policies, it does not provide a detailed analysis
of different stages of the interactions. Therefore, the second component aims to
address this shortcoming through structuring interactions in multiple stages (Fig.
3.2). Therefore, after the first component provides direction of actions in the form
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of policies, the second component provides specific actions and their sequences
to reflect emergent dynamics associated with interaction of institutionally diverse
actors. Each stage includes the actions and reactions of the actors involved and
might lead to some terminal node outcomes with their associated dynamics. In
this stage, different actions and their sequence are used to develop a detailed
structure of the interaction. In the example of social opposition in construction
projects, the output of interactional analysis at the policy level (component I in Fig
3.2) is a descriptive framework of risk and its causes, as well as policies to
mitigate this risk and their impact. These policies may include reward
mechanisms, penalty mechanisms, public engagement, network building, or
sanction mechanisms. For example, the World Bank proposed several
compensation plans as reward mechanisms in construction of the Lesotho
Highland Water Project (LHWP) in Lesotho and South Africa (Khagram 2004).
Although the first component of IA provides quantitative and descriptive
assessment of these policies, there is a need for analysis of detailed actions to
understand detail strategies that are used to pursue the proposed policies. The
second component in Fig. 3.2 provides this detail analysis as it structures the
interaction as a multi-stage combination of actions and reactions. For example,
the case of social opposition can be modeled as informal actions by the
opposition group such as lobbying, protests, or media pressure, as well as the
response of the project developer that may have the choice to respond with
informal actions and negotiate with the opposition, or respond with the formal
action and repress the opposition. Each stage at this component is defined within
the model and different potential structures can be modeled and simulated to
observer a range of potential outcomes as the risk profile of the project. This
multi-stage structure can involve informal actions such as awareness campaigns
or lobbying as well as formal actions such as filing a legal action. Accordingly,
detailed strategies of actors and their effectiveness are analyzed for each actor.
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A

B

Project Developer – Act of Opposition – Transnational groups
Owner – Act of Claim – Contractor
Contractor – Collective Safety Behavior – Labor
Construction Industry – Act of distributing CFSI – Counterfeiters
Government – Collective Sustainable Behavior – Public

Figure 3.3 Example of Interactions as Defined at the Policy Level

The third component in Fig. 3.2 serves to answer the key question of the
research: what are the measures that need to be taken to respond to the
emergent dynamics? In this component, the result of the assessment of the
interaction, modeled as a bargaining game between two actors, is used to
develop policies that can address the emergent dynamics and the associated
risks. Similarly, the result of the detailed analysis of the interaction, modeled as
an extensive game, is used to develop responses at the strategy level.
Application of these two elements to develop mitigation strategies and policies
provides a quantitative platform to mitigate emergent dynamics. Besides, defining
emergent risks based on interactions provides a descriptive platform to mitigate
associated emergent dynamics. The combination is a hybrid quantitative and
descriptive analysis of risks in complex construction projects. As discussed, the
mitigation component (component II in Fig. 3.2) is emphasized within the IA
framework to answer the main question of how to address emergent dynamics in
complex systems. Although this component is independent in a theoretic
framework of interactional analysis (Fig. 3.2), practically it is intertwined with the
other two components with the aim to offer a hybrid approach to strategy
development and policy-making. That is, interactional analysis includes both
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descriptive and quantitative analysis of emerging risks, clarifying the decision
space in complex system of systems such as construction projects. Therefore,
component three is divided into two sections associated with the policy and
strategy level of analysis (Fig. 3.2). And in this dissertation the two sections of
the third component will be described along with their respective level of analysis
in component one and two. As a result chapter four discusses the policy level of
analysis along with mitigation at the policy level and chapter five discusses the
strategy level of analysis along with mitigation at the strategy level.

3.1.3 Types of Input Data
The three components discussed in the previous section, i.e., interactional
analysis at the policy level (component I), interactional analysis at the strategy
level (component II), and mitigation component (component III), are nurtured with
three types of data: likelihoods, transaction costs, and preferences (Fig 3.2).
Likelihoods are the probabilities associated with different expected outcomes and
take values between zero and the unit. For example at the strategy level
(Component II in Fig 3.2), each potential outcome of the interaction, such as the
negotiation or litigation, is modeled as a lottery game. Therefore, each outcome
involves its associated probability of winning the lottery.
Transaction costs describe the costs associated with each action and are
used at the strategy level, where the interaction is modeled through its detailed
actions. Each alternative formal and informal action at the strategy level of
analysis (Component II in Fig 3.2) is associated with transaction costs. For
example, legal actions involve different transaction costs compared to lobbying
and as a result the impact on the associated risk profile will be different.
Preferences are called the choice problem of the actor (Rubinstein 1998);
and in economics (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953), it is described through
the utility value that each actor associates with different outcomes or alternative
choices. As this concept was profoundly based on the assumption of a rational
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actor, it includes assumptions about the actor’s knowledge of the problem, clear
preferences, and ability to optimize, as well as indifference to logically equivalent
descriptions of alternatives and choice sets (Rubinstein 1998). Therefore, the
concept of “bounded rationality” may be introduced to reflect more realistic
models of an actor’s decision-making mechanisms. Bounded rationality
addresses asymmetries in abilities of the decision makers in terms of their
abilities to make decisions and their perceptions of the decision space. At this
stage, IA limits its scope to the traditional view of utility- maximizing actors to
maintain the focus of the research on the proposed framework and its application.
The bounded rationality postulates are, however, discussed within the analysis
sections of the methodology as well as the future research.
At the policy level preferences are described through utility values. For
example, the public NIMBY in case of infrastructure development associates
different utilities with alternative compensation plans. In that case, employments
offered as compensation might be associated with different utility values
compared to cash compensations. For example, the New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (NOIDA) has granted an exclusive right of commercial
land development to NOIDA Toll Bridge Company Limited (NTBCL) consortium
in the region of Delhi-Noida-Delhi toll bridge (Pargal 2007). The high utility value
that the consortium associates with such an exclusive reward is considered in the
assessment of emergent risks. At the strategy level of analysis, the payoff is
used instead of utility values to describe the preferences of actors. In the model,
this assumption is translated into each actor choosing the alternative with higher
payoff value. For example, the payoff of project modification in the case of social
opposition in Bujagali Hydroelectric Power Station may be equal to the reduction
in profit of project because of the requested modifications. Since payoffs have a
linear function it simplifies calculations and allows deliberate focus on the model
and its application. Therefore, this assumption at the strategy level is to avoid
mathematical complexity and to shift the focus on the concept.
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3.1.4 Output Format of the IA Framework
This section aims to define the hybrid nature of the output of IA as a
descriptive and quantitative form of mitigation policies and strategies. As
depicted in Fig. 3.2, the emergent risks associated with the interactional
dynamics are framed and structured in the first and second component of the
research. As a result, the risks associated with interactions are defined in a
descriptive framework and structure that reflects the interaction and associated
interactional elements such as the actors involved and the resources applied.
The descriptive frame of each risk is then translated into the mathematical
equilibria of the interaction through game theoretic models. Finally, the equilibria
of emergent risks are simulated to observe a range of potential outcomes and
obtain the associated risk profile.
Similarly, the strategies and policies are shaped based on the framework
of the interaction, the strategies including sequences of the actions and their
potential outcomes, the policies including the associated preferences. The impact
of the mitigation strategies and policies is also analyzed through simulation of the
equilibria to provide risk profile of alternative mitigations for the emergent
dynamics. The descriptive and quantitative format of the output enables project
planners to have a methodological description of the responses and a
quantitative assessment of their effectiveness. Furthermore, the comprehensive
format of presenting policies and strategies provides a platform to devise
innovative policies and strategies to mitigate emergent risks.
To elaborate more, the output of the interactional analysis includes a
framework of the interaction, integration of the framework into the concept of
emergent risk, sequential representation of actions, descriptive representation of
policies, as well as associated risk profiles. Risk profiles along with the
framework of risk facilitate decision making and increase the transparency of the
interactional dynamics in a complex system of systems. At the bottom line the
output can be used as a wide array of potential emergent dynamics, their
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consequences, associated mitigation policies and strategies, and the degree of
effectiveness of the mitigation policies and strategies. Potential scenarios as well
as alternative mitigation policies and strategies are framed in a descriptive
manner while the associated risks as well as impact of mitigation policies and
strategies are presented in a quantitative format.

3.2

Methodologies Applied in Interactional Analysis

In order to perform the analysis associated with component I and II of the
framework of IA depicted in Fig. 3.2, the interactions associated with each
emergent risk are modeled based on the concept of game theory. Besides, the
equilibria of the game at the policy and strategy levels are simulated to observe a
wide range of potential outcomes and obtain the profile of the emergent risk.

3.2.1 Game Theoretic Model of Emergent Risks
Game theory provides a basis to analyze the contexts in which decisionmakers

interact (Osborne and

Rubinstein

1994,

Myerson 1997). The

differentiating feature of this theory compares to other approaches in decision
theory is the consideration of multiple rational actors within the decision context.
This is in contrast with decision-making models that optimize the decision based
on the assumptions of a single decision-maker within the context of the decision.
For example, risk assessment models in construction are often modeled as a
single decision maker and do not integrate the adaptive behavior of other actors.
IA applies the concept of game theory to analyze the emergent dynamics
associated with the interactions as it facilitates integration of dynamics
associated with the adaptive actions of other decision makers into the decision
and provides a multi-actor decision model.
At the policy level of IA, each interaction is analyzed as a bargaining game
between actors. Bargaining games investigate how a rational actor may choose
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strategies to promote its interest against another rational actor (Harsanyi 1986).
At this level of analysis, the equilibrium of the game is set based on the
preferences in the form of utilities. This game is presented in the normal form
assuming that each actor has only one move and the actors make their moves
simultaneously and independent of other actors (Harsanyi 1986). That is each
actor chooses a whole set of strategies as a direction of actions before the game
starts. In this dissertation the direction of actions in the normal form of game is
called policy, since policies also provide direction of actions for each specific
case in advance. The decision is made to maximize utility of the actor. Therefore,
in the context of interactional analysis each decision involves actors i, such that
i={A,…,Z}, utility vector u(i)=Ui(σ(1),…, σ(n)} that indicates the utility of actor i, in
case other actors choose actions σ(1),…,σ(n) (Harsanyi 1986). For example in
the case of the construction project presented in Fig. 3.1, actor A associates a
utility vector to different actions in the agenda of actor B. As depicted in Fig. 2.1,
in the case of construction projects these actors may include financiers,
contractors, owners, public, suppliers, etc. Therefore, in the normal form of game
each actor chooses the direction of its action before the start of interaction, for
example a construction project developer might follow the general policy of
alliance with local contractors in foreign markets. This alliance can take different
forms depending on the interaction, but the general direction of action is set
before the start of interaction.
On the other hand, the IA strategy level models interactions as an extensive
form game in which the interactions are depicted according to the sequential
moves of each actor (actions in figure 3.4). This form provides a more detailed
analysis of different actions within the interaction and their sequence and is
suitable for the strategy development level (Harsanyi 1986, Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994), while the normal form of game is suitable at the policy-making
level as it just provides direction of strategies for each actor. In the extensive
form of game each actor decides its action exactly at the respective stage of the
interaction (Harsanyi 1986). Therefore each actor has alternative actions at each
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stage of the game and it decides between these alternatives. For example, in the
case of social opposition against hydroelectric projects, transnational groups
such as International Rivers (IR) choose from an array of informal and formal
strategies to oppose construction of dams. These actions include protests, media
pressure, legal actions, or political pressure (International Rivers 2013). The
developer also can choose alternative reactions from its strategy set including
repression, inhibition, negotiation, persuasion, or legal actions. At this stage IA
provides an analysis of the equilibria of interaction for different alternative
structures of the game which are created through selection of alternative
strategies. Similar to the policy stage of analysis it is assumed that the actors are
rational and choose alternative strategies that provides them the maximum
payoff or utility. In order to analyze the range of emergent outcomes associated
with interactional dynamics, the equilibria at both levels are simulated.

Actor A
Action 1

….

Action n

Actor B
Action 1

….

Actor B
Action n Action 1

….

Action n

Payoff tuple (11) …. Payoff tuple (1n) Payoff tuple (n1) ….

Figure 3.4 Example of Extensive Game between Two Actors

3.2.2 Simulation of Emergent Risks
Simulation facilitates observation of the behavior of complex, interactive
systems under a wide range of conditions and allows for the development of
emergent outcomes (Law and Kelton 1991, Ioannou and Martinez 1996).
Previous studies of the dynamics of public participation in decision-making lack

65
the application of analytic and simulation methods (Dietz and Stern 2008). IA
applies simulation to study variations of policies and strategies so as to provide a
range of possible scenarios and their outcomes in the form of risk profiles or the
probability of terminal node outcomes. Therefore, after descriptive framing of
emergent risk and its mathematical modeling, the associated equilibria are
simulated. Simulation triggered different variations within the model; and at the
policy level of IA, simulation was performed to assess the changes in the
interactional elements and mathematical functions of policies. The effect of
variations is observed through changes in the profile of the emergent risk. At the
level of IA strategy development, simulation was applied for structural variation
and contextual variation of the model. The result of simulating the equilibria of the
interaction is an array of potential emergent outcomes associated with the
dynamics within a complex system of systems. Therefore, the risk profile is
presented as a distribution of outcomes for an assortment of potential emergent
dynamics associated with each scenario of risk. At the policy level, simulation
was applied to account for changes in the value of variables. To perform the
simulation at the strategy level Anylogic Software is used, while at the policy level
@Risk Sofware is applied.

Figure 3.5 Flowchart of Simulation Input and Output

The risk profile at different stages of the project can be updated into the
simulation based on the observation and collection of the real data. As a result
any observed inconsistencies in the assumptions and values of the variables can
be corrected and updated in the analysis of the project risk. Besides, simulation
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provides a wide range of potential outcomes and reduces the chances of surprise
outcomes. As a result, any unprecedented emergent may be approximated and
covered by the range of simulated potential dynamics. An example of surprises in
construction projects is the case of an actor that is not initially mobilized and
emerges during the project, such as the case of transnational organizations in
dam construction.
As the simulation involves using random variables, the effect of random
generation should be same in simulated models. This consideration implies that
the changes in the behavior of the model are the consequence of variations
within the model and not the effect of the random variables used within each
model. At the strategy level, simulations of each scenario are undertaken using
matched pairs of random variables to cancel the effect of changes in random
variables in the comparison of each alternative strategy. Matched pairs
simulation synchronizes the effect of uncertainty for both alternative interactional
structures (Ioannou and Martinez 1996) and omits the impact of random
variables from the outcome of the model.

3.3

Integration of the Framework within Current Planning Practices

As described in Chapter 1, the IA framework can act as an ad hoc to
current planning and risk analysis techniques in construction. A common tool for
risk assessment in the construction industry is to channelize the opinion of
experts through a checklist of risk indicators. In this sense, each actor might have
a classified list of risks related to their plans. These classified lists may be
developed from different documents and reports, certain procedures and plans,
policies, or brainstorming within the organizations (Molenaar et al. 2010). This list
can be applied within the risk assessment models to channelize expert opinions
on the magnitude of risk. In certain industry focuses, such as the international
construction market, generic lists exist that are compiled from expert opinion and
an extensive literature review of the subject area. ICRAM-1, an international
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construction risk assessment model (Hastak and Shaked 2000), or IPRA, an
international project risk assessment model (Walewski 2005), are two examples
of these generic models in the international construction arena. The subjective
assessment of these models may not provide practitioners and strategic
managers with the required insight into roots of the risk and the mitigation actions
that can effectively address these dynamics. Therefore, a descriptive and
quantitative model to analyze the related risks is required for the development of
effective strategies to address the identified risks. The proposed IA framework
can be applied to analyze risks suggested by the aforementioned models or even
integrated within their structure to analyze and refine their assessments and
develop strategies accordingly.
In order to showcase the adaptability of the interactional analysis
framework within the existing models, the hypothetical example of the
international construction project discussed by Hastak and Shaked (2000) will be
used. ICRAM-1 provides a structured approach to channelize the opinion of the
experts regarding the risks involved in an international project (Figure 3.5). It has
three levels (project, market, and macro); the market level impacts the project
level risks and the macro level impacts both the project and market level risk
indicators. Each level includes an array of associated risk indicators. Experts
determine the level of risk associated with each risk indicator to obtain the overall
risk of the project as well as risks at each of the three levels.
The hypothetical example in Hastak and Shaked (2000) suggested
societal conflicts as the highest risk indicator at the macro level, which also
impacts the market and project level risks. Although the strategy developer is
now aware of the risk she cannot decipher this outcome as far as the root causes
of the social conflicts, how they affect the project dynamics, and how efficiently
they can be mitigated.
The point of departure for the IA framework is at this exact point to frame
and assess the risk context and to provide a quantitative and descriptive basis for
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development of risk mitigation policies and strategies (Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 1.2). For
this purpose, the risk indicator will be plotted at the context of the project
including the associated actors and dynamics to link the risks with their roots. In
order to have a methodological approach, this procedure is performed according
to the proposed framework of interactional analysis. As it can be observed from
figure 3.5 the framework of interaction is then integrated into the definition of risk
as triplets of scenarios, their associated likelihood and potential consequences
(Kaplan and Garrick 1981). The result is a descriptive framework of the emergent
risk. This framework is used for two different levels of analysis named the
strategy level and the policy level.

Figure 3.5 Flowchart of the Interactional Analysis
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The policy level of analysis models the emergent dynamics based on the
bargaining game (Chapter 4), while the strategy level models the emergent
dynamics in an extensive form of game (Chapters 5). The result is a descriptive
analysis of the emergent risk identified and assessed by the existing model (e.g.,
ICRAM 1) as well as its quantified risk profile. Additionally, the analysis includes
descriptive and quantitative representation of mitigation policies and strategies as
well as their impact. The quantitative assessment of the emergent risks as well
as the quantitative assessment of the impact of mitigation policies and strategies
is presented as a risk profile of each scenario and the changes in the risk profile
as a result of the mitigation action. Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate more on the
details of the methodology.
As it was mentioned above, the input of the methodology is different at each
stage. The risk assessment models such as ICRAM-1 are based on the experts’
opinion and their assessment of the level of risk associated with each risk
indicator. In order to frame the emergent risk, interactional analysis applies
description of the case in the form of field data, experts’ opinion, as well as
archive of similar projects. The quantification at the policy level is based on the
preferences of the actors in the form of utility functions. The strategy level at this
stage applies payoffs instead of utilities to simplify representation of the
dynamics. Additionally, the strategy level requires transaction costs associated
with each action as well as probabilities associated with each outcome. Chapters
4 and 5 provide more details on the required input of the framework.

3.4

Case Studies

The empirical body of this dissertation includes two major categories of
cases. The first category includes descriptive account of cases that are reviewed
to provide a practical example of the discussed phenomena. For this purpose,
cases of infrastructure projects have been discussed throughout the manuscript.
Majority of the cases are related to social opposition in hydroelectric
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development to provide a consistent review of the problem. In order to provide
breadth, other cases of infrastructure development have been used including
bridges and roads, transportation hubs and associated facilities, energy
infrastructure, or pipelines.
The second category of cases is used to provide a consolidated example
of the application of the proposed methodology in infrastructure development
around the world. For this purpose, the proposed framework of interactional
analysis is applied to perform a comparative analysis of emergent risks in dam
construction. The construction of dams has declined sharply in recent decades
due to emergence dynamics such as social opposition (WCD 2000, Khagram
2004). Study of these dynamics in multiple contexts will provide insights into
application of the methodology and its outcome. Therefore, the case study is
focused on four contexts suggested by Khagram (2004) based on the degree of
social mobilization and democracy. The understudied contexts represent the
case of social opposition against dam construction in China, South Africa, Brazil,
and Indonesia since 60s.
Sources of the data for these cases are the literature of construction
engineering and management, specifically the topic of infrastructure development,
as well as the literature of social science and specifically public participation and
decision-making. Therefore, the main resources are based on previous case
studies. In the case of the comparative analysis of dam construction the data is
based on the case study proposed by Khagram (2004), while the data is
supported with several other case studies in related contexts such as Aditjondro
(1998), Jackson and Sleigh (2000), or Rothman (2001). The analysis provides
both proponents and opponents of dam construction with insights on emergent
dynamics and the associated risk. The consolidated case study, the associated
implications, and results are presented in the appendix.
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3.5

Verification and Validation

Verification and validation are necessary to ensure that the model reflects
the reality and delivers the specified goals. Verification aims to ensure that the
model reflects the intended concepts and performs as intended (Law and Kelton
1991, Macal 2005, and Delaurentis 2009). Validation, on the other hand, aims to
ensure that the model is a reflection of the reality of the understudied system
(Law and Kelton 1991 and Delaurentis 2009). The ultimate stage in this process
is the credibility (accreditation) stage that aims to gauge the effectiveness of the
model at the implementation of its results in the real world (Law and Kelton 1991).
In order to gauge the accuracy of the model in reflecting the emergent
dynamics of institutionally diverse construction projects, the validation and
verification process is performed as suggested by Sargent (2010) and Law and
Kelton (1991). The verification and validation stage includes conceptual
validation, specification and implementation verification, and operational validity
(Sargent 2010).
•

Conceptual validation: Face validation (Sargent 2010) is used to ensure
that the validity of the interdisciplinary concept of the model is sound in
each of the related fields. The interactional model, its equilibria, and the
definitions of payoffs and utility values were discussed with game theory
experts to validate their theoretical robustness. The concept of the model
also was discussed with social science and construction engineer experts
to ensure the relevance of the applied theories.

•

Specification and implementation verification: Game theory is widely
applied in the assessment of collaborative decision-making contexts in
social science and engineering. Ho and Liang (2004) applied game theory
to analyze the dynamics of claim, Unsal and Taylor (2011) employed
game theory for hold-up problems in project networks, De Mesquita and
Lalman (1992) applied game theory to conflicts at the global level. In this
dissertation game theory is applied to provide a mathematical model of
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emergent risks in the context of complex construction projects. On the
other hand, the simulation and analytical study of social dynamics and
interactions are encouraged in the field of infrastructure (Dietz and Stern
2008). Simulation of social and political dynamics may be an essential tool
in addition to current simulation methodologies applied for construction
processes. The extension to application of simulation is highlighted by the
importance of social and political dynamics as well as the high uncertainty
involved in these as well as any other forms of emergent risk. Therefore,
the interactional models are simulated in this study to observe the
behavior of the complex construction projects.
•

Operational validity: The performance of the simulation model was verified
to ensure that it mirrored the equilibria of the game. This stage of
validation involved techniques such as the extreme condition test,
animation, and event validity (Sargent 2010). Pilot runs were performed
with predetermined input-outputs to ensure that the simulation reflected
the equilibria. The outputs were animated graphically to examine any
specific pattern of behavior; and the output of the model was compared to
specific cases to ensure the empirical validity of the output. For this
purpose, the framework of interactional analysis is applied for comparative
analysis of emergent in dam construction.
To summarize, the interactional model and its simulations were constantly

tested to recognize its level of accuracy in reflecting the purpose of the research.
The purpose of this research was to propose the methodology of IA that would
provide analysis of emergent dynamics in complex system of systems such as
complex construction projects. To this extent, the model fulfilled the predefined
purpose of the research. The ultimate merit of the research, however, is an
unremitting process through application of the IA concept in different issues that
involve the emergent dynamics associated with interactions in complex systems
of systems.
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3.6

Summary

This chapter introduced the overall IA framework in addition to the basic
methodologies applied within the framework. First, the three major components
were discussed: 1) policy level interactional analysis, 2) strategy level
interactional analysis, and 3) mitigation action development. The third component
was divided between the two levels (policy and strategy) for the sake of more
clarity. Chapter 4 will discuss policy level IA and associated policy development,
while Chapter 5 will discuss strategy level IA and associated strategy
development.
This chapter also provided a discussion of the methodologies applied in
the IA framework. Game theory was discussed as the core analytical tool in the
proposed framework as the emergent dynamics associated with interactions are
modeled in this study as a bargaining game. As the equilibria of the interaction
are simulated to observe a diverse range of outcomes due to variations,
simulation is also reviewed briefly. Finally, the integration of IA as a
complementary tool to current planning was discussed. As construction projects
become more complex, involving a variety of political and nonpolitical
organizations, IA can help construction project planners reflect the real dynamics
of a project including risk analysis and policy/strategy development. This would
enable identification of the interactions among the actors pertinent to specific
project risks and their consequent synergies.
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CHAPTER 4. INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE POLICY LEVEL

Policy-makers are often challenged with the emergent dynamics of
complex construction projects. The increasing trend of complexity in terms of the
institutional diversity of projects highlights the importance of policies that
effectively address risks that arise from the interactions of these actors. This
chapter presents the policy level of IA as a hybrid - descriptive and quantitative approach to govern the emergent risks associated with interactions in a complex
system of systems. The policy level component of the IA framework is presented
in view of the core philosophy of this dissertation, which is shaped based on the
theories of power relations in social science.
IA frames interactions as the coupling of complex systems, i.e., actors,
and quantifies the associated emergent dynamics based on the equilibria of the
interaction. The framework is further applied to investigate the dynamism
inherent in the risk governance of complex systems. Then, the emergent risks
can be assessed based on the equilibria of the game and considering the degree
of interactional complexity. The outcome of the analysis at this level will be a
foundation that will i) frame the ontological understanding of interactions
including their consequent emergent dynamics and their associated risks ii)
quantify the assessment of this risk, and iii) develop risk mitigation policies and
assess their impact.
In addition to the first component of the IA framework (i.e., the policy level of
IA), the policy development section of the third component (mitigation component
in Fig. 3.2) is also discussed as the development of mitigation policies to address
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emergent risks (Fig 3.2). The policy component develops policies in the
quantitative/descriptive format. Policy-makers can utilize this framework for
effective governance of the emergent dynamics within interactional contexts,
such as complex construction projects. Finally, the practical implications of the
framework are discussed in global construction as a strategic management field,
while practical examples of the field are provided throughout the chapter.
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Figure 4.1 Power Relations within a Network of Actors

4.1

Interactional Framework

Dynamism may be interpreted differently depending on the context. In this
chapter, dynamism is used to describe non-stationary status of a system (or a
SoS) (Figure 4.1) that comprises multiple actors (the vertices of the network) and
their interactions (the edges of the network). For example, in the case of Bujagali
Hydropower Project in Uganda the project context includes diverse actors such
as engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) consortium as the project
developer (actor A in Fig. 4.1), the AES Nile Power Ltd. (AESNP) as the sponsor
of the project (actor E in Fig. 4.1), the government of Uganda (actor F in Fig. 4.1),
public NIMBY including Basoga and Baganda communities (actor B in Fig. 4.1),
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export credit agencies of countries such as Switzerland (actor C in Fig 4.1), the
World Bank (actor G in Fig. 4.1), as well as transnational organizations such as
International Rivers (actor D in Fig 4.1) (Bosshard 2002). Accordingly,
interactional analysis addresses the two important features of complexity
described by Baccarini (1996): i) differentiation: i.e., institutional diversity of the
actors, and ii) connectivity: i.e., the interactions among these actors. The
interactions are viewed as the coupling of the actors (the nodes or vertices of the
network), while each actor may itself be a complex system. In the case of
Bujagali, the project developer wants to mitigate the risk of social opposition
through inhibiting action of opposing the project by actors such as the
International Rivers and the public NIMBY (Fig. 4.1). Interactional analysis
focuses on these interactions, as one of the major sources of emergent
dynamism in a complex system of systems. In order to start with minimal
complexity in the model, the focus of this chapter is on the interaction of two
actors within the context of the project (Fig. 4.1).

Table 4.1 Basics of Interactional Analysis
Purpose

Analysis of emergent dynamics in complex system of systems

Core philosophy

Focus on interactions as coupling of actors

Dimension of analysis

Power relations

Unit of analysis

Actions in the form of policies and strategies

Metric of analysis

Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility values

Table 4.1 presents basics of interactional analysis based on the
formulation of the problem in the previous chapter. The fundamental purpose of
interactional analysis is to analyze and govern emergent dynamics of a complex
system of systems (Table 4.1). Interactional analysis studies emergent dynamics
as a salient property of any complex system of systems. As mentioned in chapter
two, emergence can be observed in diverse fields, while Goldstein (1999)
proposes five common properties necessary for any emergent phenomenon: 1)
radical novelty, 2) coherence, 3) macro level, 4) dynamical, and 5) ostensive. In
this regard the emergent phenomenon is novel and has not been observed
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before. It is the effect of interrelated parts that exhibit a coherent holism. It is
observed at the macro level and as a result of dynamism within the complex
system and is an observable phenomenon in complex systems. IA at the policy
level aims to address the emergent property of a complex system of system
associated with the interaction of diverse actors. Therefore, the focus is at the
construction projects (δ level) and the system of systems is analyzed based on
the coupling of actors, as complex systems by themselves. In terms of the
operations in the system of systems (Table 3.1), IA at the policy level is focused
on the direction of actions.
Several forms of emergence can be observed in construction projects, as
complex systems of systems that involve multiple actors: emerging contextual
property, emergent actors, emerging coalitions, emerging transformations of an
actor, and emergent synergies. Within institutionally diverse construction projects,
often an assortment of these categories is observed. For example, in the case of
hydroelectric infrastructure development around the world, social opposition is
proved to be an emergent risk. The consequences are the sharp decline in the
completion of dam projects around the world (Khagram 2004). As stated, this
dissertation develops a methodological approach to the emergent phenomena of
institutionally diverse projects and studies emergence through its reflections as
the consequent deviations in terms of project metrics (i.e., cost, time,
environmental impact, quality, safety, etc.) In order to mitigate the emergence at
the policy level, the interactions associated with emergent risks are framed. This
framework is applied in mitigation policy development and assessment of the
effectiveness of mitigation policies.

4.2
Foucault

Structure of the Framework at the Policy Level

(1982)

suggested

that

interactions

can

be

studied

as

communication networks or power relations between actors. Interactional
analysis focuses on the latter (i.e. power relations) to develop its analysis
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framework. In the context of global construction, a claim from a contractor is an
explicit scenario where the contractor and the owner exercise power in their
interactions. The interactions are directed, which means that the power exercise
of actor A on actor B is different than the power exercise of actor B on actor A. All
the interactions in a complex system of systems such as the one depicted in
Figure 4.1 can be studied in terms of their power relations. The core philosophy
of interactional analysis is to employ power relations within a complex system of
systems to approximate consequences of the emergent dynamics. For this
purpose the interactional analysis frames each interaction based on its elements.
The framework will be further modified to the framework of the emergent risk
which will be applied to develop and assess mitigation policies.
The first interactional element is the actor who exerts its power, which will be
called the power executor (e.g., actor A in Figure 4.1). The additional
interactional elements are defined based on the five dimensions of power (Dahl
1957): 1) extension of power, 2) scope of power, 3) base of power, 4) means of
power, and 5) amount of power.
Extension of power includes the set of actors that are impacted by power
relation. In Figure 4.1, the extension of power of actor A (executor of power)
includes actors B, E and F. The scope of power includes actions of the power
respondents that are going to be targeted through power interaction. In Figure
4.1, action X(i) from the agenda of the actor B is the action that is targeted by the
power interaction with actor A. For instance, the scope of power of a governing
body such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) over
any contractor in a construction project is limited to safety-related actions. The
scope of power in this interaction does not include other actions within the
agenda of the contractor, such as actions related to contractual relations with
subcontractors.
Base of power, which is called power resources by Wrong (1979) and
Galbraith (1983), is any resources applied in the power exercise. The base of
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power can be categorized as personal, property, and organizational (Galbraith
1983). It may include financial, legal, knowledge, technical, public (Wrong 1979,
Galbraith 1983), normative, and cultural-cognitive resources, (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983, Scott 2001) the network, or combination of them. For example, in
the case of Bujagali dam, the Ugandan High Court declared the contract as a
public document that should be revealed to public. In this case, legal resource
was used by the opposition to disclose documents pushing the contractor
(AESNP consortium) not to keep the contract as a secret document and to
increase the transparency of the process (African Development Bank 2008).
Means of power, referred to as the power mechanism by Wrong (1979) and
Galbraith (1983), are approaches to exercise power. Generally, they can be
divided into condign, compensatory or conditioned mechanisms (Galbraith 1983).
Wrong (1979) limited the means of power to the intended influence of behaviors
and categorized them as force (coercion), manipulation, persuasion, and
authority (Wrong 1979). Unintended influence as forms of power may also be
considered as normative, and mimetic mechanisms described by DiMaggio and
Powell (1983).

Table 4.2 Interactional Analysis of Risks Associated with the Public Mobilization
and Relocation in Construction Projects
Executor of power (actor A)

Project developer

Extent of power (actor B)

Public NIMBY

Scope of power

Enforce mobilization

Base of power

Financial, Legal

Means of power

Force, Authority

Default of power

Resistance to mobilization

Metric of power (Utility)

Cost, Time, Social and environmental impacts

Amount of power

Probability of enforcing mobilization

Cost of power

Opportunity cost to enforce mobilization (for actor A)

Strength of power

Opportunity cost of resisting mobilization (for actor B)
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The amount of power indicates the extent of impact over the power
respondents’ action. Dahl (1957) defined the amount of power of actor A over B
as the degree that it can increase the probability of action X(i) (unfavorable to
actor B and favorable to actor A) by exercising its power. For example, in the
case of a construction claim the amount of power of the contractor over the
owner is measured through its ability to increase the probability of obtaining claim
approval (unfavorable to the owner). The amount of power of the owner over the
contractor on the other hand is measured through its ability to increase the
probability of rejecting the claim (unfavorable to the contractor).
In an analytical attempt to quantify power, Harsanyi (1962) introduces two
more dimensions: opportunity cost to exercise power (cost of power of actor A
over actor B) and opportunity cost to resist the act of power exercise (strength of
actor A’s power over actor B). Cost of power describes how much an actor has to
invest in an attempt to exercise its power over the other actor. For example, in
the case of social opposition in construction projects the developer of the
construction project may have to spend different resources in its interaction with
the opposition. The costs that the developer has to spend to exercise its power
can be in different forms depending on the associated base of power (e.g.,
financial, legal, or normative). The strength of the power of the developer in this
case is related to the resources that the opposition has to invest to sustain its
campaign against the project. For example, in order to resist dam construction in
Indonesia the opposition had to sustain cases ranging from intimidation to
murder (Khagram 2004). In this case the opportunity cost to sustain the
opposition is high. Therefore, the strength of power of project developer over
project opposition is also high. It should be noted that the amount of power the
developer has over the opposition in this case is measured through the increased
probability of stifling the opposition campaign. Cost and strength of power can be
described in terms of the utility values of each actor to indicate their preferences.
Therefore, another element in framing interactions is the metric of power as the
unit of analysis.]
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Finally, an additional element is added to frame interactions, called the
default of power. The default of power is the opportunity cost of failing in power
exercise. In other words, default of power is the consequences for actor A if actor
B does not perform action X(i). For example, in the case of social opposition in
construction projects the scope of power is to resist the opposition against a
construction project and the default of power includes partial/complete project
modification. It should be noted that the default is quantified as the impact of noncompliance by the extent of power for the executor of power and therefore is
different from the cost and strength of power. Strength of power is the resources
necessary to resist the exercise of power and cost of power is the costs to the
executor to enforce power. Similar to cost and strength of power, the default will
be gauged by the metric of power.
In this section a framework of interactions is developed based on the ten
aforementioned interactional elements, including the metric of power. In the case
of construction projects, each project would be considered as a system of
systems including the actors involved and their interactions (Figure 4.1). This
framework is the basis of IA for analyzing policies in the form of actions in the
complex system of systems. Each interaction within the construction project
network is framed based on its interactional elements to facilitate descriptive
assessment of emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics. Table 4.2
presents this framework for the interaction of the contractor and public NIMBY in
the case of public mobilization in construction projects. This framework
represents the cases with minimal public participation in decision making, such
as the case of Three Gorges Dam in China that was associated with relocation of
over two million residents (Jackson and Sleigh 2000). In this case the project
developer used force and authority as mechanisms of power along with financial
compensation and legal bases of power. However, the interaction was
determined only from the side of one actor, i.e., the project developer, and the
public had little influence in the dynamics of the interaction. This framework will
be further used to quantify emergent risks. Next section provides more details on
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the development of emergent risk framework based on the interactional
framework of policies.

4.3

Interactional Framework of the Emergent Risk

Mitigation policies to address the emergent risks are developed based on the
proposed interactional framework. The definition of risk in the framework of risk is
adapted from the literature of strategic management. Therefore, in this study, risk
is defined as unpredictability of the variations of consequences of an action
(Bromiley et al. 2001, Baird and Thomas 1990, Aven and Renn 2009). In this
definition risk would encompass the context of the complex system of systems,
its actors, interactions of actors, and consequent emergent dynamics. The
proposed framework of interactional analysis discussed at previous section can
be modified based on the set of triplets proposed by Kaplan and Garrick (1981).
They frame risk as triplets of scenarios, their likelihood, and consequences
(R = 〈Sc , P , C 〉 ), where R indicates risk, and Sc , P , C , represent scenario i, its
related likelihood, and its consequent impact, respectively. The triplets are then
defined according to the ten interactional elements (Fig 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Interactional Framework of the Emrgent Risks
Scenarios are used to describe the pretext associated with each potential
outcome, including emergent dynamics. They involve the interactional synergies
among the actors in the context of a complex system of systems. Common risk

83
assessment in construction projects includes scenarios such as failure of
equipment, weather conditions, or underground geology. Interactional dynamics,
on the other hand, concern the coupling of two or more actors and the
consequent emergent risks. In this case, a structured format for the definition of
scenarios provides clear understanding of the case and facilitates methodological
assessment of the associated risk. Therefore, the scenarios are described
through interactional elements, including: executor of power, extent of power,
scope of power, base of power, and means of power (Figure 4.2). The first five
rows in Table 4.2 present the scenario for the risk of social opposition in
construction projects.
The consequences of risk are defined by the default of power and are
quantified in terms of the metric of power. Consequences are associated with
scenarios and may be determined in terms of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
(VNM) utility value (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). The VNM utility
function of the decision-maker is a tool for logical deduction of its preference
(North 1968), which is gauged based on the dynamics of the setting. A decisionmaker might define utility based on the metric of power such as cost, time,
publicity rates (number of votes), safety (rate of injury or fatality), quality
(acceptance of the product), or use a multi-dimensional utility value in the shape
of a vector (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). For example, in a construction project,
failure of equipment may be linked to damages and delays and would be
quantified in terms of the consequent costs. In case of emergent risks associated
with interactional dynamics, the consequences of social opposition against a
construction project is related to the actions of opposition against a construction
project and may be quantified in terms of the cost consequences of the act of
opposition for the developer.
Finally, the likelihood is a numerical measure of the state of knowledge or the
confidence regarding each consequence (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). This
likelihood is assessed in terms of amount of power, cost of power, and strength
of power. A fundamental component of the methodology of interactional analysis
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is the quantification of this likelihood. The quantification is different depending on
the degree of complexity: i) unilateral interaction ii) bilateral interaction. Therefore,
interactional analysis enables framing of the risk based on the interactional
elements and power relations within a complex system of systems. The
quantification of probability for each type of risk at the policy level is described in
more details in the next section.

4.4

Quantification of the Emergent Risks
4.4.1 Unilateral Interactional Risk

The involvement of actors in unilateral interactions is characterized by
interactions between two actors while only one actor exercises power over the
other. In this case the policies are developed based on the unilateral interaction.
That is, only one actor has the ability to determine the amount of incentives and
the degree of compliance of the other actor. In the context of the construction
industry, an example is the risks related to project siting in non-democratic
contexts. In these contexts, the project developer is able to exert its power over
the public NIMBY while the public does not have resources of power to
participate in the decision-making. The other actor may lack effective bases of
power or may be unable to exert effective means of power. It can also include
cases where the amount of power in one direction is either zero or negligibly
small compared to the other direction. In some cases the actor might not be able
or willing to trigger the required scope of the power (asymmetry of motivation in
actors’ scopes). A mixture of the enumerated causes may result in unilateral
interaction in the real world.
The unilateral type of risk dynamism involves a single interaction, which is
framed by its ten interactional elements including the executor and the extent of
power. The interaction involves action X as the scope of power, unfavorable for
the extent of power and favored by the executor of power. In the case of public
mobilization in non-democratic contexts, scope of power (action x) is the act of
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mobilization, which is unfavorable by the public NIMBY and favorable by the
project developer. The analysis focuses on dynamics resulting from actor A’s
efforts to increase the chances of actor B doing action X. The scenarios would be
defined based on the executor, the extent, the scope, the base, and the means of
power. In the case of siting construction projects in contexts with lower degrees
of public participation in decision making process, the interaction is framed
through the project developer as the executor of power and the public NIMBY as
the extent of power, enforcing mobilization as the scope of power, financial and
legal sources as the dominant bases of power, and force and authority as the
dominant means of power. In this case, the executor of power utilizes the bases
of power through the means of power to increase the probability of the scope of
power being unfavorable to the extent of power, e.g. increase the chances of
compliance to mobilization according to project plans and in other words reduce
the risk of social opposition.
The likelihood is linked to the probability of the scope of power. For instance,
the risks related to siting construction projects would be linked to the probability
of success in mobilization enforcement actions. Three elements of interaction
(amount, strength, and cost of power) are used to define the likelihood of risk.
Assuming

is a probability indicator for the risk that relates to the interaction of

!

actors A and B, the maximum power of A over B is defined as the difference in
the probability of B (∆ ) doing action X (desired by A) with and without A
enforcing its power (Harsanyi 1962, Coleman 1973). Considering a bargaining
game between the two actors, Harsanyi (1962) proposes that the maximum
amount of A’s power over B regarding action X is equal to the differences
between the utility of B in cases of actor A exercising and not exercising its
power, (∆ ), divided by disutility of B doing the action X, (x):

∆ =

∆#
$

(1)

In the absence of power exercise from actor A, actor B will not acquiesce to
action X (

%

= 0). By this assumption, the probability of risk for actor A is defined
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as

!

= 1 − ∆ . In a more generic form, actor B randomizes its behavior with a

prior probability of
equal to

!

=1−

%.
%

In this case, the probability of risk for actor A would be

− ∆ . Therefore, risk is the factor of the amount of A’s power

over B, which by itself is a factor of strength of A’s power over B and the cost of
A’s power over B. Harsanyi (1962) assumed the game with complete information.
In cases where this assumption is waived, the difference (∆ ) will be more
accurately defined through the utility that actor A assumes actor B will assign to
each outcome. Utility values can be assessed through certain equivalent as
suggested by Howard (1968). Besides, ∆ < 1 −

%

which means that the

enforcement of power from actor A can not increase the probability of actor B
doing action X more than the unit.
In the example of siting in contexts with minimal degrees of public
participation in decision making, let’s assume that the disutility of mobilization for
the public NIMBY is the equivalent of $500,000, which may include the market
value of the land, the cost of mobilization, the opportunity cost of mobilization, the
sentimental value of natural habitat, and the cost of settling down in the new
settlement. Further assume that the utility of the compensation is equal to
$400,000 for the public NIMBY, which may include the value that the public
associated with the provided housing. In this case, the likelihood of the risk of
social opposition is up to 20% (∆ = 0.8). Assuming that the default of power as
consequences associated with the risk of siting in construction projects is up to
$5,000,000 for the project developer, the expected value of the risk is $1,000,000.
In this case the default of power can be the utility that the developer associates
with the project, considering that without mobilization the project is not feasible. It
should be noted that the default of power is not a power exercise by our definition
since the actor cannot determine the incentives or influence the interactions. It
rather indicates the possibility that the enforcement of power would fail. In
unilateral type of interaction, one actor is deprived of mechanisms to impact the
power interaction, although the executor of the power might face some
consequences in the form of default of power. For example, in the above context

87
with lower degrees of democracy, the public NIMBY might be deprived of power
resources to bargain with the project developer. However, the default of power as
non-compliance to action X, i.e., mobilization in this case, results in cost
implications for the project developer, e.g. withdrawing the project.

4.4.2 Bilateral Interactional Risk
A more complex dynamic context can be observed in the case of reciprocal
power relation between the two actors. In this case both actors would exercise
power over each other within the context of the conflict. Examples of this type of
risk dynamic in construction can be the case of a dispute between a contractor
and an owner, or social opposition in the contexts with higher degree of public
participation in decision makings. In the case of bilateral interactional risk, both
parties have bargaining power over each other with the dynamics in the form of a
two-sided conflict.

Table 4.3 Interactional Framework of the Social Opposition Risk in Construction
Projects
Executor of power (actor A)

Project developer

Extent of power (actor B)

Opposition

Scope of power

Resist opposition against project

Base of power (actor A)

Financial, Legal

Means of power (actor A)

Authority, Force

Base of power (actor B)

Public, Normative, Legal

Means of power (actor B)

Persuasion, Normative, Cultural-Cognitive

Default of power

Project modification, Litigation

Metric of power (Utility)

Cost, Time, Social and environmental impacts

Amount of power

Probability of resisting the opposition

Cost of power

Opportunity cost to resist opposition (for actor A)

Strength of power

Opportunity cost of opposition (for actor B)

Similar to the unilateral type, this interaction is defined based on the ten
interactional elements except that each actor has its own bases and means of

88
power. For example in the case of social opposition risk of siting in construction
projects actor as the opposition has public, normative, and legal resources and
can use mechanisms such as persuasion (Tab. 4.3). That is, the opposition can
increase its bargaining power through persuading the owner based on its bases
within the public, as well as channeling its opinion through norms and making
sense of the context of the project. For example, in the case of the Narmada
River and Sardar Sarovar, the transnational organizations increased their
bargaining power of lobbying the decision makers in the World Bank with the
mobilization of public through meetings and protests (Khagram 2004). Similar to
the unilateral type of risk dynamism the interaction includes action X, unfavorable
for actor B and favored by actor A. The maximum net power of actor A over B
can be described in terms of the increase in probability of actor B doing action X,
(∆ ) when actor A enforces its power. Harsanyi (1962) proposes the amount of
power considering the Zeuthen-Nash theory of two-person bargaining games to
be equal to (Equation 2):
% /01

∆ = (
-

$

−

1 ∗ 3/ ∗
$∗

)

(2)

While x indicates the disutility of doing action X for B, 4 ∗ indicates the utility
for actor A from B taking action X, r indicates the utility of reward for B doing
action X,

∗

indicates the disutility for A to reward B for action X, t indicates the

disutility of penalty from A as well as retaliating to A for B, and

∗

indicates the

disutility of penalizing B and reacting to B for A. The equation includes two
/01

different parts: the first quotient (

1 ∗ 3/ ∗

B and the second quotient (

$∗

$

) representing the relative strength of A over

) expressing the relative strength of B over A.

Again, the probability of risk is defined as

!

= 1 − ∆ in the case that actor B

would not do action X if there is no power enforcement from actor A, and
!

=1−

%

− ∆ in a generic form that actor B would perform action X before

power enforcement of actor A with the probability of % . It should be noted that
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∆ <1−

%,

which translates to the maximum probability of B doing action X to

be equal to the unit.

Table 4.4 Utilities of Both Actors in the Example of Bilateral Interaction
x
x*
r
r*
t
t*

Disutility of B in case of compliance
Utility of A as B complies
Utility of reward for B
Cost of reward for A
Disutility of penalty for B
Cost of penalty for A

$500,000
$5,000,000
$300,000
$300,000
$400,000
$100,000

Assume again the case of social opposition against construction projects in a
democratic context. In this case, the actors are the project developer and the
opposition group (e.g., transnational movements). The interaction can be framed
through the interactional analysis framework (Table 4.3), while it integrates the
impact of the other actor into the analysis of the interactional dynamics. Lets
assume that the developer has applied a mixture of reward and penalty
mechanisms to ensure compliance of actor B and reduce the chances of
opposition against the project. In this project the reward is cash and the penalty
is in the form of law enforcement with the utility values and costs presented in
table 4.4, the likelihood of risk of social opposition is equal to 28% (∆

= 0.72).

After framing the emergent risks and quantifying them the next step involves a
framework to develop mitigation policies and quantification of their impacts. Next
section will discuss the development and assessment of the mitigation policies to
address these risks.

4.5

Policy Development for Mitigation of Emergent Risk
4.5.1 Interactional Elements of Policies

The risk mitigation policies can modify interactional elements of the risk
scenario. The effectiveness of the mitigation policy is then gauged according to
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the changes it makes in the likelihood of the risk so as to maintain a scenario
based QRA. In this case, the risk mitigation policies can trigger the associated
executor, extent, scope, means, and bases of power (Tab. 4.5).

Table 4.5 Examples of Policy Development through their Interactional Elements
Category
Base of power
Means of power
Executor of power
Extent of power

Description
Financial to Legal
Persuasion to Authority
Coalition with a local agency
Limit the focus of mitigation on a selected group

Lets assume the above example of social opposition risk in construction
projects with the scenario of risk presented in table 4.3. In that example switching
the base of power between financial and legal would impact the likelihood of risk.
Considering the bilateral interaction this change can mathematically alter the cost
of reward or penalty, as dynamics of legal approaches may be different than
cash rewards or penalty. Similarly the project developer can switch its means of
power between persuasion and authority, which translates in switching between
reward (r) and penalty (t) in the equilibria. On the other hand, the executor of
power can change within the scenario through coalition with local or international
actors to increase the bargaining power. This increase will be reflected in the
formula through the changes in the cost of reward and penalty as the coalition
increases the bargaining power. Similarly, the other elements of the scenario can
change to observe the effectiveness of a wide range of policy alternatives for
each scenario (Table 4.5). The result is a methodological approach to the
development of risk mitigation policies and descriptive assessment of risk.

4.5.2 Mathematical Functions of Policies
The power interaction among actors can also be represented through
mathematical functions instead of specific values (Harsanyi 1962). In this sense,
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policies are defined as changes in variables that are included within functions, or
the changes of the functions themselves. That is the policies modify the
contextual variables or change the dynamics as they represent a new function.
An example in the case of social opposition against construction projects could
be when the developer, as the executor of power, develops strategies to alter its
cost function of rewards (r ∗ = f(r)) or penalties (t ∗ = f(t)). Strategies may include
rewarding the social opposition with specific permits or potential future project
awards, which cost less than their actual value to the developer (Tab 4.6).
Obviously, the developer can also alter the function that defines the disutility of
default to reduce its vulnerability and the risk of the project. It should be noted
that in reality each policy is a combination of the pure approaches discussed in
this section. For example, a policy might include changing the base of power to
legal actions and change the utility of penalties to law enforcement instead of
fines. Next section provides an elaborate discussion of the application of the
methodology for the case of risks associated with social opposition, discussed
throughout the manuscript.

Table 4.6 Examples of Policy Development through its Mathematical Functions
Category
Utility of reward
Utility of penalty
Cost of reward
Cost of penalty

4.6

Function
:; ( )
:; ( )
< = ( ∗)
< = ( ∗)

Description
Commercial land instead of cash
Law enforcement instead of cash
Reward from government developments
Transfer to public officials

Application, Implications, and Limitations

In this section the example of social opposition risk in construction projects
as an emergent risk is presented and the application of the proposed
methodology is provided to show the procedures of the framework developed in
this chapter. Assume that an international joint venture is planning to bid for a
hydroelectric project in a developing country. The result of the initial risk

92
assessment, using models such as ICRAM-1 (Hastak and Shaked 2000) that
channelizes input of experts on an extensive list of risk factors, indicates social
opposition risk as a major challenge to the project. This result is highlighted by
the historical data that indicates increasing costs associated with social
embeddedness of hydroelectric projects. The joint venture aims to analyze this
emergent risk and assess potential mitigation policies. For this purpose, potential
scenarios associated with the emergent risks are defined based on the proposed
framework. The procedures include framing the risk scenarios based on the
proposed interactional framework of emergent risks (Fig. 4.2), developing
alternative mitigation policies based on the proposed methodology and according
to their interactional elements and mathematical functions, and assess the risk
profile of scenarios as well as the impact of mitigation policies, according to the
equilibria of bilateral or unilateral interaction. For the later purpose, the equilibria
associated with the scenarios and policies are simulated to obtain risk profiles.

4.6.1 Application of the Methodology
The three scenarios in this example refer to common cases of emergent
dynamics that project developers face in hydroelectric projects (Fig. 4.3). That is,
the mobilization plan often faces an emergent actor such as public NIMBY as
social opposition (emergent synergy). Other potential scenarios are emergent
coalition of public NIMBY with local or international actors. Figure 4.3 provides
interactional framework of these potential scenarios including the associated
interactional elements. Lets assume that the developer is aware of the bilateral
nature of the interaction while they initially only anticipated financial
compensation as a reward mechanisms. Furthermore, the consequences
associated with this risk include the default of power ranging from partial plan
modification to completely scrapping the project. Additionally, in this example
cost will be considered as the metric of power.
While each scenario is analyzed to quantify the associated likelihood, the
alternative mitigation policies are also reviewed to assess their effectiveness. Six
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alternative policies are considered in this example from common policies in the
literature of infrastructure management, which provide a combination of the
enumerated categories both based on the modification of interactional elements
and modification of mathematical functions of the policies.

Figure 4.3 Mitigation Policies for the Risk of Social Opposition

Lets assume that the utility of the joint venture in case of no opposition (4 ∗ ) is
equal to $5,000,000 that can be the net profit of the project. Assuming the
disutility that the public NIMBY associates with the act of complying (i.e., no
opposition) has a normal distribution N($500,000, $80,000) with the mean of
$500,000 and the standard deviation of $80,000, while the developer also
assigns $500,000 compensation in cash. The second and third scenarios
mathematically translate into an increase in the amount of the disutility the
opposition associates with the act of complying (4), as the collaborator should be
also satisfied. This increase is partly rooted in the increased awareness because
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of the involvement of NGOs and transnational groups and partly because of the
demands of transnational groups. Lets assume that this disutility has the normal
distribution N($1,000,000, $160,000), and N($5,000,000, $800,000), for the
second and third scenarios respectively. Table 4.7 provides the utility values for
base case scenarios and the alternative policies in terms of cost, while Figure 4.4
provides the result of the simulation as the risk profile of all the base case
scenarios (risk profile R1-R3) and the impact of mitigation policies that are
labeled as R#a-R#f.

Table 4.7 Disutility of the Opposition in the Interaction (x), in 1000 dollars
SC 1
SC 2
SC 3
Cases
Base Case
N(500,80)
N(1000,150)
N(5000,800)
Policy (a)
N(500,80)
N(1000,150)
N(5000,800)
Policy (b)
N(500,80)
N(1000,150)
N(5000,800)
Policy (c)
N(400,50)
N(750,100)
N(4500,750)
Policy (d)
N(500,80)
N(1000,150)
N(5000,800)
Policy (e)
N(500,80)
N(1000,150)
N(5000,800)
Policy (f)
N(400,50)
N(1000,150)
N(3500,600)

Policies introduced in Table 4.7 and 4.8 are defined based on their
interactional elements and mathematical implications. While Table 4.7 provides
the disutility value of the opposition in different scenarios and considering
different mitigation policies, Table 4.8 provides the utility of reward, utility of
penalty, cost of reward, cost of penalty, and disutility of the act of opposition to
the project developer.
First two mitigation policies (R#a and R#b in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8)
explore the sanction mechanisms in addition to the incentives. Nye (2008) labels
these policies as smart power, which effectively combines hard and soft policies.
While the first policy explores financial punishments such as fines, the second
policy looks into non-financial mechanisms such as repressive mechanism. For
example, development of hydroelectric dams in Indonesia from 1971-1992, such
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as the Kedungombo dam, involved several laws and decrees to regulate, co-opt,
or intimidate public NIMBY (Aditjondro 1998, Khagram 2004). These policies
were applied in combination with the resettlement compensation (Aditjondro
1998, Khagram 2004). Mathematically, these two mechanisms introduce the
utility and cost of penalty ( , ∗ ) into the equilibria of bilateral interaction, while in
the later a higher disutility associated with the penalty comes with the lower costs.

Table 4.8 Variables that Change for Each Case, in 1000 Dollars
x*
r
r*
t
t*
Cases
5000
N(500,80)
500
0
0
Base Case
5000
N(500,80)
500
N(250,40) N(250,40)
Policy (a)
5000
N(500,80)
500
N(250,40)
N(50,10)
Policy (b)
5000
N(500,80)
500
0
0
Policy (c)
5000
N(500,80)
250
N(500,80) N(100,10)
Policy (d)
500
0
0
5000
N(1000,120)
Policy (e)
5000
N(1000,120)
500
0
0
Policy (f)

The third policy (R#c in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) suggests concentrating
the reward efforts on dominant subsets of the opposition. For example, the
project developer can pursue policies that emphasize helping major businesses
among the community to mitigate the risk of opposition. Besides, the developer
may pursue different compensation plans based on the influence and power of
the affected community. In these case the disutility that the opposition associates
with the compliance would decrease, since the dominant subgroup changes the
perception of the project for the opposition. This policy is a specific form of
network building and coopting described by Miller and Lessard (2000) as the
alliance is made with a sub-set of the opposition to increase efficiency of
mitigation policies.
The fourth policy alternative (R#d in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) is more
generic form of coopting and networking and includes alliance with actors that
are more familiar with the context of the project. As a result the developer
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transfers the responsibility to actors that have more experience of the project
context, such as local partners, or international actors with the experience in this
specific market. As a result the cost of reward and penalty reduces for the project
developer. For example, in the case of Machadinho and Ita dams in Brazil the
developers pursued policies to co-opt local officials and leaders to reduce the

3rd Scenario

2nd Scenario

1st Scenario

momentum of opposition (Khagram 2004).

Figure 4.4 Social Opposition Risk Profile for Each Scenario and Considering Different
Mitigation Policies
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The fifth policy (R#e in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) looks into alternative
reward mechanisms that focus on more efficient methods of reward. These types
of policies increase the utility of reward as it shifts to reward mechanisms that
seek more engagement with the public as suggested by Dietz and Stern (2008),
such as job creation, award of special permits, award of government lands or
government development such as the case of Delhi NOIDA bridge (Pargal 2007).
In this case the land development around the project was considered in the
concession to increase the utility of reward for the project developer.

Scenario-3

Scenario-2

Scenario-1

Table 4.9 Summary of the Statistical Results of the Simulation
Context
Base Case
Policy (a)
Policy (b)
Policy (c)
Policy (d)
Policy (e)
Policy (f)
Base Case
Policy (a)
Policy (b)
Policy (c)
Policy (d)
Policy (e)
Policy (f)
Base Case
Policy (a)
Policy (b)
Policy (c)
Policy (d)
Policy (e)
Policy (f)

label
R-1
R-1a
R-1b
R-1c
R-1d
R-1e
R-1f
R-2
R-2a
R-2b
R-2c
R-2d
R-2e
R-2f
R-3
R-3a
R-3b
R-3c
R-3d
R-3e
R-3f

Mean
0.436
0.204
0.184
0.315
-0.043
-0.078
0.188
0.694
0.591
0.571
0.611
0.473
0.438
0.435
0.899
0.898
0.878
0.893
0.882
0.847
0.862

Standard Deviation
0.123
0.164
0.165
0.133
0.215
0.218
0.144
0.059
0.078
0.078
0.072
0.101
0.104
0.119
0.012
0.017
0.016
0.014
0.022
0.022
0.020

And finally the sixth alternative policy (R#f in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8)
uses influence devices suggested by Miller and Lessard (2000). It includes
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policies to educate, or increase awareness of the community. It may also include
political movements to support the project. For example, the media in Indonesia
used manipulation as means of power to influence perception of the public
against extensive programs of Indonesia for dam construction (Aditjondro 1998).
This type of policies decreases the disutility of the compliance through
awareness campaigns while it also increases the utility of reward.
The equilibria of the bilateral interaction are then simulated based on the
data provided in Tab. 4.7, and 4.8. For this purpose the Monte Carlo Simulation
is applied using the student version of the software @Risk. The risk profile of
each scenario associated with different scenarios is presented as the outcome of
the simulation in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.9. As it can be observed from the results
in Fig. 4.4 and Tab. 4.9, the mitigation policies may be less effective in scenarios
such as the third scenario. This observation can be related to the increase in the
utility that the opposition associates with the project (x). The result of the model is
empirically confirmed by the cases that involvement of the transnational
organizations has substantially increased risk of social opposition, such as the
case of Bujagali dam in Uganda and the Belo Monte dam in Brazil (Bosshard
2002, AfDB 2008, Khagram 2004). In all these cases the involvement of
transnational groups increased the bargaining power of opposition through
network, legal, and public resources of the transnational organizations. The
results of the simulation, however, indicates that the response of each scenario
to alternative policies is different, e.g. the fourth policy (d) is more effective in the
first scenario and sixth policy (f) is more effective in the case of second scenario.
This is in contrast with concrete guidelines for mitigation of emergent risk in
complex construction projects.

4.6.2 Implications
One of the major implications of this model is the integration of behavioral
patterns into the risk assessment. For example, in the case of social opposition
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against construction projects, the opposition expects loss with high probability.
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in these cases the actor exhibits
risk-seeking behaviors. In contrast to the risk neutral actor with the utility curve in
the form of a straight line, the utility curve of a risk-seeking actor is convex. As a
result the utility value of the same reward is less for this actor than the risk
neutral actor, and disutility of penalty is more. Therefore, the behavior of the
other actor is integrated into the risk assessment model. Utility values provide a

Utility

venue to integrate these behaviors into the assessment.

Risk Averse
Actor B

1
Risk Neutral
Actor B

Ura
Urn

Risk Seeking
Actor B

Urs

r

Reward

Figure 4.5 Utility Curve of Opposition

Lets assume the example of emergent risks associated with social opposition
in construction projects presented in section 4.4.1 of this dissertation. In that
example the assumption of linear function of utility (i.e., a risk neutral opposition
group) resulted in the risk of social opposition equal to 0.20% (∆

= 0.8). Now

assuming that the opposition exhibits risk seeking behavior, according to figure
4.5 the utility of reward Urs=$350,000 would be less than the market value of
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reward Urn=$400,000. Therefore, the likelihood of the emergent risk associated
with the social opposition would increase to 0.30% (∆

= 0.7). Similarly, if under

certain conditions (such as social status or institutionalized behavior of the
opposition group) the opposition exhibits risk-averse behaviors; the quantified
likelihood of the risk of social opposition would decrease.

4.6.3 Limitations
The proposed methodology assumes some limitations including its limit of
analysis to two actors, assigning utilities, assuming the game of complete
information between rational actors, and the policy level of analysis. In order to
establish a clear proof of concept, the model assumed minimal complexity
focusing on two actors. However, these two actors can represent two coalitions
within the model in case the coalition is assumed as a single decision maker to
fulfill the assumptions of unitary rational actor. Additionally, the equilibria of the
interactions assume the game with complete information, that is, each actor is
aware of the moves of the other actors and utilities associated with outcomes of
the interaction. The equilibria also assume a rational actor that makes decision to
maximize its utility. These limitations can be addressed in a methodological
approach to increase the complexity of the model. Finally, the assignment of
utilities to each actor might be a challenge to analysis and should be deliberated
carefully. In this study the descriptive cases from literature were used to assign
utility values, while the analysis was supported by studying range of variables to
examine the impact of variations. However, there is a need for further study of
behavioral patterns and preferences in different contexts to obtain more accurate
account of utility values. Finally, the analysis only focuses on directions at the
policy level and does not clarify specific actions and stages of interaction
between two specific actor. At the policy level, however, the methodology
provides a framework to define policies quantitatively and descriptively.
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4.6.4 Conclusion
The major contribution of the proposed methodology is to integrate a
methodological analysis of emergent dynamics associated with a complex
system of systems into the current risk analysis techniques. The procedures
associated with this integration involved: i) interactional framework of emergent
risk, ii) quantitative assessment of emergent risks based on the equilibria of
unilateral or bilateral interactions (i.e., degree of complexity), iii) development of
mitigation policies based on the interactional elements and the associated
mathematical functions, iv) assessment of the impact of mitigation policies.
Observation of numerous cases of project failures (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003) have
proven that the impact of emergent dynamics associated with the interaction of
institutionally diverse actors can be detrimental. This methodological approach
can help policy makers to provide a descriptive QRA (quantitative risk
assessment) for emergent risks in complex construction projects and to shed
more lights on the concept of performance paradox in infrastructure development
through the lens of complex system of systems. Furthermore, it provides a
methodological approach to frame and assess the impact of common mitigation
policies.
One potential misconception for the decision maker in construction projects
is to suppose that the consequences are solely determined by her decision. This
misconception often results in optimism bias and negligence of costs associated
with the emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics. Integration of
interactional analysis methodology into current risk assessment techniques
provides a decision space to account for multiple decision makers. The ability of
the methodology is demonstrated to increase the understanding of emergent
dynamics and consequently transparency of decision-making in complex system
of systems such as complex infrastructure projects. A combination of quantitative
assessment framework with scenario-based risk assessment platform provided a
better understanding of the decision stratum. Besides, it facilitates institutional
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arrangement and helps in the direction of aligning policies among diverse actors
in dynamic and complex projects to ensure sustainability of projects not only
economically, but also socially and environmentally. Since the outcome of this
chapter was to assess emergent dynamics at the policy level to provide direction
for actions there is a need for more detailed analysis of interactions. Next chapter
aims to discuss interactions at the strategy level including actions and their
sequences.

103

CHAPTER 5. INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE STRATEGY LEVEL

The first component of the research aimed to analyze the emergent
dynamics associated with the interactions of institutionally diverse actors at the
policy level (Chapter 4). Although the proposed analysis provided insights to
general guidelines in the form of policies to govern these dynamics, it lacks the
details necessary for strategy developers. Similarly, at the strategic level of the
project context the outcomes of construction projects emerge from increasingly
complex dynamics. However, common strategic management approaches have
not sufficiently incorporated these growing complexities. As a result, managers
regularly face cost and time over-runs, unforeseen conflicts, project renegotiation,
and failure in project completion. These inconsistencies are coupled with the
often costly dissatisfaction of target-users and unprecedented frictions with noncontractual actors (such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local
communities, or political parties.)
At the policy level of IA, each interaction is modeled as a single episode with
general information about the dynamics. This chapter aims to provide more
detailed analysis of the interactions and provides discussion on the second
component of the research: the strategy level of IA. The interactional model is
developed according to the framework of IA to investigate the emergent
dynamics of complex system of systems and studies the emergent dynamics of
social opposition risk and consequent synergies at the strategic management
level of construction projects. The model rests on game theoretic equilibria for
the interactional analysis of the dynamics, and the equilibria are then simulated
for two different structures: formal and informal actions. A methodological
comparison of the two structures creates four scenarios of social opposition for
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each structure. These scenarios differ in variables that can represent real
contextual cases. The goal of this chapter is not to provide a generic risk analysis
tool; instead, it demonstrates the potential application of IA in analyzing emergent
dynamics of a complex system of systems.
This chapter includes a brief discussion of IA and risk as the core focus of
the analysis at the strategy level and further develops an interactional model for
the specific case of social opposition in construction projects. It further provides
some insights into the other half of the third component of the research that aims
to develop strategies based on the analysis of the second component. The
strategy level of IA in this chapter is discussed in the context of social opposition
to construction projects as a practical issue within the construction industry. The
analysis can be used for policy-making and governance of complex systems in
different fields other than large-scale construction projects.

5.1

Transition from the Policy Level to Strategy Level

The first component of the IA, proposed in Chapter 4, provides a generic
approach to analyze the emergent dynamics associated with interactions in a
complex system of systems. It also facilitates the development of policies to
mitigate the consequences of these emergent dynamics and quantified the
impact of mitigation policies. As a result, mitigation policies are devised in a
descriptive and quantitative manner and can be further analyzed for different
variations. Strategy developers often require more detailed analysis of emergent
dynamics and associated actions. Therefore, the theories of power in social
science and equilibria of interaction are applied to extend the methodology of
interactional analysis into the strategy development level. For this purpose, each
interaction is structured in an extensive form, including multi-stages with actions
at each stage and their associated characteristics. This analysis provides a
transition from the direction of actions in the form of policies to the detail of
actions and their sequences.
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For example, in the case of social opposition risk in construction projects,
there has been a transformation in the power and normative structures of global
governance (Sikkink 2002). As a result, emergent actors, such as local
opposition groups, regional NGOs, national political parties, and international
social movements influence project outcomes through strategies such as
informal or soft power, protests, and media strategies. IA investigates these
emergent dynamics in the context of the power relations among diverse actors to
analyze the consequent risk at the strategy level.
The transition in the case of social opposition can be described through the
policy (b) at the example of the section 4.6.1. In that example, policy (b) includes
direction of actions towards legal mechanisms without mentioning clear
strategies. At the strategy level the planner need to know: i) what strategies are
needed to be taken, ii) what are the variable that define that strategy, e.g.
associated costs, and iii) at what stage of the interaction they should be applied.
This chapter aims to answer these specific questions. The case of the emergent
dynamics of social opposition in construction projects is further studied in this
chapter, but before that discussion a review of the risk at this level of analysis is
provided.

5.2

Risk in the Strategy Level of IA

As discussed, the definition of risk varies among different disciplines (such as
psychology, finance, economics, and strategic management) based on varied
assumptions, applications, and the inherent vagueness of the term. The strategic
management approach was applied to risk, envisioning it as tied to the
unpredictability of outcome variables (Bromiley et al., 2001). Through the lens of
a complex system of systems, the variation in potential outcome state of the
system defines the risk. If the project x is expected to transform from state a
(O(a? )) to state b (O(b? )) while in reality the final outcome turns out to be state c,
(O(c? )), the risk will be the difference between the predicted state (b) and the real
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outcome (c), R ?

= O( c? ) – O( b? ). This equation highlights a mathematical

interpretation of the required strategic management approach to risk (R) in a
complex system of systems. Each state of the system can be gauged through
different metrics, so that R serves as a multi-dimensional indicator describing the
outcome of the project. R can be considered to be any of the four basic project
metrics used in construction management: cost, time, quality, and safety. Further,
the distribution of R is more meaningful for analysis and strategy development
than single point descriptions of risk (Kaplan and Garrick 1981, Aven 2012). In a
complex system of systems this translates into consideration of several potential
consequent states of the system where these states can be presented through
the aforementioned metrics. This definition of risk is applied in interactional
analysis to provide a foundation for quantitative analysis of emergent risks
associated with interactions in a complex system of systems.
Accordingly, IA provides a foundation for descriptive analysis of risk at the
strategy level. This chapter models the specific case of risk of social opposition
against construction projects and provides a detailed understanding of dynamic
interactions, their emergent outcomes, and patterns of behaviors. Although these
patterns are important for policy-makers who seek to develop long-term policies
in fields such as energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure development,
they can be used by firms and public agencies as a guideline for strategy
development for any complex project that faces the emergent dynamics
associated with the interaction of diverse actors.

5.3

Structure of the Interactional Model

According to the core philosophy of IA, the analysis at the strategy level
strengthen the shift in the emphasis of analysis from the actors to their
interactions as the roots of dynamic complexities. It views the interactions as the
coupling of multiple complex systems (i.e., actors). As stated, Foucault (1982)
suggested that interactions can be studied as communication networks or power
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relations between actors. IA at the strategy level emphasizes the focus on the
power relations among different actors in a complex system of systems to
investigate the emergent dynamics of the system. This focus is facilitated with a
more detailed model of the interaction based on the concept of the extensive
games.
The interactional model proposed in this chapter starts with the minimal
complexity and variables to observe the emergent dynamics. It focuses on the
dynamics resulting from the interaction of two actors i, such that in case of social
opposition i = {the project opposition (N), the project developer (Y)}. In
accordance with the social opposition literature, actor N is an emergent actor in
the context of project while actor Y plans the project as the principal decision
maker. Examples of opposition actors (N) include transnational organizations
such as International Rivers in the case of hydroelectric dams, residents of
nuclear power plant host communities in Japan, and regional and national
political parties such as the Green Party in the case of Stuttgart 21 in Germany.
The model assumes actors make rational decisions, that is, they seek to
maximize their utility. Besides, as suggested by De Mesquita and Lalman (1992),
it assumes a unitary rational actor so that the decisions are made as if an
individual decision maker chooses strategies. The dynamic game reflects the
interactions between actors as they choose their strategies after observing the
move of the other actors (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Furthermore, the
interaction is considered as non-cooperative, as routine mechanisms to enforce
contracts between these actors may not exist. Based on this assumption the
interaction will not introduce a specific mechanism of cooperation between actors
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1994), but it does not preempt cooperation cases
between self-interested actors (De Mesquita and Lalman 1992). For example, the
project developer and the opposition might decide to cooperate in the absence of
specific mechanisms that enforces cooperation to maximize their respective
payoffs.
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The interaction starts as a game with the move of the opposition, since the
developer favors the status quo in the case of social opposition to an
infrastructure project. Developers often face unexpected and unpredicted action
from opposition groups, which can emerge in the midst of project planning or
construction (Khagram 2004). The interactional model assumes perfect and
complete information, meaning that the players are aware of all the preceding
moves, as well as the payoffs related to each outcome (Osborne and Rubinstein
1994). These assumptions, based on the literature of game theory, allow us to
shift the focus of study from the complexity of the model to its results and
application. Figure 5.1 depicts a generic extensive representation of the
interactional model for social opposition in infrastructure development.
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~FN

Developer
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IFY

~IFN
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Figure 5.1 Interactional Structure IA(1) for Social Opposition
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5.3.1 Strategies for Sequential Stages of Interaction
The model involves strategy space Si for each actor i, such that i = {N, Y},
where actors N and Y might interchange between formal (F) and informal actions
(IF) such that the strategy space Si is equal to Si ={(IF, F), (IF, ~F), (~IF, F), (~IF,
~F)}. Note that the latter two are impossible combinations though they are part of
the strategy space. There are two major sections to the game: the informal
confrontation sub-game followed by the formal confrontation sub-game (fig. 5.2).
The informal strategies represent actions such as political, public, or media
pressure, while the formal strategies represent explicit actions between the
actors (e.g., lawsuits, licensing challenges, and other legal actions).
As can be seen from figure 5.1, the interaction starts with the strategic choice
N

by the opposition whether to initiate an informal action against the project (IF ) or
N

not (~IF ). For example the opposition may decide whether to launch a public
campaign against the project or not to do any action. In the latter case the project
will not face any new risks, given that all other conditions were to remain as
planned. The outcome in this case will be called status quo (sq). In the former
case, the developer will have the choice of informal strategies to counter the
Y

Y

move (IF ) or to acquiesce to the request of the opposition (~IF ). Acquiescence
to the opposition party’s request at this stage will result in modification of plans
(pm). In the case where both actors take informal action against each other, the
interaction reaches the point when the opposition has the choice of taking formal
N

N

action against the project (F ) or refraining from formal actions (~F ). The latter
translates into the case of negotiation (ng) between the opposition and the
developer. The former is the point where the interaction enters the formal
confrontation sub-game.
Up to this point of the interaction the choice of strategies was limited to
informal moves such as protest, awareness campaigns, lobbying, and so forth. At
Y

this point, however, the developer will have the choice of formal action (F ), which
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Y

results in litigation (lg), or complying with the request (~F ) that results in
settlement (st). There is a transaction cost associated with the formal and
informal actions of each actor, as both sets of strategies require the use of
resources including time, opportunity costs, and money. Each terminal node
(outcome) involves a two-tuple of payoffs that is discussed in more detail in next
section along with the transaction costs and probabilities.

5.3.2 Terminal Node Outcomes
If the confrontation leads to negotiations, the expected payoff takes the form
of a lottery. Considering the probability of winning the negotiation for the
opposition (

;

) , the expected payoff of each actor would be equal to the

expected value of the lottery in cases of loss and gain minus the transaction cost
of its informal actions (A; , A= ). The results of the settlement will be similar to plan
modification minus the transaction cost of formal action for the opposition (B; ),
while the developer has yet to pay the transaction for formal action and only pays
the transaction cost of its informal action. Finally, the litigation results in a lottery
(similar to negotiation) minus the transaction costs of both the formal and
informal actions (A; , B; , A= , B= ) and considering the probability of winning the
litigation for the developer (

=

). The interactional model presented in Figure 5.1

and the payoff of each actor shown in table 5.1 is a generic model that can be
modified and applied to a variety of interactional settings.
Several assumptions and clarification may be illustrated to further structure
the model. First, it should be clarified that table 5.1 presents payoffs and not
utility values. Additionally, : ; (∆= ), serves as the ultimate capitulation for the
opposition (i.e., the status quo) and can be seen as the acquiescence of the
opposition to the project developer. Further loss due to informal and formal
actions is captured within the transaction costs of those actions (i.e. A; , B; ).
Furthermore, it can be assumed that the payoff of the opposition is higher in case
its request is approved compared with the case where the request of the
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developer would be endorsed, : ; (∆; ) > : ; (∆= ). If not, the rational opposition
would not make any request at all.
Table 5.1 Payoff of the Actors at Each Terminal Node
Expected Payoff of Opposition
: ; (∆= )
: ; (∆; ) − A;
;
; (∆ )]
;
[:
)[: ; (∆= )] − A;
; + (1 −
: ; (∆; ) − A; − B;
(1 − = )[: ; (∆; )] + = [: ; (∆= )] − A; − B;

Status quo
Plan modification
Negotiation
Settlement
Litigation

Expected Payoff of Developer
: = (∆= )
: = (∆; )
(1 − ; )[: = (∆= )] + ; [: = (∆; )] − A=
: = (∆; ) − A=
=
[: = (∆= )] + (1 − = )[: = (∆; ))] − A= − B=

Status quo
Plan modification
Negotiation
Settlement
Litigation

As stated each actor will choose strategies according to their transaction
costs and payoffs related to each outcome. The absolute cost of the requested
change for actor Y, < = = (: = (∆= ) − : = (∆; )), is the cost of interaction for the
developer considering zero transaction costs, and can range from zero to partial
(or occasionally complete) modification of the project. The absolute value of
request for actor N, G ; = H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I, is the reward of the dispute for the
opposition considering zero transaction costs. < = and G ; establish the range of
the expected payoff of interaction for the respective actor and is used in
conjunction with transaction costs to choose alternative strategies.

5.4

Equilibria of the Interaction

The interactional model is solved using the concept of sub-game perfect
equilibrium, as a refinement to the Nash equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein
1994). The solution of the interaction involves backward induction at each
decision node using the payoffs discussed above.
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The initial stage focuses on the last decision node concerning the decision of
the developer to engage in formal action (or not). It states that the developer will
avoid the formal action (J = ), only if:
=

B= ≥

<=

• This equilibrium suggests that the developer will undertake litigation only if
the transaction cost of litigation is less than the product of probability of winning
litigation for the developer and the absolute cost of requested changes. Since
this equilibrium suggests two conditions, the next stage of the game concerns the
decision of the opposition to engage in the formal action (FN) or not (~FN)(~F N ):
O

1)

B; ≥ (1 −

=

−

;

O

2)

B; ≥ (1 −

;

=

B= <

<=,

P

Q

)H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I
=

B= ≥

<=,

P

Q

)H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I

The next stage analyzes the decision of the developer on an informal action
( J = ). In this case there are four conditions resulting from previous equilibria, two
of which represent the same terminal node of the game (i.e., negotiation). As a
result, the developer will not take informal action under three conditions, as:
O

1)

B= <

a.

= =

< O R B; ≥ (1 −

=

−

;

)(G; )

only

if

: = (∆; ) > : = (∆= ),
B= ≥

b.

= =

< O R B; ≥ (1 −

;

)(G; ), only if : = (∆; ) >

: = (∆= )
2)

O
=

∝= + B= ≥
3)

B= <

O

=

< = O R B; < (1 −

=

−

;

)(G ; ),

P

Q

H: = (∆= ) − : = (∆; )I
B= ≥

=

< = O R B; < (1 −

;

)(G ; ), only if ∝= ≥ 0

In cases 1a and 1b (i.e., negotiation) the only condition under which the
developer would not have to recourse to informal action is when : = (∆; ) >
: = (∆= ). As was mentioned previously, the payoff to the developer is always
more when the opposition takes no action. Consequently, in this case the
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developer always chooses from the informal strategy space. In case 3, which is
relevant to settlement, the developer will not take informal action only if the
transaction cost of informal action is more than zero. As this is always the case,
the developer never takes informal actions under these conditions. As a result, in
the game of perfect information the chance of getting to settlement is
theoretically equal to zero.
The last stage of the interaction includes all the terminal nodes (outcomes) of
the interaction. It integrates the initial decision of the opposition to take informal
action against the project, and there are three conditions under which the
opposition would not take action:
O

1)

O

a.

= =

B= <

< ,

P

O

b.

< O R B; < (1 −

Q ∝; + B; ≥ (1 −
=

B= ≥
=

B; ≥ (1 −

= =

B= <

=

−

;

)(G; ), O R ∝= +

= )H: ; (∆ )
;

< = O R B; < (1 −

− : ; (∆= )I,

; )(G ; ),

P

Q ∝; +

)H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I

incaseβY ≥ P(L)Y CY andβN < H1-P(N)N I(B N ), onlyif ∝N + βN ≥

2)

(1-P(L)Y ) bU N (∆N )-U N (∆Y )d
;

= =

B= <

a.

O

< O R B; ≥ (1 −

=

−

;

)(G; ),

P

Q ∝; ≥

H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I,
O

b.
P

Q ∝; ≥

3)
∝= + B= ≥

O

;

G; ,

=

< = O R B; ≥ (1 −

;

)(G ; ),

H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I
=

B= <
=

B= ≥

P

< = O R B; < (1 −

=

−

;

)G; , O R

Q ∝; ≥ H: ; (∆; ) − : ; (∆= )I

In the case of 1a and 1b, the opposition will not take any action against the
project only if the sum of the transaction costs for informal and formal actions is
more than the product of the opposition winning the litigation and the absolute
value of dispute for the opposition. The cases of 2a and 2b occur only if the
transaction costs of informal action for the opposition are more than the product
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of the probability of the developer winning the negotiation and the absolute value
of the dispute for the opposition. And finally in the last case, the situation occurs
only if the cost of informal action for the opposition is more than or equal to the
absolute value of the dispute for the opposition.

Table 5.2 Summary of the Conditions for Each Terminal Node Outcome in IA(1)
Y

F /~F

Y

B= ≥

B= <

N

F /~F
=

=

<

=

<=

N

Y

IF /~IF

B; ≥ (1 −

;

)G

B; < (1 −

;

)G;

Y

N

IF /~IF

;

B; ≥ (1 −

=

−

;

)G;

B; < (1 −

=

−

;

)G;

;

∝= + B= ≥

=

<=

∝= + B= <

=

<=

N

Outcomes
;

∝; ≥
G
; ;
∝; <
G
∝; + B; ≥ G;
∝; + B; < G;
∝; ≥ ; G;
∝; < ; G;
∝; ≥ G ;
∝; < G ;
∝; + B; ≥ (1 − = )G;
∝; + B; < (1 − = )G;

sq
ng
sq
pm
sq
ng
sq
pm
sq
lg

Table 5.2 is a summary of the conditions and the consequent terminal node
outcomes. Each actor will decide on formal and informal actions based on their
transaction costs while comparing them with the expected payoffs. This table can
be used as a risk assessment guideline at the planning stage of projects
considering the distributions of payoffs, the probabilities of winning litigation and
negotiation, and the estimated transaction costs. Changes in the value of the
variables of the interaction result in switching the outcome state and the
consequent payoff. Based on the distribution of variables the social opposition
risk can be quantified as the distribution of the payoff for each actor. Since this
chapter aims to investigate behavioral patterns in the case of social opposition
interaction in construction projects, next the equilibria of the interaction will be
simulated. The impact of informal actions on the risk of the project is emphasized
to understand the effectiveness of soft actions in each scenario as risk mitigation
strategies.
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5.5

Simulation of the Interaction

Simulation facilitates observation of the behavior of complex, interactive
systems under a wide range of conditions and allows for the comparison of
emergent outcomes under alternative approaches (Ioannou and Martinez 1996,
Law and Kelton 1991). Past studies of the dynamics of public participation in
decision-making were lacking application of analytic and simulation methods
(Dietz and Stern 2008). In this current study the simulation aims to study two
types of variation within the model: 1) structural variation of the model and 2)
contextual variation within the model.

Figure 5.2 Meta-model for Selection of Interactional Structures

Structural variation of the model results from the strategy selection by the
actors. The goal of investigating structural variations is to observe the impact of
different strategies on the outcome of the interaction. It involves comparison with
interactional structures that are framed differently from the proposed interactional
structure, e(%) . Therefore, alternative interactional structures can be developed
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and compared with each other to find the best combination of strategies that
responds to the dynamics of each case (Fig. 5.2).

Table 5.3 Summary of Conditions for Each Terminal Node in IA(2)
Y

Y

F /~F
B= ≥ = < =
B= <

= =

<

N

N

F /~F
B; ≥ G ;
B; < G ;
B; ≥ (1 − = )G ;
βN < (1 − P Y )B N

Outcomes

sq
st
sq
lg

The development of each structure can be based on observations and
empirical case studies of the dynamics for each context. In the case of social
movement against a construction project the opposition itself initiates the game;
and creating structural variation simply includes adding one stage before the
initial node. As depicted in Figure 5.2, this stage involves the opposition’s
decision about the structure of the game. Therefore, the first move of the
opposition group sets the structure for interaction. In the study of social
opposition against construction projects the proposed interaction, ( e(%) ), was
compared to another alternative structure of the interaction, e(-) , when the
actors are deprived of (or choose not to recourse to) the choice of informal action
(Fig. 5.2). For example, in the case of Kedung Ombo dam project in Indonesia
the opposition pursued formal strategies in the form of legal actions from the first
stage of the interaction (Khagram 2004). This interaction can be reflected
through e(-) as the interaction does not involve informal strategies. However, in
the case of the Asahan dams in Indonesia the opposition started with informal
strategies such as petitions and campaigns and then moved to formal strategies
such as legal actions (Aditjondro 1998).
Through this comparison the impact of informal actions on the outcome of
dynamics is studied. In e(-) the strategy space f! for each actor i, such that
= N, Y , is f! = J, ~J . As can be observed in the case of formal confrontation
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game, ( e(-) ), there is no negotiation or plan modification and the terminal node
outcomes are limited to status quo, settlement, and litigation (Fig. 5.2). Table 5.3
presents the equilibria, as the conditions of this game, along with consequent
terminal node outcomes.
On the other hand, each structure of the game can be studied individually to
analyze contextual variables. Changes in contextual variables can create
different scenarios within a single structure of the game. The contextual changes
can create a variety of challenges in the implementation of public participation
strategies (Dietz and Stern 2008). This analysis can assist strategy developers
with modeling each context and the associated strategies. Khagram (2004)
suggested that higher degrees of social mobilization and democracy in each
context provide extensive foundations for further involvement of opposition in the
decision-making process. Under such conditions anti-facility groups find it easier
to mobilize, engage in formal and informal actions against the developer, and
recruit external allies to bolster their cause. Contextual variation of the model
provides a basis to infuse the characteristics of these contexts through lower
formal and informal transaction costs and better chances of winning the
negotiation and litigation. The proposed interactional structures ( e(%) , e(-) ) of
opposition to construction projects are simulated for four different scenarios. In
this study the contexts vary in terms of the transaction costs of formal actions, B;
and B= , as well as the cost of the requested change for the developer < = . These
scenarios represent the cases of hydroelectric project development in the
countries with high degree of social mobilization, while the degree of democracy
increases through the understudied period as a result of democratization. This
pattern is regularly observed in several countries such as Brazil or Indonesia
(Khangram 2004), while in most cases the development of hydroelectric dams
were influenced directly by these changes. Other variables remain the same
within the four scenarios.
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The combination of each set of variables is a scenario that depicts different
contexts in the real world to examine the effectiveness of different policies. For
example, in the context of France the cost of formal action such as a lawsuit or
licensing challenge against a nuclear project might be high, while in the United
States the transaction cost of the same formal action against a plant remains
rather low. On the other hand, changes in the value of < = indicate the range of
requested change in the scope of project from the opposition and its impact on
the interactional dynamics. For example, in Indonesia in the case of
Kotopamjamg dam the opposition demanded partial modification of the dam,
while the opposition was completely against the construction of dams on Tandui
River (Aditjondro 1998). These contextual nuances can help each actor to
observe the dynamics associated with every specific context and impact of
mitigation strategies in each context.

Table 5.4 Variables Fixed Among All Scenarios, in the scale of 0 to 1
α(Y)
α(N)
P(N)
P(L)
UN(∆N)
UN(∆Y)
UY(∆Y)

Uniform(0,0.05)
Uniform(0,0.05)
Normal(Mean=0.5, SD=0.16)
Normal(Mean=0.35, SD=0.16)
1
0
1

Some assumptions are shared between the scenarios. In all the scenarios
the expected payoff of the opposition is initially equal to zero (: ; (∆= ) = 0) and if
its request is ratified the expected payoff would be equal to the unit (: ; (∆; ) = 1).
Initially the expected payoff of the developer is equal to the unit (: = (∆= ) = 1); but
if it ratifies the request of the opposition, its expected payoff would fall
somewhere between zero and one (0 ≤ : = (∆; ) < 1). Therefore, the absolute
cost of requested change is between zero and one (0 < < = ≤ 1) and the absolute
value of the request for the opposition is equal to the unit G ; = 1. Considering
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the expected payoff between zero and the unit is the result of normalization of
each actor’s payoff with the maximum payoff of the same actor. The rationale for
using the normalized value is to align the degree of importance of payoffs for
each actor regardless of its size. This assumption implies that half of the budget
of a small opposition group is relatively as important for the opposition as is the
half of the budget of the developer for the developer, despite the numerical
significance of the budget of the developer compared with the opposition. The
absolute value of the request for the opposition can be associated with the
compromise on demands for impact mitigation in the case of a not in my back
yard (NIMBY) protest, public appeal resources in the case of political parties, or
outreach, funds, and donations in the case of transnational organizations or
movements. On the other hand, the absolute cost of the request for the
developer represents the costs associated with plan modifications, reductions in
the scope of projects, or delays.
The cost of informal actions is assumed to be lower than the 5% of the initial
payoff of the developerH0 < (A; , A= ) < 0.05: = (∆= )I with the uniform distribution.
Furthermore, the probability of winning the litigation for the developer is
considered to have a normal distribution with the mean of 0.5 and the standard
deviation of 0.16, while the probability of winning the negotiation for the
opposition is considered slightly lower at normal distribution with a mean of 0.35
and a standard deviation of 0.16 (Table 5.4).

Table 5.5 Variables Changing Among Scenarios in the scale of 0 to 1
Variables
UY(∆N)
β(N)
β(Y)

1st Scenario
Uniform(0,1)
Uniform(0,0.5)
Uniform(0,0.5)

2nd Scenario
Uniform(0,1)
Uniform(0,0.2)
Uniform(0,0.2)

3rd Scenario
Uniform(0,0.5)
Uniform(0,0.5)
Uniform(0,0.5)

4th Scenario
Uniform(0,0.5)
Uniform(0,0.2)
Uniform(0,0.2)

Simulations of each scenario were conducted using matched pairs of random
variables to cancel the effect of the changes in the random variables in the
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comparison of the two alternative games. Matched pairs simulation synchronizes
the effect of uncertainty for both alternative interactional structures (Ioannou and
Martinez 1996). As a result, the comparison only reflects the impact of structural
or variable variation in the behavior of the models. As stated above, the two
structures of the model are simulated for four scenarios as following (Table 5.5):
1. The first scenario involves relatively high transaction costs for formal
actions and the complete range of the modification request from the opposition.
For this case the uniform distribution was considered for the cost of formal action
in the range of 0 to 0.5.
2. The second scenario involves cases with relatively low transaction costs
for formal actions and the complete range of the modification request from the
opposition. The difference between scenario one and two is the cost of formal
actions, which in this case is a uniform distribution in the range of 0 to 0.2.
3. The third scenario involves relatively high transaction costs for formal
action with a large sized modification request. This is the equivalent of scenario
one while being truncated for only significant modification requests. It translates
into cases where the opposition requests significant modification in the scope of
the project and alters the payoff of the developer by more than half of the initial
plan.
4. The fourth scenario involves relatively low transaction costs for formal
actions and a modification request of considerable size. This is the equivalent to
the second scenario while, like the third scenario, it is truncated to exclude
opposition requests with extreme impacts on the developer.
The first and third scenarios reflect the dynamics of hydroelectric
infrastructure development in Brazil from the late 60s to the late 80s, while the
second and fourth scenarios reflect the cases of hydroelectric infrastructure
development in Brazil after the late 80s. As suggested by Khagram (2004), in the
later period the degree of democracy increased in this context.
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In order to compare the two structures within each scenario, the final payoffs
of each actor are plotted for e(%) on the X-axis against e(-) on the Y-axis.
Figure 5.3 provides the result of this comparison for 1000 simulation runs. The
comparison of structures e(%) and e(-) provides a basis to assess the decision
of the opposition on strategy selection so as to initiate the interaction with formal
or informal actions. Visual observation of the graphs indicates that the opposition
has a cluster of cases that strongly favors application of informal model e(%) .
Several cases in the development of dams in Indonesia and Brazil such as the
case of the Kedung Ombo dam confirms this result, as the opposition was not
successful in cases that they pursue interactional structure e(-) . The rest of the
cases are clustered around the 45° line, indicating indifference with slight
inclination to use of e(%) . The developer exhibits a clustered payoff around the
45° line, although there is a slight preference towards formal interactional
structure e(-) .
Four metrics to analyze each graph in Figure 5.3 was looked at, including the
percentage of cases below the 45° line, the average and variance of the
difference between the two alternative structures, the distribution of outcomes for
each actor, and the total number of each terminal node. The percentage of the
cases below 45° line indicates the degree of preferring e(%) (and hence the
informal action) for each actor. However, merely counting the numbers below the
diagonal line is not sufficient to understand the dynamics. The complementary
indicator is the magnitude of the differences in payoffs between the two
structures, or the cost implications of each structure. The average and variance
of the differences was used within the simulation results to display the extent of
preference or the cost implication of choosing each structure as a strategy. In
order to have a comparable tool for common risk assessment approaches in
projects the distribution of outcomes is also presented as a risk profile for each
scenario. The distribution of outcome provides quantified assessment for the risk
of social opposition to projects. Figure 5.4 depicts the distribution of outcomes as
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a risk profile of the developer for each structure within the four scenarios. Finally,
the number of each terminal node outcome for each scenario is counted. The
results of the analysis as well as their practical implications are discussed next.

Table 5.6 Preferences of Interactional Model IA(1)
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Scenarios
Percentage of preference
0.82
0.55
0.77
0.42
Actor N
0.50
0.32
0.52
0.30
Actor Y
Average magnitude of preference
0.193
0.072
0.178
0.052
Actor N
0.027
0.003
0.054
0.002
Actor Y

5.6

Discussion and Practical Implications

In the case of infrastructure development, social embeddedness is a major
challenge to deliver sustainable projects (Khagram 2004, Aldrich 2010, McAdam
et al. 2010). The main reason for the enormity of this challenge rests on a lack of
understanding of the dynamics resulting from social opposition. As stated before,
project planners often develop their strategies in a normative or static manner
and hence lack a clear methodology to forecast emergent dynamics. Simulation
of the interaction provides a foundation to understand the dynamics of social
opposition and the associated risk, as the decision models need to reflect a
decision space including multiple decision makers.
The first metric used for the comparison of different structures is the
percentage of cases in 1000 simulation runs that each actor prefers e(%) to e(-)
or is indifferent to the two structures. As can be observed in the first two rows of
table 5.6, the preference of both actors for e(%) reduces in the second and fourth
scenarios where the cost of formal action is relatively low. For actor Y (the
developer) the indifference changes into preference for e(-) . Observation of
Figure 5.3, however, suggests that actor Y is still marginally indifferent as the
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data points are clustered around the 45° line. The complementary metric as the
magnitude of the difference confirms this observation, as the magnitude of
difference in the second and fourth scenarios is still positive and close to zero as
seen in table 5.6.

Table 5.7 Potential Outcomes as Terminal Nodes (Percentage)
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Scenarios
Interactional Model IA(1)
Status Quo
0.02
0
0.02
0
Plan Modification
0.50
0.26
0.27
0.03
Negotiation
0.37
0.36
0.54
0.44
Settlement
0
0
0
0
Litigation
0.12
0.39
0.19
0.53
Interactional Model IA(2)
Status Quo
0.09
0.01
0.12
0.01
Settlement
0.51
0.23
0.26
0.02
Litigation
0.40
0.77
0.62
0.97

Based on the metric of average magnitude of preference and graphs in
Figure 5.3 it can be concluded that even in the cases of low transaction cost for
formal action, actor Y slightly prefers e(%) to e(-) , while otherwise it strongly
favors the e(%) . Furthermore, review of the terminal node outcomes within the
simulation reveals that e(%) substantially reduces the cases of litigation and
increases the cases of negotiation and plan modification for all scenarios (see
Table 5.7). Khagram (2004) and Aditjondro (1998) indicated that the observed
data exhibits an increase in the cases of litigation in Indonesia and Brazil.
For risk assessment purposes the outcome of the project is presented as the
average of the final payoffs for each actor in 1000 simulation runs. As mentioned
above, social opposition risk can be quantified as the difference between the
predicted outcome of the complex system of systems (here equal to 1) and the
resulted outcome (as the result of simulations in table 5.8).
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Indicating the IA(2)
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For example, in the first scenario the payoff of actor Y (the developer) decreases
to 0.634 in e(-) while e(%) reduces this risk by 0.027 (see Table 5.8).
Further, the distribution of outcomes as an indicator for the risk pattern of
social opposition reveals substantial risk reduction in the case of e(%) for high
costs of formal action (first and third scenarios) as the graphs in Figure 5.4
moves towards the right. The risk pattern in the cases of high costs of formal
action does not reveal any observable pattern.
The results indicate the cost benefits from informal actions with a more
tangible impact in cases of high transaction costs for formal actions. The rational
developer in the case of complete information is relatively indifferent to recourse
to informal actions with its slightly positive cost consequences. As negotiation
advantages were not considered within the model and both actors were assumed
homogeneous within the model, this behavior may be attributed to the fact that
the developer is reacting (rather than initiating) within the model as the opposition
starts the action against the project.

Table 5.8 Average Outcome of Actor Y (in the scale of 0 to 1)
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Scenarios
IA(1)
0.661
0.679
0.524
0.539
0.634
0.677
0.469
0.537
IA(2)

Finally, the cost of formal action may be a significant determining factor in the
decision to opt for informal action. For example, scholars have illuminated how
the institutional and governmental structures in France have created strong
deterrents to formal action against nuclear power plants. Anti-nuclear movements
find it difficult to obtain“standing” in the courts and also in finding sympathetic
judges willing to take lawsuits seriously (Aldrich 2010, Boyle 1998). Under such
conditions where opposition groups find it difficult to reach decision-makers
through standard, institutional channels, they may move their mobilization into
informal channels instead.
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In order to gauge the accuracy of the model in reflecting the emergent
dynamics of social opposition in construction projects, validation and verification
was performed as suggested by Law and Kelton (1991). The interactional model,
its equilibria, and definition of payoffs for terminal nodes first were discussed with
game theory experts to validate their theoretical robustness. Subsequently, the
performance of the simulation model was verified to ensure that it mirrored the
equilibria of the game. Pilot runs were performed with predetermined inputsoutputs to ensure that the simulation reflected the equilibria. The next step
involved validating the interactional model and its simulations to test its level of
accuracy in reflecting the purpose of the research. This chapter proposed an
interactional analysis of emergent dynamics associated with social opposition
risk in a complex system of systems such as a construction project. Through
case analyses of real world phenomena in the cases of dam construction in
Brazil it was found that the model approximated empirical reality. The case study
accompanied examples of other infrastructure in other parts of the world such as
the case of the nuclear construction in France.
Nevertheless, the current structure of the proposed model has a number of
limiting factors. The assumptions include the rationality of each actor in
maximizing its payoff. It was believed that this supposition needs more
deliberation, specifically in the case of opposition groups where the informality of
these actors is coupled with varying motivations and power networks (Sikkink
2002). Further, the interactional model is based on the assumption of complete
information, and the elimination of a settlement possibility from the informal game
comes from this assumption (Tab. 5.7). Moreover, the game remains confined to
two actors with the impact of other actors not considered explicitly in this
interaction. Finally, the interactions have been modeled with a focus on payoffs
instead of utilities; using utilities at the terminal nodes would integrate preferential
attributes of actors within the decision framework. The limitations and
assumptions are vital to understand the extent of the validity of the model. The
goal of the interactional model was to design a simple framework with clear
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assumptions to showcase the methodology and its suggested application. The
framework can be modified and developed for other cases of emergent risk
associated with the interactional dynamics of a complex system of systems (Fig.
3.3). As shown in the structure of the model, it can be varied depending on the
observations from each real case. Similarly, the variables can be changed to
reflect a wide range of empirical and contextual observations. These flexibilities
are integrated within the model with the hope for its actual implementation in the
decision–making process, as the ultimate step in development of the model is to
establish its credibility through its application in the decision-making process
(Law and Kelton 1991).

5.7

Conclusions

Although this chapter discusses the emergent dynamics of social opposition
and compares informal and formal strategies in this interaction, its primary
purpose was to showcase the methodology to analyze emergent risks in a
complex system of systems. Infrastructure development, as a complex system of
systems, faces several emergent dynamics that impact the consequence of
projects despite detailed technical designs and plans. Improving sustainability of
infrastructures through reducing the impact of emergent dynamics requires
identifying the sources of the complexities and illuminating their interactions. The
interactional models were introduced to study dynamic emergence in complex
systems of systems such as infrastructure projects, shifting the emphasis of
analysis from the actors (the vertices of a network) to their interactions (the
edges of a network). The focus was on the power dimension of interactions
between the actors to address their emergent dynamics, and the methodology
was applied as a proof of concept to study social opposition against construction
projects.
The equilibria of the interaction were developed to model the scenarios
defined by transaction costs, the magnitude of the dispute for the project
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developer, and the chances of winning litigation and negotiation. Interactional
models can be used at different levels of project planning, and strategy
development for firms, as well as public sector and governance at the global level.
While this chapter has narrowed its discussion to the first two, in the long term
the focus of this sort of analysis can improve policy-making and governance.
Simulations of the interactional model for the different scenarios suggested
measurable impacts for the informal strategies on the risk of social opposition for
both actors, although they were different in scales. Several steps have been
taken to enhance the confidence level in the simulation. The comparative
analysis provided a case to simulate multiple contexts and observe the changes
in risks based on the deviation of variables. Besides, the simulation was tested
for extreme cases to observe the outcome and its variations. However, to
enhance the confidence of the model there is need for further applications and
case studies. The equilibria can be simulated similarly for any specific context
and a sensitivity analysis of each variable may provide the scheme of impact for
each variable. Further, the proposed structure can be altered for cases of
different sub-games such as different legal dynamics or completely different
interactions among other actors in the complex system of systems.
This analysis increases the transparency of the planning stages of
controversial construction projects, raising the cost of opportunistic behavior from
all actors. Such transparency can help both project developers and opposition
groups to avoid cost, time, and energy consuming confrontations and provides a
basis for compromise and integration of the project. This study is an initial step in
analytical

study

of

the

emergent

behaviors

of

complex

infrastructure

developments in terms of social sustainability. Hopefully this model will serve as
the first stage in reducing these conflicts to develop more sustainable
infrastructures.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Requirements for construction projects have changed drastically to address
the increasing need for the service of these projects, as well as the higher
requirements and standards. For example, there is an increasing need for energy
infrastructure to address the upsurge in the energy consumption, while at the
same time projects need to meet higher sustainability standards to ensure
prolonged resources for the generations to come. As a result there is a need for
more robust projects to satisfy the increasing demand, withstand exogenous
fluctuations, and ensure the prolonged resources. To achieve higher levels of
robustness, complexity of construction projects have increased in multiple
dimensions such as institutional diversity of actors and their interactions.
However, projects perform poorly and face several emergent dynamics in the
form of social opposition, regulatory issues, political power games, or conflicts.
Based on the literature of complex systems, increasing complexity of projects to
achieve certain robustness results in more fragility towards cascading failures
such as the emergent dynamics. Performance paradox (Flyvbjerg et al. 2013)
points to poor performance of complex infrastructure projects in terms of
sustainability despite the upsurge in the number and complexity of projects. This
dissertation aims to elucidate this paradox through the lens of complex system of
systems. Additionally, it provided the methodology of interactional analysis as a
quantitative and descriptive approach to assess emergent dynamics associated
with the interaction of institutionally diverse actors as the missing link in
performance paradox. It further provides a framework to develop and assess
actions to mitigate risks associated with these emergent dynamics at the policy
and strategy level. The methodology can be integrated within the existing risk
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analysis techniques within the construction industry to address the increasing
requirements of construction projects in terms of capacity and sustainability.

Figure 6.1 Final Framewrok for Integration of IA with Current Risk Assessment
Techniques
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6.1

Research Summary

The objective of this research was to provide a descriptive and
quantitative methodology to analyze emergent dynamics associated with
interactions within a complex system of systems. The proposed methodology
has been further developed for risk analysis in construction projects.
Therefore, this methodology assists project planners to: 1) frame emergent
risks associated with the interactions in complex construction projects, 2)
quantify risks at the policy level, 3) quantify risks at the strategy level, 4)
develop mitigation policies and assess their effectiveness in terms of reducing
the emergent risk, and 5) develop mitigation strategies and assess their
impact.
The study reviewed definition of complexity in the literature with the focus
on construction projects and established its emphasis on institutional diversity
of these projects and the associated interactions. It further reviewed the
concept of emergence as a property of the complex system of systems and
its implication in construction projects. Additionally, the concept of
performance paradox suggested by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) was reexamined
within construction projects in view of the literature of complex systems. It
was argued that the increasing complexity of projects aims to enhance
robustness of projects, while the poor performance was the resulted fragility
associated with the increasing complexity of the system in the form of
emergent dynamics.
In order to address the emergent dynamics associated with the
interaction in complex construction projects the study frames interactions
according to the concept of power relations in social science. In this study the
scope was limited to the interaction between two actors to provide clear
understanding of the concept. The framework including ten interactional
elements was integrated into the definition of risk as multiple expected
scenarios, their associated likelihoods, and consequences. This framing of
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risk provided a methodological platform to define the cases of emergent
dynamics associated with the interactions in a complex system of systems
(Figure 6.1).
The

proposed

framework

provides

a

methodological

descriptive

framework to identify risks. In order to have an assessment of the risk the
quantification is performed at two different levels of policies and strategies.
The mitigation at the policy level is a guideline for the direction of the
mitigation actions and does not provide detail mitigation actions with their
sequences. This detail level of analysis is performed at the strategy level with
focus on each sequence of interaction, the alternative actions at that
sequence, and outcomes at each stage of the interaction.
The policy level analysis applies the framework of emergent risks
associated with the interactions and quantifies the likelihood of the risk based
on the bargaining game between the two actors. It applies the normal form of
games which is suitable for the analysis at the policy level. In this sense the
risk will be linked to the dominant action and one actors aims to control the
action of the other actor to mitigate the risks associated with the dominant
action of the interaction, i.e., the scope of power. The quantification is
therefore shaped according to the power balance between the two actors.
The quantification at the policy level is based on the degree of complexity
of the interaction. Accordingly, the assessment models the interaction for
unilateral and bilateral interactions. The input of the analysis in this step is the
utility value that each actor associates with different states of the scenario as
well as reward and penalty mechanisms. The analysis is accomplished with
the consequences associated with each scenario of the dominant action and
would include detailed descriptive and quantitative profile of risk through
scenarios, likelihoods, and consequences.
Furthermore, mitigation policies would be developed through two different
approaches based on interactional elements and mathematical functions of
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the interactions. The impact of each alternative mitigation policy can be
similarly quantified to observe the changes in the outcome of the project as
the risk profile associated with the respective scenarios.
Accordingly, multiple prospective scenarios can be developed and
simulated along with different alternative mitigation policies to assist the
decision makers to manage emergent dynamics. Development of potential
scenarios is based on the experience of experts along with the data on any
specific project. The list of potential scenarios and the associated result of
simulation as a spectrum of outcomes helps the decision maker with a better
understanding of potential emergent risks and their associated dynamics.
As stated the previous level only provides directions in the form of policy
to mitigate emergent risks in complex construction projects. For more detailed
analysis of actions at different stages of the interaction, the methodology
provides the analysis at the strategy level. This level of analysis helps
decision makers with the assessment of scenarios while scenarios are
defined at the action level considering different sequences of the interaction.
Besides, certain characteristics of each strategy are determined in the model
to analyze the impact of alternative mitigation strategies on the overall risk of
the project.
In order to analyze risk at the strategy level the interaction was modeled
as an extensive game between the two actors. This extensive game is then
solved using the concept of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Scenarios of
risk are modeled based on structural and contextual variations. Structural
variations are made by different sequences of interaction or different
combination of strategies. Contextual variations, on the other hand, are made
through changes in the input of the variables. The combination of these two
categories of variations results in different scenarios that can be simulated
and quantified based on the equilibria of the interaction. Changes in the
variables may be a reflection of the changes in the interactional elements,
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such as the change in the base of power from financial to legal and
authoritative that can change the transaction cost of actions. It can also be
the result of changes in the context of the interaction, such as changes in the
national policies of the home country that increases the transaction cost of
certain actions.
Similar to policy level analysis, mitigation strategies can be developed
and applied to analyze the impact of diverse strategies. In this case mitigation
strategies are defined as a set of strategies that together shape different
structures of the game and cover different sequences of the interaction.
Additionally, each strategy is defined by its contextual variables such as
transaction costs and each strategy may be represented by changes in these
variables to model an array of strategies to mitigate the risk of emergent
dynamics.

Figure 6.2 IA Procedures

The combination of all the proposed steps as a consolidated framework
can provide a comprehensive methodology to provide a descriptive and
quantitative

analysis

of

the

emergent

dynamics

(Figure

6.2). This

comprehensive methodology can be integrated into the existing planning
procedures to add different dimension of analysis to project plans and provide
decision makers with a descriptive and quantitative analysis of associated
risks.
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6.2

Research Limitations

To develop a methodological approach to analyze emergent dynamics
associated with the interaction in complex system of systems, the modules and
sub-sections of the model start with minimal complexity. At the outset, the model
focused on the interaction of two actors in a complex system of systems to
observe the emergent outcome and the accuracy of the model to reflect them.
This deliberate choice reflects the fact that the study focuses on the concept,
methodology, and its application while complexity of the model can increase
gradually as required. Impact of interactions in a complex network of project was
considered as exogenous and has been integrated into the analysis through
associated variables. However, the impact of other directions on any specific
actor is synergic and simply integrating them through variables may result in
ignoring synergies and emergent dynamics at a higher level of complexity.
At both policy and strategy levels, the actors were assumed to be rational
actors that seek to increase their utility and payoff, respectively. This approach to
model rationality simplifies decision space by assuming that the decision maker
has complete knowledge of the choices and dynamics of the decision, has clear
preferences, has perfect ability to choose optimal actions, and is indifferent to
logically equivalent choices (Rubinstein 1998). Similar to the focus on two actors,
this assumption shifted the emphasis of the analysis to the concept, its
application, and results instead of computational complexity. In the bargaining
model at the policy level, the decision maker is assumed to be aware of the
scenarios, utility values associated with different scenarios, and the alternative
choices of the other actors. At the extensive game at the strategy level the
decision maker is assumed to know different structures of the game, outcomes,
preferences of the other actor, and variables such as transaction costs, and
probabilities of winning negotiation or litigation. Besides, at the policy level and
strategy level the actors were assumed to make decisions only based on utility
and payoff maximization. However, in reality actors do not possess a clear

137
preference system, are not able to calculate optimal decisions, and are not
indifferent to the selection of logically equal choices. Integrating the concept of
bounded rationality can increase the accuracy of the methodology to reflect
emergent dynamics of a complex system of systems. This integration, however,
is based on the field data of the problem and may be different for any specific risk.
For example, in order to integrate the bounded rationality in the case of social
opposition there is a need for detail analysis of the behavioral patterns of
opposition. This pattern might be different for risks associated with claims,
regulatory risks, or other emergent risks of interactional nature.

6.3

Intellectual Merits

The intellectual merits of this study are beyond the construction industry and
extend to analysis of emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics in
any complex system of systems. The study is organized in three major steps: 1)
identification and formulation of emergent risks associated with interactions in a
complex system of systems 2) quantification of the emergent risks 3)
development and assessment of the effectiveness of mitigation policies and
strategies. The major steps are accompanied by extensive literature review of
risk, institutional theory, power, construction planning, system of systems,
complex systems, emergence, international business, game theory, and
simulation. Among others, some intellectual merits of the study are:
i.

Simulation of social and political dynamics: in the field of construction

simulation is mainly focused to construction operations including fleet
management, construction process optimization, productivity of workers, etc.
Extending the application of simulation to social and political dynamics
associated with construction projects is important for several reasons: i) recent
observations indicate that social and political dynamics are the major determinant
of the fate of projects, ii) social and political dynamics are considered emergent
and almost completely ignored from planning stages, iii) applying same

138
methodologies to assess this risk reduces the boundary obstacles to introduce
this assessment into construction practices.
ii.

Integrating knowledge of social science into a problem of engineering

nature: the interdisciplinary nature of the problem requires combination of
expertise from different fields. This holistic approach will add to the depth of the
solution and contributes to understanding of the problem, delivering more specific
solution to what is a global problem. Integrating knowledge of diverse fields into
common practices of construction industry in a collaborative manner to fit the
methodology within the existing techniques reduces the challenges of applying
the innovative concept within the industry.
iii.

Paradigm shift in analysis of synergies: Several research have been

performed to evaluate synergies of Joint Ventures (JV), contractor-owner
relationships, etc (e.g. Kumaraswamy 1997, Loosemore and McCarthy 2008).
The focal point of these studies is their focus on contractual interactions. Shifting
the focus to power relations will add a new dimension to evaluation of
interactions. It will provide broader application arena for studying interactions.
The proposed methodology offers a new approach to reassess resources and
mechanisms used in any synergic relationship such as a Joint Venture.
Furthermore, project actors who diversify their resources and mechanisms as an
analytical move can apply the methodology, for example, in the case of a
contractor that seeks local embeddedness.
iv.

Provision of a bridge to traditional risk assessment methods in

construction: Traditional methods of risk assessment in construction industry
underrated the real causal sources of emergent dynamics. On the other hand,
qualitative researches neglect risk assessment models common in construction
research. This study attempted to reduce that gap through connecting risk
assessments presented by traditional models to interactional elements and
strategic alternatives. Therefore, it narrowed the gap between social science
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oriented research in construction and traditional management oriented research
through collaborative study.
v.

Facilitating

the

application

of

institutional

theory

in

engineering:

Institutional diversity proved to be a major factor in global business environment
and global construction (Kostova (1996), Xu and Shenkar (2002), Mahaalingam
and Levitt (2007), Orr and Scott (2008)). Interactional Analysis (IA) facilitates the
integration of institutional arrangements into project strategy development
through institutional resources and mechanisms along with conventional
resources and mechanisms. Institutional elements can be regarded as a
significant resource for any actor within interplays of the strategic games. The
study has carefully explored, categorized, and defined interactional resources
and mechanisms. It provided an analytical approach for actors to recourse to
alternative resources or mechanisms as a modification to strategies.
vi.

New approach to analyze behavior of system of systems with emergent

behavior: emergent is an important property of the construction projects, as
agendas of the actors would evolve during the project. There are several
approaches to address evolution within systems. IA methodology integrates
evolution of basic resources and mechanisms into analysis through inclusion of
project phase for definition of unit of cases. This may facilitate casual explanation
of backward and forward evolution as well as lock-ins within the network of actors.
vii.

Aligning policy making in different hierarchical levels: the proposed

methodology can be applied to interactions of different actors within a project
rendering any actor with better understanding of consequences of policies. This
will help to align policies that actors choose from strategy sets, since strategies
will take more actors, broader resources, as well as evolutionary nature of the
project setting into account. While the construction project setting is a
disassortative network by nature, analysis of interactions reflected this
characteristic of the network by considering non-contractual interactions e.g.
interaction of NGO and project developer.
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viii.

Inclusion of the triple sustainability bottom-lines into initial roots of policy

and strategy development: interactional elements cover broad concepts that can
be added to policy making such as economical aspects, social and institutional
aspects, political aspects, etc. Integrating all factors within one framework avails
planners with more insights to prevent myopic plans and strategies. This
inclusion is facilitated through a multi-decision maker space that was developed
in this dissertation. Considering multiple actors and broader agendas within
different stages of project may avail more social and economical sustainable
project plans. As it was discussed in chapter 2 and 3, reflection of complexity in
decision models provides an inherent mechanism to increase sustainability of
infrastructure development.

6.4

Contributions to Practice

The main contribution of this methodology to practice may be: i) to increase
the transparency of decision making in construction projects, ii) to simulate
emergent dynamics associated with social and political dynamics and assist
planners in review of potential dynamics, iii) provide a quantitative tool to
increase sustainability of projects and assess the impact of policies and
strategies.
The equilibria of emergent risks with clear assumptions and analysis provide
a descriptive decision making model that is supported by quantitative analysis.
Getting distance from existing culture of normative decision-making in
construction industry may help reducing conflicts and improving performance of
projects. As a result, this study will improve our understanding of complex
settings that involve synergies among project actors such as: project governance,
strategy development, conflict analysis, project integration planning.
The proposed analysis can be modified for the purpose of educating
community groups such as minorities to build resilience in the process of
integration within their network and search for appropriate resources and
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mechanisms that can help them to increase institutional integration. These
modifications would be made considering both the nature of the problem as well
as how the tool can communicate with the target actor (i.e. minority group).
To summarize, IA, developed initially for construction projects, not only aim
to be applied in cases of integrating construction projects within the social and
political contexts, it can be also applied to provide a common language for
different actors in any context that requires involvement of institutionally different
participants. The simple structure of the proposed approach will help creating
modified versions to broaden educational benefits while the analytical depth and
mathematical verification may help planners to analyze complex situations.

6.5

Recommendations for Future Research

The results of this study aim to contribute to the analysis of the emergent
dynamics of complex system of systems. The intellectual merits of IA involve a
paradigm shift in analysis of the emergent dynamics associated with interactions
within complex system of systems. Its contributions may help align different
hierarchical decision levels to build more coherent and sustainable relations
based on efficient interactions. In addition, it may increase the transparency of
decision-making in controversial construction projects. Accordingly, the cost of
opportunistic behavior from any actor would increase and the political difficulties
that continue to plague a number of large-scale infrastructure projects around the
world hopefully could be diminished.
Future research plans in the case of IA may expand the scope of the
methodology in an interdisciplinary collaborative, as it is applicable to a wide
range of issues within and outside the construction area. Three main areas of
future research may include:
i) further study of the multi-lateral risk dynamism to investigate patterns of
risk within the network of actors to assess: a) the behavioral patterns associated
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with interactional risk b) the dissemination of mitigation strategies within the
network c) the role of actors within the interactional network d) the resilience of
the interactional network in case of emergent actors and e) the systemic risk of
complex construction projects;
ii) test the application of interactional analysis for in-depth study of a variety
of interactional problems within construction, such as: a) interactional patterns in
the economical and cultural dimensions of safety, b) institutional exceptions as a
mechanism of interaction, and c) interactional analysis of counterfeiting risk in
construction.
Besides, the broader impact of the research may be extended for other areas,
including: homogeneous networks (e.g. financial network), urban and coastal
systems, transportation systems, energy networks, and disaster response
networks.
iii) develop a marketable tool for project planners, strategy developers, and
policy makers to analyze emergent dynamics associated with interaction of
complex system of systems such as complex infrastructure projects.
This research aimed to explore an innovative methodology for analysis of
emergent dynamics. The merit of this research will be further scrutinized through
its application in diverse areas and its expansion to more complex settings. As is
the nature of scientific approach, it is necessary to test, revise, refute, and verify
the theory to increase its benefit. Hence, I do hope that the future studies will
provide a clinical improvement for the proposed methodology.
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APPENDIX

Comparative Analysis of Emergence in Dam Construction
The proposed framework of interactional analysis is applied to study
emergence in construction of hydroelectric projects. In order to address
variations the case of emergent risks of social opposition is studied in the form of
a comparative analysis. The goal of the comparative analysis is to provide further
empirical validation of the proposed methodology. This validation is provided
through modelling different contexts for a wider range of variables and to observe
the variations in the outcome of the model. Ultimately, the performance of the
model is observed for different cases.

Description of the Contexts
The case study includes the interactional model of four comparative contexts
of dam construction. Khagram (2004) performed a case study of dam
construction based on two factors of the degree of democracy and the degree of
social mobilization. This analysis aims to model the four categories proposed in
Khagram (2004) based on the equilibria of the interaction between the two actors:
the project developer and the social opposition. The output of the comparative
analysis is the emergent risk associated with the interaction of these two actors
in each context. As Khagram (2004) indicated these four contexts provide a
range of outcomes to study dynamics of social opposition in different contexts.
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• Context 1: Low level of democracy and low level of social mobilization
In this context the mechanisms to impact the decision-making process is very
limited or non-existent, while any attempt to leverage decision-making is also
inhibited (Khagram 2004). Besides, different actors can not mobilize their action
and there is a minimal possibility to link to transnational organizations. Khagram
(2004) named China as an example of this context, while the public had
negligible participation in public decision-making and limited access to
transnational organizations. Jackson and Sleigh (2000) indicated the common
practice of involuntary resettlement and authoritarian measures of decisionmaking.
• Context 2: low level of democracy and high level of social mobilization
Although in this context campaigns can be formed through linking different
groups and mobilizing the society, the decision-making process is still top-down.
Khagram (2004) indicated the case of Indonesia as an inhibiting and repressive
context with the record of social movements against hydroelectric projects.
• Context 3: high level of democracy and low level of social mobilization
In this context the higher level of democracy and decentralized mechanisms
of decision-making lacks the strong domestic social mobilization (Khagram 2004).
As a result the linkage among different actors of the opposition such as the public
and transnational organizations is weak. Khagram (2004) discussed the case of
South Africa as an example of this context.
• Context 4: high level of democracy and high level of social mobilization
In this context the high level of social mobilization enables transnational
groups to form coalitions that oppose projects including public and nongovernmental organizations (Khagram 2004). The example of this context is the
case of Brazil, where building dams became extremely difficult.
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Interactional Model of the Comparative Cases
As it was exhibited within the examples at chapter 4 and 5, and according to
the flowchart of interactional analysis depicted in Fig. 3.5, interactional analysis
focuses on dynamics associated with a risk indicator, in this case social
opposition against dam construction. The analysis involves framing the emergent
risk and modelling the emergent dynamics at the policy and strategy levels for
each context. The framework of social opposition in construction projects,
presented in Table 4.3, is used in this comparative study. The first assumption in
the analysis is to consider the dynamics between the two actors as the project
developer and the opposition. The executor of power, as the project developer,
may involve the government, contractors, and financiers (such as World Bank or
Export Credit Agencies). The extent of power, as the opposition, may include the
public, the NGOs, as well as the transnational organizations (such as
International Rivers). Regardless of the combination of the two sides of
interaction, the study assumes a unitary actor for both actors, i.e., the project
developer and the opposition.

Interactional Analysis at the Policy Level
Assuming the equilibria of the bilateral interaction at the policy level of
analysis and considering the utility of the developer as the unit, the cost of
rewards and penalties are defined in proportion to the utility of the developer from
dam construction in general at each context. Similarly, the disutility of the
opposition is initially defined as the unit and the utility of rewards and penalties is
defined with reference to this utility. Based on the descriptive nature of the input,
each case is modelled with reference to standard cases that are presented in
section 4.6.
Associated Variables
As Khagram (2004) mentioned, the lower level of democracy is usually
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reflected through repression and penalties. Therefore, degree of democracy is
mathematically translated in the model through increase in the disutility of the
penalties (t). On the other hand, the social mobilization can be reflected in
increasing participation of local or transnational actors in decision-making.
Therefore, degree of social mobilization is mathematically translated into
increase in the disutility that the opposition associates with the project (x). This
assumption is based on the fact that social mobilization often empowers criticism
of the project and augments negative perceptions of the public towards these
projects. However, as suggested by Khagram (2004), and will be discussed
further in the analysis, the magnitude of this increase is significantly higher in
cases that transnational groups are involved.
Many researchers have discussed the insufficiency of compensations in dam
construction (Menezes 1991, Jackson and Sleigh 2000, Khagram 2004, Tilt et al.
2009, Wilmsen et al. 2011). Accordingly, the utility of reward (r) is considered to
be equal to 0.75. On the other hand, the cost of reward (r*) is assumed to be
equal to 0.06 which is equal to 6% of the utility of the project for the developer.
This value is justified based on case studies such as Myagase Dam in Japan:
(Hattori and Fujikura 2009). Finally, the cost of penalties for the developer (t*) is
assumed to be equal to 0.01, accounting for 1% of the utility of the developer
from the project. Accordingly, the likelihood of the emergent risk is calculated for
the four contexts suggested by Khagram (2004).
In order to reflect different degrees of democracy in the model, four ranges
for the disutility of penalty (t) are considered as: 0-0.25, 0.25-0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.751. In this case the disutility of penalty equal to the unit implies that the disutility of
penalty is equal to the disutility that the opposition associates with the project.
That is, if the opposition associates loss of $500,000 to the project because of
the resettlement, the utility of the penalty is also equal to $500,000 in the form of
cash penalty or law enforcement to repress the opposition.
In order to reflect the degree of social mobilization in the model, the risk is
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calculated for disutility of the opposition equal to one as the standard case and
then increased up to 10, that is, the social mobility increases the disutility of the
project to 10 times more than the base case. There is no case study to measure
the increase in disutility of the project as the opposition is mobilized. Logically,
the worst case is the infinity, which represents the cases that the opposition will
not comply regardless of penalties and rewards. However, the case studies such
as Menezes (1991) or Tilt et al. (2009) suggest that the compensation has a
ceiling that satisfies the opposition. In order to observe the outcome for a wide
range of disutility of opposition (x), the risk of social opposition at the policy level
is calculated for the value of x in the range of 1 to 50. After observing the results,
the ceiling was chosen to be 10 since it provided an acceptable range of risk
(close to 100% risk of social opposition). Therefore, the disutility of dam
construction for the opposition varies between 1 to 10 (x={1,…,10}).

Disutility of
penalty (t)

Table A.1 Risk of Social Opposition in Different Contexts (%)
0

0.645

0.833

0.895

0.926

0.945

0.958

0.966

0.973

0.978

0.983

0.25

0.520

0.770

0.853

0.895

0.920

0.937

0.949

0.958

0.964

0.970

0.5

0.395

0.708

0.812

0.864

0.895

0.916

0.931

0.942

0.951

0.958

0.75

0.270

0.645

0.770

0.833

0.870

0.895

0.913

0.926

0.937

0.945

1

0.020

0.520

0.687

0.770

0.820

0.853

0.877

0.895

0.909

0.920

1

2

3

8

9

10

4
5
6
7
Disutility of the project (x)

Results of the Interactional Analysis for Four Contexts
The risk is calculated based on the proposed variables and the equilibria of
the bilateral interaction at the policy level. The result of interactional analysis at
the policy level for dam construction in four contexts indicates extremely high risk
of social opposition in the context with higher degree of social mobilization and
democracy, such as Brazil, (upper right section of Tab. A.1) with the likelihood of
risk being more than 90%. The lower row of the table indicates the cases with
minimal social mobilization. As it can be observed these cases represent
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contexts such as China and exhibit a very low level of risk in some cases close to
zero (2% risk of social opposition). As mobilization of the public increases, while
moving right in the Tab. 5.9, the risk of opposition increases substantially.

Interactional Analysis at the Strategy Level
At the strategy level of analysis the interactional model IA(1) (Fig. 5.2) and its
equilibria (Tab. 5.2) is applied in the analysis. Therefore, the degree of
democracy is mathematically represented through the transaction costs
associated with formal actions and the degree of social opposition is
mathematically translated through transaction costs associated with informal
actions. In order to provide a full spectrum of potential dynamics in all the four
contexts, the equilibria of the game is simulated for different ranges of variables,
i.e., the transaction cost of formal actions and the transaction cost of informal
actions. The average payoff of each actor is obtained for all the cases to
compare risks in each context. Considering four data ranges for each of the
variables (transaction cost of formal and informal actions), sixteen simulations
has been performed, while each simulation includes 1000 runs. The results of
these simulations are displayed in Tab. 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. The conclusions of the
comparative case study performed by Khagram (2004) are compared to the
results of the simulation to provide another step in empirical validation of the
simulation.
Table A.2 Variables Fixed Among All Contexts, in the scale of 0 to 1
α(Y)
β(Y)
P(N)
P(L)
UN(∆N)
UN(∆Y)
UY(∆Y)

Uniform(0,0.05)
Uniform(0,0.25)
Normal(Mean=0.5, SD=0.16)
Normal(Mean=0.5, SD=0.16)
1
0
1
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• Context 1: Low level of democracy and low level of social mobilization
This context is mathematically modelled with the high transaction cost of
informal and formal actions for the opposition. Therefore, the transaction costs
for both formal and informal actions of the opposition (actor N in Tab 5.1) are
more than the half of the utility of the opposition H0.5: ; (∆; ) < (A; , B; ) <
: ; (∆; )I. Khagram (2004) concluded that in contexts with lower degrees of social
mobilization and democracy (e.g., China), changes in projects (or risk of social
opposition) is unlikely. In this context the developer is more likely to achieve its
expected payoff (lower left corner of Tab. A.3). Besides, the observation of
simulation results further confirms the minimal payoff for the opposition in
contexts with lower degrees of social mobilization and lower degrees of
democracy such as the case of China (lower left corner of Tab. A.4). Observation
of potential outcome nodes also indicates that in the contexts such as China, the
risk of facing litigation is negligible (lower left corner of Tab. A.5).

Table A.3 Payoff of the Deverloper in Each Pattern (0-1)
Beta(N)
0-0.25
0.25-0.5
0.5-0.75
0.75-1

0.953
0.989
0.993
0.993
0.75-1

0.845
0.898
0.921
0.921
0.5-0.75

0.689
0.743
0.768
0.777
0.25-0.5

0.661
0.699
0.723
0.732
0-0.25

Alpha(N)

• Context 2: low level of democracy and high level of social mobilization
Considering the equilibria of the interaction at the strategy level (Tab. A.2),
this context is modelled through high cost of informal actions and low cost of
formal actions. Therefore, the transaction cost of formal action is less than half of
the utility of the opposition: 0.5: ; (∆; ) < A; < : ; (∆; ) O R 0 < B; < 0.5: ; (∆; ).
Khagram (2004) argued that in contexts with low level of democracy and high
level of social mobilization, as well as contexts with high level of democracy and
low level of social mobilization, the results are mixed “with intermediate level of
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reform in dam construction”. The results of the simulation with the assumptions of
the variables presented at Tab. A.2 indicated a relatively high payoff for the
developer and relatively low payoff for the opposition (upper right side of Tab. A.3.
and Tab. A.4)
• Context 3: high level of democracy and low level of social mobilization
This context is modelled through high cost of formal actions and low cost of
informal actions. Therefore, mathematically the context is modelled with the
transaction cost of formal action less than the half of the utility of the opposition
and the transaction cost of the informal action more than the half of the utility of
the

opposition:

0.5: ; (∆; ) < B; < : ; (∆; ) O R 0 < A; < 0.5: ; (∆; ).

While

Khagram (2004) indicated mixed results in this context, the simulation indicated
some risks for the developer as the payoff of the developer is lower than the first
and second contexts (lower right section of the Tab A.3 and Tab. A.4)

Table A.4 Payoff of the Opposition in each Pattern (0-1)
Beta(N)
0-0.25
0.25-0.5
0.5-0.75
0.75-1

0.027
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.75-1

0.137
0.069
0.023
0.023
0.5-0.75

0.315
0.265
0.178
0.144
0.25-0.5

0.558
0.501
0.423
0.373
0-0.25

Alpha(N)

• Context 4: high level of democracy and high level of social mobilization
This context involves low cost of formal and informal actions for the
opposition. That is the transaction costs of formal and informal actions are less
that the half of the utility of the opposition H0 < (A; , B; ) < 0.5: ; (∆; )I. Khagram
(2004) suggested that in the contexts with higher degrees of social mobilization
and democracy, the project reforms are more likely (i.e., higher risk of social
opposition). The simulation results indicate lower payoff for the developer in
highly democratic and socially mobilized contexts such as India or Brazil (upper
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right corner of Tab. A.3), while the payoff of the opposition is significantly higher
than other contexts (upper right corner of Tab. A.4).
Table A.5 Number of Litigation Cases in each Pattern (0-1)
Beta(N)
0-0.25
0.25-0.5
0.5-0.75
0.75-1

0
0
0
0
0.75-1

26
0
0
0
0.5-0.75

131
9
0
0
0.25-0.5

155
26
2
0
0-0.25

Alpha(N)

Interactional Analysis at the Strategy Level
To summarize, the results of the simulation indicated that increase in the
disutility that the opposition associates with the project (as a proxy for the degree
of social mobilization) significantly increases the risk of social opposition.
Similarly, increase in the disutility of the penalty (as a proxy for the degree of
democracy) increases the risk of social opposition. Therefore, the risk of social
opposition can be quantified in any context that with the combination of
contextual variables.
Although the application of the proposed methodology provided a consistent
outcome with the conclusions that are made by Khagram (2004), it also indicated
several limitations. The most important limitation is the assigning of utilities and
disutilities. This shortcoming has been further explored through modeling
different cases in this comparative study and limited the sensitivity analysis of the
outcome considering a range of variables. However, to completely address this
shortcoming there is a need for complementary studies to determine the
behavioral patterns and preferences of different actors in these contexts.
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